James F. Redmond: An Urban Superintendent’s Response to Selected Challenges (1966-1975) by Reilly, John P.
Loyola University Chicago 
Loyola eCommons 
Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 
1991 
James F. Redmond: An Urban Superintendent’s Response to 
Selected Challenges (1966-1975) 
John P. Reilly 
Loyola University Chicago 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss 
 Part of the Education Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Reilly, John P., "James F. Redmond: An Urban Superintendent’s Response to Selected Challenges 
(1966-1975)" (1991). Dissertations. 2922. 
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/2922 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more 
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. 
Copyright © 1991 John P. Reilly 
JAMES F. REDMOND: AN URBAN SUPERINTENDENT/S RESPONSE TO 
SELECTED CHALLENGES <1966-1975) 
by 
John P. Reilly 
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the School of 
Education of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial 
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Education 
May 
1991 
John P. Re 111 y 
Loyola University of Chicago 
JAMES F. REDMOND: AN URBAN SUPERINTENDENT/S RESPONSE TO 
SELECTED CHALLENGES <1966-1975) 
The purpose of this study was to give a historical 
review of four challenges that were faced by James F. 
Redmond during his tenure as General Superintendent of 
Schools in Chicago. The study presents a brief review of 
challenges met during prior superintendencies in Chicago in 
the first chapter. 
Chapter II discusses the rising discontent for 
Redmond/s predecessor, Benjamin Willis, and the community's 
demand for a more empathetic leader. Redmond/s previous 
tenure in Chicago and his superintendencies in New Orleans 
and Syosset ~re also reviewed. 
Chapter III reviews the first challenge that Redmond 
encountered as superintendent. Upon his arrival in Chicago, 
Redmond immediately began to take part in Chlcago/s first 
collective bargaining with a recognized bargaining agent, 
the Chicago Teachers Union. The development of the Teachers 
Union as a powerful bargaining agent ls reviewed. The 
chapter then summarizes the difficulties encountered in the 
negotiating process through Redmond/s years as 
superintendent. 
Chapter IV gives a historical perspective of the 
development of the segregated school system that existed 
upon Redmond/s arrival. The remedy designed by the Redmond 
administration and the gains that were made in integrating 
the schools are discussed. 
Chapter V reviews the decentralization, both 
administratively and politically of the Chicago Pub! ic 
Schools. The Booz. Al Jen. & Hamilton Study is discussed 
with its impl !cations for the administration of the school 
system. 
Chapter VI discusses the Shared-Time Experiment that 
existed during the Wi 1 lis and Redmond administrations. This 
program offered private/parochial students the opportunity 
to attend certain classes in the public school. 
Chapter VII gives an assessment of the leadership style 
of Redmond as noted by his subordinates, an adversary, his 
Board of Education members, three leadership theorist, and 
Redmond himself. Chapter VII discusses how Redmond/s ideas 
and decisions have fared with the test of time. Chapter 
VIII is a summary and conclusions. 
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CHAPTER I 
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE CHICAGO SUPERINTENDENCY 
The purpose of this study is to explore the tenure of 
James F. Redmond as General Superintendent of Schools in 
Chicago. We wil I study four challenges Redmond faced during 
his years in off ice and investigate his solutions to the 
four chal Jenges. In order to better understand the 
difficulties that arose for the Redmond and his predecessors 
we shal I take a brief look at the administrations of 
previous superintendents. In the history of the Chicago 
public school system, the individuals who served as 
superintendent have had to face educational. social, and 
political problems. To provide examples of the problems 
they faced, Chapter I reviews the superintendencies in 
earlier administrations. Actually controversy arose in 
the school system prior to the appointment of the first 
superintendent of schools. In 1841, two years after the 
creation of their office, the seven school inspectors hired 
a music teacher at $16.00 per month, "because the children 
like to sing.'11 But in 1842 some parents suggested that 
this was an unnecessary extravagance and the teacher was 
dismissed. It was not unti 1 1854 that the school inspectors 
determined that it was necessary to hire a superintendent of 
1 Mary J. Herrick, The Chicago Public Schools: A Social and 
Political History (Beverly Hi 1 ls: Sage Publications, 1971), 
p.32. 
2 
schools "who would act as a kind of secretary to the school 
inspectors and bring order and unity to the school 
districts." 2 The first superintendent, John Dore, served 
for only two years <1854-1856). With his appointment as 
superintendent, he found no system of record keeping. His 
accomplishments included the introduction of school records 
and a daily attendance record for each child. He introduced 
common textbooks and asked the school inspectors to 
establ lsh a high school. Dore remarked that if the pub! ic 
now had a duty to provide public schools, then certainly 
parents had a responsibi 1 ity to see that their chi Jdren 
attend. Dore left the school system to enter business but 
later returned to public service as a state senator and as 
president of the fifteen-man Board of Education which had 
replaced the seven inspectors. 
Dore was succeeded by WI 11 lam Harvey Wei ls. Wei Is is 
referred to as "one of the most effective administrators in 
the early history of public education." 3 Upon his 
appointment Wells found i 11 prepared teachers in an ungraded 
system. His administration <1856-1864) enhanced the 
training of teachers by offering Saturday morning classes in 
teaching methods. He noted the important Job assigned to 
primary teachers and Insisted that they be paid equally with 
teachers of upper grades. Under his leadership a graded 
21.Qj_Q, 
SThi~ 39 ~·· p .• 
3 
system of elementary and high schools was initiated and a 
complete graded curriculum was established. According to 
Herrick, "Wells' book, A Graded Course of Instruction with 
Instructions to Teachers, gave detal led instruction on 
materials to be covered in each grade." 4 Wells was forced 
to resign his position as superintendent because of fai I ing 
health. His service to schools was acknowledged by a warm 
reception given in his honor by George Howland, principal of 
the high school, who read a resolution stating ''that his 
uniform kindness and encouragement have contributed very 
greatly to the pleasure as well as the success of the 
teachers in the public schools."~ Wei Is, I ike Dore, later 
returned to serve as president of the Board of Education 
between 1872 and 1874. 
Wei ls was succeeded in the off ice of superintendent by 
Josiah Pickard <1864-1877). Pickard's tenure was difficult 
in that he had to try to manage a school system through the 
end of the Civil War, a post-war depression, and a fire that 
nearly destroyed the city. Pickard's successor was Duane 
Doty <1877-1880). Doty had difficulty establishing rapport 
with his teachers because of a murder case related to his 
appointment as superintendent. He did, however, manage to 
gain approval for a plan to simplify the records that 
teachers were required to keep. 
4 Ibid., p.42. 
~Thl~ 46 ~·· p •• 
4 
George Howland/s tenure as superintendent <1880-1891> 
was noted for the increased demands for vocational education 
and for ethnic control. Each immigrant group wanted 
concessions for their chi 1 dren. The po I it i ca 1 I eadersh i p 
counted on these ethnic groups for support so their power 
had to be reckoned with. Howland gave examinations to 
teachers to qua! ify them and recommended that they be 
appointed by the Board of Education. Howland, also a 
political realist, suggested that teachers also get letters 
of recommendation from their ward committeemen.·'-'· 
Superintendent Albert G. Lane C1891-1898) had a history 
as an effective school administrator from his service as 
county superintendent of schools in Cook County. Lane 
welcomed input from outside agencies 1 ike the Chicago 
Woman/s Club, the Women/s Christian Temperance Union, School 
Children/s Aid Society, and Hui I House. Lane increased the 
teaching of manual arts in the elementary schools, 
incorporated kindergartens, and extended night school 
classes. His administration required training sessions 
for teacher cadets in the elementary schools. Later the 
problem of teacher training was solved when the Board of 
Education acquired the Cook County Normal School in 1896 and 
appointed Colonel Francis W. Parker as its/ head. Lane 1 s 
most dramatic confl let over schools was completely outside 
his authority of control. It dealt with the disposition of 
6 
.l.bl.Q. , p . 56 . 
5 
the increasingly valuable remaining section sixteen school 
lands. The sale and leasing of school lands at favorable 
rates to politically connected people or companies was 
common but the public was just becoming aware of it. 
Following the superintendencies of E. Benjamin Andrews 
and Edwin G. Cooley, came a woman in a profession 
traditionally dominated by men, El la Flagg Young 
<1909-1915). Young began her career in Chicago in 1865. 
She was educated in the Chicago public schools and later 
studied under John Dewey and received her doctorate at the 
University of Chicago. 7 As a district superintendent, she 
established a teachers/ council to give teachers a voice in 
what happened in the schools. Herrick in The Chicagg 
Schools: A Social and Political History gives current school 
administrators a chance to laugh when she mentions that El la 
Flagg Young "is the only recorded principal in Chicago 
schools who ever dismissed an incompetent school engineer, 
and was able to keep him dismissed."e Herrick continues: 
Mrs. Young/s greatest contributions to the Chicago 
schools lay in her efforts to give teachers pride in 
participation and improvement of the schools of which 
they were a part. There is no evidence that she 
supported - or that she approved - al 1 of the 
Federation activities. But there is no doubt that she 
sought to establish a close and sympathetic 
relationship with the teaching staff and to impart a 
sense of involvement in school decisions. 9 
7 Joan K. Smith, El la Flagg Young. Portrait of A Leader <Ames, 
Iowa: Educational Studies Press, 1979), p.64. 
9 Herrlck, Joe.cit., p.115. 
9
.lJ2l.d,, p.120. 
6 
During Young's tenure as superintendent, high school 
attendance grew and in 1910 reached 25,000. One reason for 
the rise was the opening of commercial courses in the high 
school so that the students learned ski 1 ls that made them 
employable. She also offered "prevocational courses'' to 
seventh and eighth graders to keep children from leaving 
school after the sixth grade. One of the programs that she 
initiated, sex education for high school and normal school 
students, was later deleted by the Board of Education after 
several groups protested the program. 10 Young's career 
as superintendent ended with her resignation in December 
1915. Her last year was marked by a series of conf I lets 
with local politicians, especially newly elected mayor 
Wl lliam Hale Thompson. A story circulated that Thompson's 
dislike of El la Flagg Young began when he, as a seventh 
grader, was sent home to his parents from the Skinner School 
where Young served as school principal. Thompson never 
returned to the school with his parents and never forgave 
her. 11 
Superintendent John D. Shoop succeeded El la Flagg 
Young and held his office for three years <1915-1918). He 
held no influence over the Board of Education and was 
generally overlooked by them. He was succeeded by Charles 
E. Chadsey who had the shortest tenure of any 
1 o Th; ,..j 
~·· 1 1 Th; ,..j 
~·· 
p .117. 
p. 138. 
7 
superintendent. He was hired by the Board of Education in 
March 1919, and due to problems with the new Board appointed 
by William Hale Thompson, he resigned on 26 November 
1919. 12 Peter A. Mortenson (1919-1924> succeeded Chadsey 
and tried to placate teachers by suggesting that the 
Board reinstate the Teachers/ Councils previously 
established by El la Flagg Young. Corruption continued to 
flourish in the Thompson appointed Board unti 1 State/s 
Attorney Robert Crowe exposed the scandalous behavior and 
brought forth indictments on the main characters. 13 
The corruption of the Thompson administration of city 
government led to a cal 1 for reform and Thompson announced 
that he would not run for mayor in 1923. The candidate of 
the Democratic party was William E. Dever, a judge with an 
impeccable reputation. Dever felt that it would be best for 
the Board of Education to be free from political 
interference, so he appointed seven competent and concerned 
citizens to the school board. 14 The new Board was split on 
its/ vote for the new superintendent between William Owen of 
the Normal School and William Bogan of Lane High School. As 
a compromise the Board settled on William A. McAndrew who 
was at the time an assistant superintendent in New York 
City. McAndrew had served as principal of Hyde Park High 
School in Chicago earlier in his career but was dismissed 
1 2 .l..Q.lQ. 
1 s .l..Q.lQ. , p • 142 . 
14Thirl 143 ~··P· . 
8 
when he refused to pass a pol itician/s son. 1 ~ With his big 
city experience and independence from political pressure, 
McAndrew seemed to be an excel lent candidate. McAndrew was 
warmly received by the Chicago Teachers Federation CCTF> but 
quickly turned their welcome into conflict with his plan to 
create junior high schools. As McAndrew/s plans for the 
junior high school became known, the leadership of the 
Chicago Teachers Federation began to realize the threat that 
junior high schools would have on their organization. 
Younger members of the CTF took the certification test for 
Junior high and upon certification left the CTF and Joined 
one of the high school unions. McAndrew ignored the 
questions regarding the junior high schools which had been 
brought up by teacher councl ls. He stated that he saw no 
need for teachers' meetings on school time and that they had 
no business tel ling the superintendent what to do. 1 • The 
Elementary General Council asked the Board to consider 
further study and discussion of the junior high school plan 
but the Board ignored their request and recommended the 
adoption of the plan. Rumors were spread that McAndrew had 
been brought to the city to subdue teachers, and to support 
the domination of the schools by business interests. Both 
the Federation of Women High School Teachers and the 
Federation of Men Teachers favored the establishment of 
l!i5Th;d~., 145 ~ p. . 
16 Ibid., p.146. 
9 
junior high schools, but with restrictions that they be 
monitored closely for abuses and be on an experimental basis 
only. Margaret Haley and the Chicago Teachers Federation 
opposed the plan from the beginning to the end and this 
opposition had an effect on McAndrew/s career as 
superintendent. The junior high school system was born in 
Chicago in 1924 and ceased operation in 1933. 
McAndrew also introduced the uplatoon system'' for the 
elementary schools. This system proposed to use the school 
plant for a long day, with a half-day of classroom 
instruction and a half-day of supervised play and other 
non-academic activities, so that a bui !ding could be used to 
accommodate a larger number of students at one time. 17 The 
"platoon system" had been tried earlier during El la Flagg 
Young/s administration but only as a stop-gap measure. 
McAndrew's "platooning" was to be permanent and would reduce 
overhead costs, require fewer bui Jdings, and less 
equipment. 19 The "platooning" became the target of 
criticism from national and local labor movements as a way 
of short changing children and pleasing tax cutters. 19 On 
8 April 1925 the Board approved McAndrew's plan for a 
council of organizations who would act as his advisors when 
he needed their help. The new council included four 
1 7
.lQj_Q. , p. 148. 
1 9 
.LJ:U.Q, , p. 149. 
19Lawrence A. Cremin, The Transformation of the Schools CNew 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961>, p.155. 
10 
principals and a superintendent who could outvote the three 
large teacher groups. McAndrew/s disregard for teachers 
served to unify their efforts against him. 20 In 1927 
McAndrew and the Board lost control over non-teaching 
employees, that is, clerks, firemen, janitors, etc.; when 
the courts ruled that stationary firemen should become civil 
service positions under the city government. McAndrew 
became an issue in the election for mayor in 1927. Wi I l iam 
Hale Thompson accused McAndrew of using textbooks that were 
overly sympathetic to the British and did not paint the true 
picture of the American Revolution. 21 After the election of 
Thompson in 1927, this controversy cost McAndrew his job. 
The pro-British textbook controversy was later refuted and 
this, combined with the civil service problems and evidence 
of underworld control of his administration, ended up 
costing Thompson his power and he lost the 1931 election. 22 
William J. Bogan took office as acting superintendent 
in August 1927, and was formally selected superintendent in 
June 1928. Bogan had served as a teacher and a principal 
in Chicago for years. He had become principal of Lane High 
School and developed it into an institution whose reputation 
for high standards in vocational and general education are 
still recognized nationwide. 23 As superintendent, he 
20 Herrick, Joe.cit., p.165. 
21 George S. Counts, School and Society in Chicago <New York: 
Arno Press, 1971), p.13. 
22Herrick, Joe.cit., p.172. 
23 lbid., p.226. 
1 1 
created an advisory council that included experts in health, 
welfare, psychology, and social problems. These experts 
could help devise plans to assist the schools in meeting the 
needs of their students. With this advisory council. Bogan 
divided the city into forty-one areas and established local 
community-school advisory committees in each area. 24 Bogan 
continued to battle the Thompson appointed board and 
attempted to defend the educational department. Bogan, who 
was an expert in school finance, knew that figures presented 
to the Board were rigged. He was sure that the businessman 
who refused to distinguish between expenditures for 
education and for patronage was quite willing to reduce his 
own taxes at the expense of youth. Bogan was considered a 
friend to all of the education related union groups and to 
community groups like the Citizens Schools Committee 
<1933). 2~ Bogan refused to permit the schools to be used to 
disseminate Thompson?s political propaganda. The influence 
of the underworld over the Thompson regime again was evident 
when Bogan and several parent groups tried to get the police 
to close down speakeasies that sprang up around the high 
schools but received no support. The influence of political 
patronage was not new to the school system but what was 
alarming was the growth in control of jobs by known criminal 
elements. 26 The only change that took place with the 
24 Ibid. 
2~Ibid., p.227. 
26!bid., p.175. 
12 
election of a democratic mayor in 1931 was that the 
patronage army had become Cermak Democrats rather than 
Thompson Republicans. 27 
The next superintendent was William H. Johnson 
<1935-1946). Johnson/s career prior to Chicago included 
government work in Washington, D.C., a college instructor, 
dean of a junior college, and finally a teacher at Lane High 
School. While at Lane, he received his doctorate from the 
University of Chicago in Educational Administration. He 
taught briefly at the Chicago Normal School unti 1 he passed 
the principal/s examination. He served as an elementary 
principal in three schools prior to his appointment as an 
assistant superintendent. 28 This appointment was made by 
the Board of Education over the objections of Superintendent 
Bogan who considered Johnson ~an opportunist without much 
concern for the children he taught. 112 <;> 
Studies of the administration of the Chicago Public 
Schools during this time period <1935-1946) generally refer 
to the "McCahey-Johnson" administration because of the close 
ties between the superintendent and the president of the 
school board. James B. McCahey was elected president of the 
Board of Education in 1933 and served until May 1947. 
27Kip Sullivan, "Politics and Educational Policy: The Control 
of the Chicago Public Schools during the Administration of 
Mayor Anton J. Cermak" <unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, 
Loyola University of Chicago, 1985), p.86. 
28Herrick, Joe.cit., p.224. 
:291Qld. 
13 
During this administration, there were many charges that the 
leadership of the Chicago public schools was subservient to 
the partisan will of the city administration. Specifically, 
the McCahey-Johnson administration was charged with 
personnel practices based upon political or personal 
favoritism, the unethical administration and grading of the 
principals/ examination of 1936-1937, the failure to restore 
rapidly the salary cuts made during the depression of the 
1930/s and the use of public office by Board members and 
the superintendent for private financial gain. 30 
During the McCahey-Johnson administration several civic 
groups confronted the Board of Education for their unjust 
practices. One of the most vocal of these groups, that 
eventually led to the resignations of McCahey and Johnson, 
was the Citizens Schools Committee. The committee was 
founded in 1933 to protest a drastic cutback in school 
programs which McCahey insisted was a result of the 
depression. The Citizens Schools Committee became a 
watchdog group for the city schools and tried to 
unsuccessfully influence the selection of Bogan/s successor. 
The Citizens School Committee included members of other 
groups such as the Woman/s City Club, the League of Women 
Voters, the Parent Teacher Association, certain University 
3 °Kay Hodes Kamin, "A History of the Hunt Administration of 
the Chicago Public Schools, 1947-1953" Cunpubl ished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Department of Education, University of 
Chicago, 1970), p.3. 
14 
of Chicago faculty members, and Chicago public school 
teachers. 31 The committee was fortunate to have as advisors 
school Board Members Helen Hefferan and James Mullenbach as 
well as University of Chicago Professor Charles E. 
Merriam. 32 The Citizens Schools Committee continued to 
monitor appointments, expenditures, and business activities 
of the Board of Education and the superintendent and 
strongly opposed William H. Johnson/s reappointment in 1940 
and 1944. 33 
Superintendent Johnson caused so much anguish among the 
various teacher union groups that a movement began to unite 
the separate bodies into one group. On 28 October 1937 a 
new organization was formed. The four teacher unions 
surrendered their charters and received a new charter from 
the American Federation of Teachers as Local One. The major 
issues confronting the union were adequacy of funding for 
the schools and the appointing of unqualified temporary 
teachers while 800 qualified teachers waited for 
appointments. 34 Lower level administrators and school 
principals were also treated unfairly. Many were 
transferred or demoted for offering opinions different from 
those of the superintendent or the school board. 3~ 
In 1943 Edward E. Keener, president of the Illinois 
31 Ibid., p. 3. 
32Herrick, Joe.cit., p. 235. 
33 Ibid., p. 237. 
34 Ibid., p.246. 
3~Ibid., p.250. 
15 
State Teachers Association, urged the National Education 
Association to investigate the activities of the Chicago 
Board of Education and Superintendent Johnson. The results 
of the N.E.A. investigation suggested: 
1) That the superintendent control all employees and 
activities of the school system, not just instruction. 
2> The Board of Examiners should be disbanded as it 
exists presently, and a new Board created with a 
person knowledgeable in school personnel problems. 
3>The superintendent should not have the examining 
system as his personal province, with the right to 
disregard the examiners he appointed and control Jed if 
he so chose. 4> Before any teacher or principal 
demotions, he/she should be given a hearing and a 
statement of the reasons for the action. 5> Teaching 
positions should be opened to any qualified instructor, 
not just graduates of the Normal Col Jege. 6) The 
superintendent should provide channels of communication 
so that teacher/s ideas could be given his careful 
consideration. 36 
The event that caused the overthrow of the 
McCahey-Johnson administration was the threat from the North 
Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools to 
withdraw the accreditation of the city/s public high schools 
unless specific reforms were made. This denial of 
accreditation would stigmatize the city/s public high 
schools as being sub-standard and would make it difficult 
for graduating seniors to be accepted into regularly 
accredited colleges. 37 On 1 April 1946, Mayor Kelly 
appointed a school advisory committee composed of the 
presidents of area universities and asked them for their 
recommendation to avoid the interdiction of the North 
36 lbid., p.272. 
37Kamin, Joe.cit., p.4-5. 
16 
Central Association. The committee/s recommendations, 
announced on 18 June 1946, were difficult for the mayor to 
accept. It flatly stated that the superintendent and the 
entire Board of Education should resign and a completely 
new Board be selected on the advice of civic agencies. 38 
Johnson and one board member resigned immediately and by 
September three more board members had resigned, leaving six 
vacancies on the Board. Kelly had no real recourse but to 
accept the recommendation of the committee and appoint an 
advisory commission to screen Board nominees. 3 ~ The 
mayoral e;ection of 1947 was won by Martin J. Kennelly who 
had promised the Citizens Schools Committee that he would 
reform school governance. 
In late 1946 the school board began to search for a new 
superintendent. The Board found that many candidates were 
refusing to be interviewed because the Board had retained 
its direct management over a large part of the school 
system. The Board control led contracts as wel I as personnel 
and budget making, excluding the superintendent from any 
control in these areas. 40 The Heald committee was joined by 
the Chicago Teachers Union, the Chicago Division of the 
Illinois Department of Education, the Regional PTA, and the 
Citizens School Committee in lobbying for legislation to 
38Herrick, Joe.cit., p.274. 
39
.llli..Q.' p. 275. 
40 Ibid. 
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create the off ice of General Superintendent of Schools. 41 
After much lobbying, a bill was passed that created the 
office of General Superintendent but exempted the off ice of 
Board Attorney from the control of the superintendent. Once 
the bill was signed by the governor, the Superintendent of 
Schools in Kansas City, Herold C. Hunt, was chosen to 
replace William Johnson. Hunt accepted the appointment as 
General Superintendent and assumed his off ice in August 
1947. 42 
Hunt was welcomed to his new superintendency like none 
other before him or since. The Citizens Schools Committee 
Publication, Chicago Schools, praised Hunt/s appointment. 
Former Committee President William C. Reavis of the 
University of Chicago and its current President Dr. John A. 
Lapp, wrote: 
You have been summoned to heavy duty. It is probable 
that no educator in America ever faced problems more 
intricate. All who know the difficulty of your task 
wil 1 give sympathetic understanding to your efforts. 
The Citizens Schools Committee and associated groups 
will stand guard over the gains which have been made 
and will be in readiness to support progressive 
advances .... We pledge our cordial support in redeeming 
Chicago/s schools and placing them in the forefront. 43 
Hunt was given several welcoming receptions, including one 
by the Citizens Schools Committee where he met 
representatives from over one hundred organizations, several 
Board of Education members, ten aldermen, and Mayor 
4 1 I bi d . , p . 278 . 
·~ 2 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., p.279. 
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Kennelly. He spoke at a meeting of the union teachers at 
Orchestra Hal 1 and met with the new Regional Parent Teachers 
Association. 44 Hunt assumed his position but to t~e 
surprise of some was not vindictive toward Johnson/s staff. 
Two of Johnson/s assistant superintendents were retained but 
new faces did arrive on the scene. The new Department of 
Personnel was headed by Edward E. Keener, whose department 
included both instructional staff and non-teaching civiri 
service employees. When George Cassell retired from his 
position as assistant to the superintendent, his successor 
was James F. Redmond. who had been on Hunt/s staff in Kansas 
City. 4 ~ Hunt took further steps to insure the integrity of 
the principals/ examination which was to be administered in 
November 1947. Hunt hired the American Council of Education 
to grade the written examinations and conduct oral 
examinations. The Board also extended the opportunity 
to take teacher certification examinations and other 
examinations to all citizens of the United States. 46 To 
resolve problems in the purchasing department, Hunt 
reorganized and placed it under the direction of Redmond. 
Textbooks would now be selected by committees of principals 
and teachers in each area and no book company could approach 
a committee member individually. 47 
44 lbid., p.280. 
4 ~Ibid., p.281. 
46 lbid. 
47.l.Q.j__Q. 
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Hunt stated that he wanted advisory councils so that 
the public and teachers could participate in planning 
improvements for the schools. He wanted to establish 
workshops for teachers and conferences with principals and 
administrators. In helping to develop a philosophy for the 
public schools, Hunt identified nine functions of living 
that should be reflected throughout the curriculum. He 
continually asked for public support to obtain social, 
psychological, and health services for the school system. 48 
Hunt/s public statements consistently stressed the basic 
American philosophy of equality of educational opportunity. 
Paul H. Douglas, later an U.S. Senator, noted in 1951 that 
"there was a kinship between Ella Flagg Young and 
Superintendent Hunt in the wideness of their vision of the 
place of public education in a democratic society. 49 
Hunt/s relationship with the teachers union was 
generally good. In 1948 Superintendent Hunt, Board 
President Charles Whipple, and Union President John Fewkes 
appeared before the city council to demand an increase in 
the school levy. The council had no legal control over the 
levy voted by the Board of Education but had refused to 
approve the levy. Confronted by the Superintendent, Board 
President, and the Union, the council reluctantly approved 
the levy.~0 Hunt and the union disagreed in two areas: 
49 Ibid., p.283. 
49 Ibid., p.285. 
~ 0 Ibid., p.291. 
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salaries and the relationship between the superintendent and 
teacher organizations. Hunt;s attempt to revive the 
Teachers; Council met with some opposition from the union. 
When election for the counci Is were held, the majority of 
members elected were active members of the teachers union. 
The council served no real purpose not already met by the 
union, but gave the superintendent a neutral stance among 
the teacher organizations. In 1953 no election was held for 
the council and it disappeared.~ 1 The salary issue might 
have been avoided if more money were available but it was 
not. A single salary schedule was introduced with 
elementary teachers getting five-sixths of a high school 
teacher/s salary because elementary teachers worked five 
hours per day to the high school teachers six hours. The 
union had its say on these two issues and was not 
antagonistic toward Dr. Hunt. They congratulated him 
on his second contract in 1951.~2 Hunt announced in the 
spring of 1953 that he was accepting the post of Eliot 
Professor in the Harvard Graduate School of Education. The 
Chicago Teachers Union newspaper carried a front page 
farewell and thank you to Hunt for his leadership and said 
that his report card grades were A for effort, A for 
accomplishment, and A for sincerity and fair play.~3 
Hunt/s unexpected resignation concerned the Citizens 
~ 1 Ibid. 
~2 Ibid., p.292. 
~ 3 Ibid., p.299. 
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Schools Committee. In a telegram to the Board of Education, 
the Committee urged that no one in the system be chosen to 
replace him, unless Dr. James F. Redmond could be released 
from his commitment to become superintendent of the New 
Orleans schools. It further urged that, if necessary, a 
canvass of the entire country be made for Hunt/s 
successor.~4 Redmond kept his word to the Orleans Parish 
Board of Education and moved onto his first superintendency. 
The nationwide search for a new superintendent resulted in 
the selection of Dr. Benjamin Coppage Willis who was then 
the Superintendent of Schools in Buffalo, New York. The 
administration of Dr.Willis wi 11 be discussed later in this 
dissertation. 
As we have seen in our presentation of past 
superintendencies, each superintendent faced problems, some 
unique and some similar. The administration of the public 
schools in Chicago has been a challenge throughout our 
city/s history. It is the purpose of this dissertation to 
discuss some of the major problems and their solutions that 
faced James F. Redmond during his tenure as superintendent 
from 1966-1975. 
During an interview with Dr. Redmond, it was noted that 
Herold Hunt was both a mentor and a personal friend. Since 
Redmond considered Hunt a mentor,~~ I will use Hunt/s eight 
~ 4 Ibid., p.300. 
~~Personal interview with Dr. James Redmond, Benton Harbor, 
Michigan, 28 July 1989. 
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functions of administrative responsibility of a school 
administrator as an indication of Redmond/s ability to meet 
his responsibilities in solving the problems discussed. 
According to Hunt, these functions include: 
1. Cooperative development and direction of a program 
that is custom-made for the community and its 
children. 
2. Organization of an administrative framework to 
implement and facilitate the program. 
3. Service as the adviser, as well as the executive 
officer, of the Board of Education. 
4. Democratic leadership of the activities of al 1 
school personnel. 
5. Observation of legal educational and administrative 
requirements. 
6. Eevelopment of working relations with homes and 
other community agencies. 
7. Adequate instructfon and guidance in the values and 
practices of loyal American citizenship. 
8. Regard to healthful, humanized and satisfying 
living for pupils and teachers in the course of 
school work.~ 6 
This study wil 1 discuss James F. Redmond/s approach to 
the fol lowing challenges he met during his administration: 
desegregation of the schools, decentralization of the school 
system, collective bargaining with a recognized bargaining 
unit, and the concept of dual enrollment or as it was known 
in Chicago, "shared time." It is a goal of this study to 
provide a historical narrative of a previously unexplored 
period of the Chicago Public Schools/ administrative 
history. It is hoped that this study wi 1 l provide readers 
with information about possible solutions to problems that 
occurred and in some cases are still occurring in urban 
~ 6Kamin, Joe.cit., p.11. 
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CHAPTER II 
WILLIS LEAVES AND REDMOND RETURNS 
In order to fully understand the atmosphere within the 
school system that James F. Redmond encountered upon his 
appointment as superintendent, we will discuss the volatile 
situation which occurred during the last years of the Wil 1 is 
administration. One of the first problems that Redmond 
faced was the need to end the poor relationship that had 
developed between the African-American community and the 
superintendency. Redmond needed to respond to demands of 
the African-American community and at the same time attempt 
to convince the white community that integrated education 
could work. Redmond returned to Chicago with an image as 
"the cone i 1 i a tor" . 1 Redmond, un 1 i ke his predecessor, 
welcomed the input from community action groups on both 
sides of an issue. He would talk to the groups and solicit 
their views. By studying the different approaches to the 
superintendency exhibited by Wi 1 lis and Redmond, we ~~n gain 
further insight into Redmond/s style of leadership and his 
approaches to the four challenges chosen for discussion in 
this study. 
Dr. Benjamin Coppage Willis succeeded Harold Hunt after 
a nationwide search. Willis, who had been superintendent in 
1 Ridgely Hunt, "Redmond the Conciliator," Chicago Tribune 
Sunday Magazine, 13 September 1967, pp.8-19. 
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Buffalo, New York, arrived to a warm welcome in September 
1953. In his first year Dr.Willis and the Teachers Union 
worked out a new salary schedule that created a six-hour day 
for all teachers, and salary increments for additional 
degree work beyond a bachelor/s degree. Willis attempted to 
increase the number of seats and the number of teachers and 
thereby reduce the average elementary class size. 2 Wil !is/ 
administration expanded services in vocational education, 
programs for trainable mentally handicapped children and 
socially maladjusted children, and recognized gifted 
children as a group to be given special education. Special 
help was also given to children in low income areas through 
after-school speech and reading clinics, and through 
after-school remedial reading classes for some students. 3 
Wil 1 is became known as "Ben the Builder'' because of the 
great number of schools that were built during his 
administration. Wnek, in her study of the Willis 
administration, credits Willis with building one hundred 
thirty-two new schools, making eighty-one new additions, and 
acquiring sixteen buildings. 4 Willis met his first 
controversy in June 1955, when residents of the North 
Lawndale area complained of badly overcrowded conditions in 
their schools. People of the area voiced the opinion that 
2 Herrick, Joe.cit., p.308. 
3 Jbid. 
4 Cynthia A. Wnek, "Big Ben the Builder: School Construction 
--1953-66" <Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Graduate School 
of Loyola University of Chicago, 1988), p.236. 
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preference was being shown to Hyde Park with new schools, 
building additions, and new teachers.~ 
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People <NAACP) and the Citizens Schools Committee became 
vocal against Willis when he was offered his second 
contract. In January 1961 the Chicago Committee on Racial 
Equality <CORE> released a statement sent to the II linois 
School Problems Commission, asking thelr help in solving 
problems that existed in Chicago. CORE questioned half-day 
sessions, maximum class size in elementary schools, bus 
transport~tion, the use of experienced teaching staff. and 
inferior education and racial segregation in schools that 
were predominantly Black. 6 In March 1961 the NAACP issued 
a statement to both the Board of Education and Mayor Daley 
that present board policies resulted in separate and unequal 
schools for most Black pupils in the city. They charged 
that it was the responsibility of the school board to 
equalize all schools, and they urged that school districting 
be used to achieve integration and equal opportunities. 7 By 
August, CORE and the NAACP had joined forces to demonstrate 
their position. In October the Chicago Urban League and 
its executive director, Edwin C. Berry, issued a statement 
regarding the "unequal education In Chicago's public 
~Ibid., p.99. 
6 Ibid., p.158. 
7 Ibid., p.157. 
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schools." 0 It now seemed that every Black organization was 
opposed to Willis and the Board of Education. 
In January 1962 the first mobile classroom units were 
set up in Chicago. Units were assembled at both Black and 
White schools. At first the units were acceptable, but by 
May 1962 protests began to arise in regard to the use of 
mobile units in certain sections of the city.~ Protests 
began to multiply and the units were referred to as "Willis 
Wagons." Although many teachers and children found the 
units to be comfortable and by necessity class size was 
limited to thirty, community groups like the Woodlawn 
Organization refused to see anything good about the 
classrooms. 
On 22 October 1963 the Coordinating Council of 
Community Organizations CCCCO), an umbrella organization of 
seventeen civil rights groups under the leadership of Al 
Raby, called for a boycott of the Chicago Public Schools. 10 
Raby was a thirty-two year old teacher from the Hess Upper 
Grade Center on the West side. He was the CCCO delegate 
from Teachers for Integrated Education. He later gained 
more prominence in the area of civil rights when he joined 
the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in marches through 
the Southwest side, Austin, and Cicero. 11 
9 Ibid., p.178. 
9 Ibid., p.171. 
10 Ibid., p.191. 
The boycott was 
11
"Who is this man Raby?" Chicago Daily News, 6 June 1965. 
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successful to the extent that forty-seven percent of 
Chicago/s students were absent. ceca presented a list of 
thirteen demands to the school board, first was a demand for 
Wi 1 J is~ resignation. 12 ceca sought the removal of Sterling 
McMurrin and Lester Nelson from the Hauser Panel and 
suggested they be replaced by Kenneth Clark who had 
testified in the Brown v. Board of Education case and Dan 
Dodson who was director of the Center for Human 'Relations , 
and Community Studies at New York University. They further 
sought information about the racial make up of each school 
and their achievement levels. CCCO demanded that Robert 
Havighurst be given complete control, rather than shared 
with Wll lis, of the report he was conducting for the board. 
Other demands cal Jed for changes in personnel policies and a 
reconstitution of the board that would include appointment 
of members who "were publicly on the record for overcoming 
de facto segregation in Chicago." 13 
In September 1961 the Board of Education authorized 
the first survey of the public schools in thirty years. 
Board member Fairfax Cone and his committee were to narrow 
the focus of the survey and to choose a director. Dr. 
Willis was in full support of the need of a survey. 14 The 
board searched for a director for over a year and a half and 
12Wnek, Joe.cit., p.191. 
13James Sullivan, "School Demands Listed", Chicago Tribune, 21 
October 1963, p.1-2. 
14Larry Cuban, Urban School Chiefs Under Fire. <Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1976), p.21. 
29 
was rejected by such well know educators as James Conant, 
Herman B. Wells, and Francis Keppel. In January 1963 Dean 
Eldridge R. Mcswain of Northwestern University/s School of 
Education agreed to lead the survey. He later withdrew.'~ 
On April 22 Cone announced that he had persuaded Professor 
Robert J. Havighurst of the University of Chicago to head 
the survey. Havighurst took a leave from his duties at the 
University to conduct the study. He is the author of more 
than three dozen books on the sociology of education and 
particularly urban education. He is noted for his study of 
all the components that affect education in metropolitan 
areas. 16 This appointment did not sit well with Willis. 
He objected to Havighurst because he felt that this 
indicated a switch in the Board/s policy of the neighborhood 
school. Willis did not like the fact that Havighurst had 
supported integration and the creation of regional high 
schools rather than district high schools. 17 In order to 
pacify an irate Willis, Board President Claire Roddewig 
appointed a troika of Willis, Havighurst, and Dean Alonzo 
Grace of the University of Illinois, to oversee the survey. 
It was not until 27 November 1963 that the Board formally 
approved the areas to be surveyed and its $190,000.00 
budget. The vote was unanimous (8-0) with board member 
1 ~Ibid., p.23. 
16Robert J. Havighurst and Daniel U. Levine, Education in 
Metropolitan Areas. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971), 
p.x. 
17Cuban, Joe.cit., p.23. 
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Adams, who also supported the survey, being unable to vote 
due to an il lness. 16 A year later in November 1964 the 
five hundred page report was released. The report cal led 
for action from the Board of Education in the face of its 
current crisis. Havighurst cal led upon schoolmen to take 
"an active participation in making and practicing of pol icy 
for social urban renewal." 19 Fifteen of the twenty-two 
recommendations could be put into effect within months 
through board action without any cost to the system. 
Havighurst recommended that teachers should receive 
additional in-service training and that specialists should 
be available to faculties to help them adapt the curriculum 
to the local school. Additional resource and auxi 1 iary 
staff members should be added so that all the services 
needed at a school are available. He also suggested the 
expansion of programs to meet the special needs of the poor 
and disabled. The areas of vocational and adult education 
needed to be upgraded and expanded. Finally Havighurst 
noted the need for a decentralization of the administration 
of the schools into three regions, each with its own 
curriculum specialist who could help local staffs adapt the 
curriculum to meet their needs. These regions could also be 
organized in a way that would assist in a community-wide 
16Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 27 
November 1963, Chicago, Il ., p.746. 
19Robert J. Havlghurst, The Public Schools of Chicago. 
<Chicago: Chicago Board of Education, 1964), p.30. 
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policy of stable integration and community development. 20 
Havlghurst considered three issues "most important": one 
involved different ways to further integration in the 
elementary schools, a second involved improving education of 
the poor, and the third was to reorganize administration so 
that more decisions could be in the hands of principals and 
teachers. 21 We shal I see later that most of Havighurst 
recommendations are part of Redmond~s programs to 
desegregate and to decentralize the schools. They are two 
of the four challenges discussed in this study. 
The second survey, authorized by the Board on 28 
August 1963, was originally known as the Five Man Panel 
of Educators but later became known as the Hauser Report. 22 
This report was chaired by Dr. Philip Hauser of the 
University of Chicago. The Board unanimously (9-0) approved 
the budget of $50,000.00 to fund the new survey. 23 The 
report was the outgrowth of a judge-negotiated out of court 
settlement of the Webb v. Board of Education CCiv. No. 
61C1569 D.C., N.D. II 1 .) reached in August 1963. The suit 
charged the Board of Education with the operation of a de 
facto segregated school system. 24 The report discussed 
20 Ibid., p.403-04. 
21 Ibid. 
22Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 28 August 
1963, Chicago, Il ., p.332. 
23Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 25 
September 1963, Chicago, Il ., p.432. 
24Roscoe Hill and Malcolm Feeley Ced.), Affirmative School 
Integration (Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1967), 
p.84. 
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the impact of segregation on the quality of education in the 
Chicago schools. The report summarized the court decisions 
as to the responsibility of the Board on school segregation 
caused by residential segregation and stated: 
The neighborhood elementary school, which has served 
this nation well historically, operates now to retard 
the acculturation and integration of the in-migrant 
Negro in Chicago and in metropolitan United States as a 
whole. Earlier in the century, the neighborhood school 
actually helped to bring persons of diverse ethnicity 
and culture together, because foreign immigration was 
on a smaller and more gradual scale than in recent 
in-migration of Negroes ... The public school must do 
its share in breaking down the walls of segregation and 
paving the way for the exercise of free choice on the 
part of the Negro, as for all citizens, in respect to 
his rife pursuits. 25 
The report suggested methods to enhance the integration 
of elementary and high schools. Suggestions were made for 
the integration of faculties of all schools, and a more 
equitable distribution of experienced teachers. Other 
suggestions included in-service training and further 
educational opportunities for teachers so that they could 
better understand the students with whom they were 
working. 26 The recommendations of this panel were similar 
to those of the Havighurst study but were limited to the 
integration of the schools and improvement of in-service 
for teachers. Redmond/s response to the challenge of 
desegregation of the schools made many of the same 
2~Report of the Advisory Panel on Integration of the Public 
Schuols. <Chicago: Chicago Board of Education, 31 March 
1967), p.12. 
2~Herrick, lee cit., p.325. 
recommendations that were raised by these reports. 
The summer of 1963 brought a series of sit-ins and 
protests at the Board headquarters as wel I as local high 
schools. After the Board approved boundary changes on 7 
July 1963, members of CORE began a ten day sit-in that 
ended with the arrest of protestors. Two weeks later CORE 
began to picket construction sites where mobile classrooms 
were to be installed. Picketing at school sites began to 
turn ugly when protesters began to throw rocks at workers 
and at pol ice officers. More than 170 pickets were 
arrested. Later in the month protestors began to march 
around the homes of Board President Roddewig, Mayor Daley, 
and Superintendent Willis.?~ 
In September 1963 Superintendent Willis resigned over 
33 
a conflict with the Board over duties of his office and the 
Board. Many groups rejoiced over his resignation but the 
more influential groups, businessmen, home-owners 
associations, teacher and principal groups, and the state 
chairman of the North Central Association demanded that the 
Board not accept his resignation. 29 The Board refused to 
accept his resignation and at its/ October meeting 
established a committee to negotiate with the 
superintendent. This committee met with the superintendent 
and set up ground rules for future board-administration 
27Cuban, Joe.cit., p.15. 
~scuban, Joe.cit., p.19. 
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relationships. 29 In April 1964 a three page resolution was 
introduced and passed by the Board that stated the 
principles and procedures for cooperation between the Board 
and the General Superintendent. The resolution defined the 
role of the Board as policy maker and the superintendent as 
the implementor or executor of Board policy. The resolution 
reminded the Board that they should refrain from intruding 
into the administration of policy by the superintendent. 
, 
The Board also reaffirmed its legal responsibility to reject 
or accept any recommendations of the superintendent and the 
right to revise its policies, rules and regulations to meet 
changing conditions. 30 
Willis/s contract came up for renewal in the spring of 
1965. Community groups led by the CCCO marched on city hal 1 
urging Mayor Daley to pressure the Board not to re-hire 
Willis. However, the Board, after a heated debate, voted 
7-4 to renew Willis/s contract at a meeting on May 28. The 
Board agreed on the package only with an oral stipulation 
that Willis would retire at age 65, a year later. 31 Board 
President Frank Whiston shortly thereafter commented to the 
press that the Board had asked seven college presidents to 
serve as a screening committee to produce a list of 
candidates for the superintendency and that such a list 
z·;>Ibid. 
30 Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 23 April 
1964, Chicago, Il ., p.2212-14. 
31 lQl.Q. ' p. 28. 
35 
should be ready by October 1965. 32 These comments created 
much concern for the American Association of School 
Administrators CAASA) who responded with a letter of protest 
to Whiston and the Board. The AASA also objected to 
the hiring of a successor to Will is as his executive 
assistant until the successor could legally be hired as 
superintendent. The association noted that "these actions 
would be a serious breach of ethical procedures for a board 
in its dealing with its chief administrator." The 
association urged the Board to reconsider its actions at its 
next meeting and defer such action to a more appropriate 
time. 33 Beginning in May 1966 the Chicago newspapers began 
to speculate on a successor for Willis. The Chicago Tribune 
on 11 May 1966 reported that Redmond was the choice of a 
six-man Board committee. The article mentions that a 
committee of three educators, John J. Corson of Princeton, 
Roa Id F. Campbell of the University of Chicago, and Herold 
C. Hunt of Harvard, had screened candidates and had arrived 
at a list of six finalists. The list included: Sidney P. 
Marland of Pittsburgh, Gregory C. Coffin of Darien, 
Connecticut, Robert Jenkins of Pasadena, Paul W. Briggs of 
32Letter from Forrest E. Conner, Executive Secretary of the 
American Association of School Administrators to Frank M. 
Whiston, President, Chicago Board of Education, 21 June 
1965. From personal collection of David Heffernan, 
Assistant Superintendent of Schools. 
33 lbid. 
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Cleveland, and John B. Davis of Worcester. 34 Editorials 
emphasized the fact that James Redmond was a public 
relations expert. and stated that: 
some think it is more important for the superintendent 
to be a public relations expert that a gifted educator. 
Certainly a superintendent needs the patience to suffer 
fools gladly, along with the courage to oppose them 
when he thinks they are wrong. This is an area in 
which Supt. Willis faltered ... 3 ~ 
At the meeting of the Board of Education in May 1966, Dr. 
Willis announced his resignation effective 31 August 1966. 
At this same meeting the Board voted to ask James F. Redmond 
to be his successor. 36 
REDMOND - A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
James Francis Redmond was born on 13 September 1915 in 
Kansas City, Missouri to James Timothy and Gertrude Shwarz 
Redmond. He was educated in the Kansas City Public Schools. 
His first career choice was that of law but due to the 
financial burdens on his family resulting from the Great 
Depression he was unable to pursue law school. His 
educational pursuits were then channe 1 ed in to teach er __ 
training, a field for which he was able to receive financial 
assistance in the form of a Federal Education Relief Act 
grant. The grant covered the entire cost of his tuition 
34
"Redmond Selected to Succeed Willis," Chicago Tribune, 11 
May 1966, p.1. 
3 ~"Criteria for New Superintendent," Editorial, Chicago 
Tribune, 11 May 1966. 
86Herrick, Joe.cit., p.338. 
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which amounted to $18.75 per quarter. He studied at the 
Kansas City Teachers College for two years and in 1935 
accepted an appointment as an elementary school teacher. In 
the previous three Teachers College classes no teaching 
appointments were made so he considered himself fortunate to 
get a position. He continued his studies for the Bachelor 
of Arts degree in the evenings and on Saturdays and was 
awarded his B.A. from Teachers College in 1937. His 
teaching experiences in the public school system of Kansas 
City and his observation that there were opportunities for 
men in elementary school administration helped persuade him 
to change his career plan to that of public school 
administration. 37 
On 3 June 1939 Redmond married Mary Edith Adams. The 
Redmonds have one child, James Leonard. The Redmonds 
decided that their child would be educated in the public 
schools wherever Dr. Redmond served, rather than in Catholic 
or private schools. The Redmonds are extremely proud of 
their son who received an appointment to the United States 
Military Academy at West Point. James Leonard is now an 
executive with Commonwealth Edison.se 
Early in their marriage the Redmonds agreed that James 
would pursue his graduate degrees as soon as possible. 
Redmond attended Teachers College of Columbia University in 
37Personal interview with Dr. James F. Redmond, St. Joseph, 
Michigan, 28 July 1989. 
36 Ibid. 
New York during the summers of 1939-1940. He received a 
Master of Arts degree from Columbia in 1940. The Redmonds 
returned to Kansas City where Redmond left his elementary 
teaching position to assume the duties of Assistant to the 
Superintendent. This first position in school 
administration was the result of his recommendation by the 
Superintendent of the Kansas City Schools, Herold Hunt. 
Hunt had known Redmond since his interview for his first 
teaching position. Hunt was both a mentor and a close 
friend of Redmond and encouraged his pursuit of further 
education,.-=-.;-
The Redmonds had discussed pursuit of a doctorate and 
decided that it would be achieved before Redmond reached 
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thirty. However, this plan was interrupted by World War II. 
Redmond served four years in the United States Army and rose 
to the rank of lieutenant colonel in the Adjutant General/s 
Department at Camp Wolters, Texas. His duties included 
supervision of the testing of soldiers, the assignment of 
these men to specialty training based on their tested 
abilities, and the assignment of these men according to unit 
needs. 40 
After the war Redmond returned to his post as Assistant 
to the Superintendent in Kansas City. He continued in this 
position for only six months before taking a leave to return 
39 
to Columbia University to pursue his doctorate. During this 
stay in New York, Redmond was chosen to serve his only 
tenure as a school building principal. In 1947 Redmond 
served as the director of the experimental/demonstration 
school, Horace Mann Lincoln School, on Columbia University/s 
campus. This assignment had added challenges because 
Columbia had decided that the school would close after 
Redmond/s term as director. Columbia had decided that they 
would become involved with school districts throughout the 
country rather than just in their own experimental school. 
Redmond/s job was to insure that the closing of the school 
would be done in a manner that would be least disruptive 
to the students and faculty, and assist the students and 
faculty in finding future placement. Upon completion of the 
school year Redmond was awarded his Doctor of Education 
<Ed.D.) degree from Columbia University in 1948. 41 
Redmond/s dissertation was entitled "Administrative Factors 
Affecting Teacher Strikes", a topic which he would learn 
even more about during his tenure as Superintendent in 
Chicago. His dissertation committee included Daniel R. 
Davies, Willard S. Elsbree, John K. Morton, and the renowned 
George S. Counts. His study focused on teacher strikes in 
three East Coast towns and the administrative factors that 
40 
Jed to a strike rather that an agreement. 42 
FIRST TENURE IN CHICAGO 
The relationship that existed between Redmond and 
Herold Hunt came into play again in 1948. Hunt had accepted 
the superintendency in Chicago in 1947 and had made an 
agreement with the Chicago Board of Education that he would 
be able to hire Redmond as an Assistant to the 
Superintendent when Redmond had completed his doctoral 
studies. Hunt therefore enabled Redmond to move around the 
building principalship (except for his year at Horace Mann 
Lincoln> to the level of superintendent. As Assistant to 
the General Superintendent Redmond administered the Bureau 
of School Clerks, Bureau of Lunchrooms, and the Public 
Relations Department. Later when problems arose in the 
Purchasing Department, Hunt appointed Redmond as Director of 
Purchasing and asked him to put things in order in the 
department. Redmond returned to school at Northwestern 
University to learn more about purchasing. As a result of 
his work at Northwestern, Redmond was able to meet and hire 
competent assistants who helped reorganize the purchasing 
department. Redmond continued to be a confidant to Hunt 
during his four years as Director of Purchasing. It 
was from this position that Redmond later moved to the 
42James F. Redmond, "Administrative Factors Affecting Teacher 
Strikes" (Unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Teachers College, 
Columbia University, 1947>, p.1. 
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superintendency of New Orleans in 1953. 43 
THE FIRST SUPERINTENDENCY - A BAPTISM OF FIRE 
Although there is much speculation that Redmond could 
have stayed in Chicago and become superintendent upon Hunt/s 
resignation, Redmond remained a man who kept his word. 
Prior to Hunt/s decision to accept a position at Harvard, 
Redmond had accepted a contract offer from the Orleans 
Parish School Board. The parish boundaries are identical to 
the boundaries of the city of New Orleans. The distinction 
must be made, however, that the parish school board is 
responsible directly to the state, not to the city. 
Upon his arrival in New Orleans, Redmond was faced with 
the problem shared with many other superintendents at the 
time. As a result of Brown v. Board of Education 347 US 483 
(1954) the United States Supreme Court ordered school 
districts to end racially segregated schools and nullified 
the doctrine of separate but equal. The local case filed in 
the United States District Court in New Orleans was known as 
Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board 138 F Supp. 337, 342 
(1956). 44 Of the many decisions in the case the first was 
delivered on 15 February 1956 by Judge J. Skelly Wright of 
the Federal District Court in New Orleans. Among other 
43 Ibid. 
44Morton Inger, Politics and Reality in an American City - The 
New Orleans School Crisis of 1960 CNew York: Center for 
Urban Education, 1969), p.17. 
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things his decision enjoined the Orleans school board from 
requiring and permitting racial segregation and directed the 
board to "make arrangements for admission of children ... on 
a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate 
speed ... 4 ~ Judge Wright used as a reference both Supreme 
Court Brown cases, however, as we wi 1 l learn, the Orleans 
Parish School Board seemed to have a very liberal 
interpretation of the term "with all deliberate speed." 
Inger tells us about a New Orleans in the 1950/s that 
was expected to be a leader in peaceful desegregation in the 
south. "Although there were inequalities, whites and 
Negroes had lived in apparent harmony for decades, and New 
Orleans had perhaps less residential segregation that any 
large American city, North or South." 46 The city had 
peacefully added African Americans to its police force, and 
had desegregated its public libraries, buses, and 
recreational facilities. An article in the New Republic in 
February 1959 was perhaps the first report to bring the 
surprising news that no leadership for peaceful school 
.-
desegregation had yet emerged in New Orleans. 
There is no organized effort - as in Atlanta - to 
encourage people to think in advance of what the loss 
of the public schools would mean to them and to make 
their views known ... There is no organized defense of 
the public schools by Protestant clergy or professional 
men and women, and most Negro leaders in New Orleans 
seem more interested in their personal political 
organizations than in matters of principle. The press 
45 Ibid. 
4 <!·Ibid., p.9. 
- an anemic force in New Orleans life - gives its 
readers no hint that there is cause for concern 
about the future of the schools. 47 
One of the largest groups of citizens in New Orleans 
was the Catholic Church. Nearly two-thirds of the 
43 
population of the city was Roman Catholic. The diocese had 
the reputation of being liberal on race relations and at one 
time the diocese seemed to be leading the way for acceptance 
of desegregation. The church leader, Archbishop Joseph 
Francis Rummel, had earlier ordered the "white" and 
"colored" signs removed from church pews. On the Sunday 
following Judge Wright/s ruling, the Archbishop issued 
a pastoral letter stating that racial segregation was 
"morally wrong and sinful because it is a denial of the 
unity and solidarity of the human race as conceived by God 
in the creation of man in Adam and Eve." 48 
Support for Archbishop Rummel waned after his pastoral 
letter and some priests refused to read it to their 
congregations. Five months later Rummel announced that he 
had planned to have the parochial schools integrated on a 
grade by grade basis beginning in September 1957. 
Contributions to the church dee] ined seriously and pledges 
to capital projects were not honored. When September 1957 
47Helen Fuller, "New Orleans Knows Better", New Reoubl ic, 
16 February 1959, p.16. cited by Morton Inger, Politics and 
Reality in an American City - The New Orleans School Crisis 
of 1960, <New York: Center for Urban Education, 1969), p.9. 
48Newsweek, 5 March 1965, p.51, cited in Morton Inger, 
J oc . c i t . , p . 22 . 
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arrived Rummel, who had not referred to his school 
desegregation statement since it was made, was unable to 
desegregate the parochial schools. In July 1959, Rummel 
announced that the parochial schools would integrate at the 
earliest possible opportunity and definitely no later than 
the public schools. 49 
Redmond refers to cooperation between the Catholic 
school system, its Superintendent/Monsignor Henry Bezou, 
and the public schools. The archdiocese had reached an 
agreement with Redmond and the Orleans Parish School Board 
to desegr~gate both systems at the same time. 
Unfortunately, before it could take place, the archbishop 
became ii l and the plan never came to fruition. Without 
Archbishop Rummel/s leadership, the group of priests who 
were making decisions for the diocese decided that they 
would postpone the desegregation of the Catholic schools 
until after the public schools had successfully integrated 
their schools.~0 
The leaders of New Orleans made no attempt to prepare 
the community for desegregation of the schools. They al I 
believed that their schools would not be forced to 
desegregate, even after the federal courts ordered it. It 
must be remembered that New Orleans is not a small 
Bible-belt town but is the nations/s second largest port, 
49 Inger, Joe.cit., p.23. 
~ 0 Redmond interview, Joe.cit. 
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the home of liberal French Catholicism, and one of America/s 
most cosmopolitan cities. 
In 1959 a group cal led Save Our Schools, Inc. <SOS) 
was organized. The group was composed of social workers, 
Tulane professors and their wives, some lawyers and 
businessmen, many Jews, and pro-integration Catholics. None 
of the members of SOS were in the elite; they were New 
Orleans liberals and could not attract the moderates of the 
city. SOS emphasized open schools rather than integrated 
schools. 51 The city/s elite, the influential bankers, 
attorneys, and businessmen did not become involved in the 
decisions that led to the desegregation of the schools. 
They remained silent through the days of violence and 
boycotts. The elite eventually spoke out for a peaceful 
solution, but only after the city/s reputation had been 
tarnished. 
In an interview, Superintendent Redmond recalled his 
view of the situation in New Orleans. Like other southern 
cities, the neighborhoods of New Orleans were not 
segregated. African-Americans and whites lived in the same 
area and even on the same block. The segregated 
neighborhoods that existed in Chicago did not exist there, 
with the exception of the lakefront area which was developed 
in the post-World War II era. These housing patterns did 
not have an effect on the schools, however, because by law 
51 Inger, Joe.cit., p.25. 
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the races could not attend school together. You may walk 
further to your school than your neighbor because he was of 
a different racial group.~ 2 
Redmond felt and his feelings are generally supported 
in the literature that he was hired by "a reform board. a 
very progressive board." He felt an advantage in that he 
and the entire Board were within five years of age of each 
other. and this added to their cohesiveness. 53 'He felt that 
even though the board was elected by popular vote. they did 
not necessarily represent the popular attitude on the 
race issue. Redmond stated that the board. their attorney. 
Sam Rosenberg. and he decided as a group that it was 
necessary to fight the court order to desegregate in every 
legal way possible. and push every legal angle of law that 
was available and honorable. These actions spanned the 
years 1956 to 1959. The case was appealed to the United 
States Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court both of which 
affirmed Judge Wright/s decision In district court. On 
15 July 1959 Judge Wright ordered the board to file a 
desegregation plan by 1 March 1960. He later changed the 
date to 16 May 1960 at the board/s request.~~ Prior to the 
next court appearance the board surveyed the parents of 
children in the schools and asked whether they would rather 
see the schools open with some Integration or not open at 
52Redmond Interview. Joe.cit. 
~ 3 Ibid. 
~ 4 Inger. Joe.cit .• p.18. 
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all. To the board's amazement over 80 percent of the white 
parents responded that they would rather see the schools not 
open at al 1. On 16 May, the board told the court that it 
had no desegregation plan, and Judge Wright responded by 
supplying his own plan, ordering the desegregation of all 
first grades at the opening of school in September. 55 On 
17 August 1960, additional support for desegregation was 
gained when a suit <Wi 1 liams v. Davis 187 F. Supp. 42 
<1960)) was filed by thirty white parents asking the court 
to issue and injunction restraining the governor and other 
state officials from obeying the state court injunction and 
the state statutes with respect to segregation. It is 
speculated that the four moderates on the school board gave 
encouragement and support in the fil lng of this suit. There 
ls even some evidence that Board Attorney Rosenberg and 
Judge Wright may have been instrumental in the preparation 
of the sult.~ 6 On 31 August 1960 the four moderates on the 
board asked Judge Wright for another delay to al low the 
staff time to prepare a desegregation plan. He granted 
their request and set 14 November as the day desegregation 
would start.~ 7 
Redmond then prepared a plan and presented it to Judge 
Wright. Wright approved the plan and ordered Redmond and 
the Board to carry out the plan. The plan developed was 
55 !bid .• p.19. 
5
"'·Ibid., p.32. 
57 Ibid. , p. 33. 
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designed to place some African-American children in white 
schools. The board refused to consider such political 
considerations as: who would support what plan, where would 
support most likely arise, and where would the opposition 
be.~9 The board established a four-step administrative 
procedure for considering applications for permits to 
transfer. The board wanted a "scientific selection" that 
would be completely objective, thus freeing the board and 
the superintendent from personal responsibility. The first 
step was a review of the application by four assistant 
superintendents. The second step was the review of the 
applicants scholastic aptitude and Intelligence by 
psychologists and the acting director of guidance and 
testing. The next review was performed by the assistant 
superintendent for instruction and other staff members who 
tried to consider what effect the new program would have on 
the transferred child and what effect the transferred child 
would have on the existing program. The final review was 
held by the superintendent, his first assistant, the medical 
director, and other staff members. Their job was to 
evaluate the information previously collected and present 
the results to the board who would direct the superintendent 
to issue or not to issue a transfer to the student.~~ 
Redmond refers to the process as "not scientific, the 
~ 9 Ibid., p.34. 
5 Q!bid., p.36. 
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screening was based on hunches. This kid can make it. This 
kid has what it takes to go into a rough situation and make 
1 t • .,sn 
On 26 September 1960 the board formally announced the 
integration plan described above. In the weeks after the 
plan was announced, a total of 137 African-Americans applied 
for permits to transfer."'· 1 While awaiting the transfer 
applications members of the board actively sought out 
support for the integration plan from the community/s elite. 
Although it appeared that some headway was being made, some 
of the elite said that they could support only a plan that 
kept first graders separated by sex and that the toilets 
would remain segregated. Board attorneys felt that Judge 
Skelly Wright would accept separation by sex because it had 
a board policy at one time but there was little doubt that 
segregated washrooms would be permitted. 62 
At the same meeting the board also established as a 
guideline that any student whose application was accepted 
must have test scores equal to or above the median of the 
school to which they are applying. 63 This decision made it 
more difficult to place the transferring students because it 
was necessary to find a school that had first grade median 
scores low enough to admit the African-American children . 
.:-
0 Redmond interview, Joe.cit. 
"""
1 Inger , 1 oc . c i t . , p . 36 . 
62 Ibid . 
.:-
3 Ibid. 
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People within and outside of the board tried to convince 
Redmond and the board members, as a first step, to find 
schools where white parents and their children would be more 
accepting of the African-American children and then find 
students who could fit in those schools. Redmond and the 
board rejected this suggestion because they felt that 
selection would then be too subjective. The result of the 
board using its "scientific" method was that it chose to 
desegregate the schools that gave every appearance of being 
the worst possible ones. 64 
Only.two schools were chosen to participate in the 
p;an, William Frantz and McDonogh No.19, both in the same 
neighborhood. Located in the most neglected part of the 
city, the ninth ward, the proximity of the two schools to 
each other made it relatively easy for segregationists to 
cause disturbances at each school. The ninth ward bordered 
St. Bernard's Parish, the county control Jed by 
archsegregationlst, Leander Perez, from which it was easy 
to send pickets to protest at the school sites. 6 ~ 
On 27 October the school board announced that it had 
granted transfer permits to five African-American pupils, 
all girls. 00 The board refused to Identify either the 
children or the schools into which they would transfer. 
This action convinced Governor Jimmy Davis that the Orleans 
04 Ibid., p.38. 
05 Ibid. 
6
-.!·Ibid., p.41. 
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Parish Board was going to follow through on its 
desegregation plan and he cal led for a special session of 
the legislature to discuss the state's next move. 67 The 
special session was used by Governor Davis to try to stop 
the school board from complying with the federal court order 
to desegregate. The governors' allies in the state 
legislature voted to suspend the rules and introduced 
twenty-seven bills that cal Jed for various state actions 
that would happen if a local school board tried to integrate 
their schools in opposition to state law. The entire 
legislative package depended on Bil 1 Number Two, which 
purported to interpose the sovereignty of the state between 
the federal government and the school board. 68 
On 14 November 1960 four frightened African-American 
girls Cthe fifth had withdrawn her application), three at 
McDonogh No. 19 and one at Frantz, became the first of their 
race in the Deep South since the end of Reconstruction to 
attend classes with whites below the college level . 69 Since 
the board's plan had been kept a secret there were no 
demonstrations upon the students arrival at school. 
However, as word spread in the morning, many white parents 
came to school and took their children home. By the end of 
the week every white child had withdrawn from McDonogh No. 
19, and all but two white children withdrew from Frantz. 
67 Ibid. 
""s!bid., p.44. 
e· 9 !bid., p.50. 
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White parents boycotted class at McDonogh 19, for the entire 
school year, except for a short period of time in January 
1961. The parent who broke the boycott was fired from his 
job at Walgreen;s and was forced to leave town because no 
one would hire him. Two families at Frantz kept their 
children in school and later other families also returned 
their children to school and the boycott was never total . 70 
. 
The state legislature again met for a special sessjon 
on 15 November 1960. This time the lawmakers declared 
illegal all acts of the "now defunct New Orleans School 
Board" and warned all banks and businesses not to do 
business with or honor checks of or make loans to the "old" 
school board. 71 Other actions by the legislature included: 
directing the transfer of the Orleans School Board funds to 
the legislature; provision for education expense grants to 
parents of children attending non-prof it, nonsectarian, 
non-public schools; and the firing of Superintendent Redmond 
and board attorney Rosenberg. 72 Turmoil continued in the 
school system. On 22 November Redmond announced that the 
school board would be unable to meet its teacher payroll 
because it was unable to secure a loan. The next day the 
legislature authorized pay for all Orleans Parish school 
employees except for the administrative staff and the 
teachers at the desegregated schools. 
701QJ_Q. 
7 1 I bi d. , p . 53 . 
72 Ibid. 
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The boycott became more intense as time went on. The 
number of white children attending class at Frantz had 
increased to twenty-three by early December but a new wave 
of threats, stonings, and other harassments reduced the 
number of white students to eight. Eventual Jy, federal 
marshals were brought in to transport the white children who 
wanted to attend FrantZ. 78 The continued boycott hurt 
businessmen and reports around the country noted that New 
Orleans was feeling financial repercussions. Tourism was 
definitely down and even the Mardl Gras was threatened. 
Finally on 14 December a group of 105 business and 
professional men ran a three-quarter page ad in the 
newspaper appealing for an end to threats and street 
demonstrations and for support for the school board. 74 
The financial crisis continued and the teachers were 
again victim to the legislature's attempts to defeat 
integration. The legislature adjourned on 22 December 
without releasing funds for the salaries of the teachers and 
other employees of the Orleans school system. Some of the 
funds were released in January but again the administrative 
staff and teachers at the desegregated schools were not 
included. 7~ 
The turning point in the attempt to gain public support 
for the school board came in January 1961. Several women/s 
78 Ibid., p.57. 
74 Ibid., p.62. 
75 Ibid., p.63. 
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groups sponsored a testimonial dinner to honor the four 
board members and Superintendent Redmond. On 30 January 
1961 a dinner was attended by 1650 citizens who came to pay 
tribute to the board members and superintendent for the 
sacrifices they had made to preserve public education in New 
Orleans. 76 At the dinner, the attendees were reminded of 
the need for them to provide public displays of confidence 
and support. From that point on, although the boycott 
continued and financial problems sti 11 existed, the Board 
and the superintendent knew that their problems would become 
more manageable. Public support began to grow and the 
crisis was on a downswing. On 31 August, a full-page 
advertisement listing 315 civic and business leaders ran in 
the Times-Picayune that called for a peaceful desegregation 
of the schools. The ad demanded that "public education ... 
must be preserved; ... and the dignity of our city 
upheld .... " 77 In addition to the public statements, there 
were private assurances to the school board of the support 
of some of the top civic leaders. 
Redmond recalled the period of time after the 
announcement of the plans to desegregate as a time "when the 
legislature and part of the population of New Orleans lost 
their rationallty." 79 During this period of time Redmond 
notes that he was fired fourteen times by the state 
76 lbid .• p.64. 
77 Ibid., p.68. 
78Redmond interview, Joe.cit. 
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legislature only to be reinstated by Judge Skelly Wright. 
The faculties of the two schools that were the object of the 
boycott remained at their schools and "they developed 
in-service type programs, instructors came in to work with 
them, we kept those schools going." 79 Redmond noted that 
70-80 percent of his budget revenues came from the state, 
so that when the state began to withhold funds from the 
schools, it had a great impact on the operations of the 
system. Redmond was gratified that during this time of 
financial crisis some groups offered assistance. "One union 
official from Chicago offered to put four mil lion dollars in 
the bank so that we could meet our payrol 1. Another rich 
individual offered a million dollars for the same 
purpose• II SO 
said: 
Redmond remembered the New Orleans experience and 
we didn/t teach school that year, we were Jiving the 
desegregation problem. We did desegregate the schools. 
We did have problems but we didn/t have soldiers in the 
street. We didn/t have riots, we did have 
demonstrations. Hindsight tel ls us that the schools 
selected were in the worst section of town. Hindsight 
tells you that you should not have put it on a 
voluntary basis. You should have selected parts of 
town you knew would have accepted it better. OK, but 
that would have been maneuvering but at least at that 
point in time we were purist. It probably would be 
better in a more liberal part of town. We probably 
could have swung it with Jess problems. 91 
Redmond related that as the school year was ending his 
79 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
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contract was expiring. The board was willing to offer him 
another contract but he was also offered a contract by a 
consulting firm at a smal I increase in salary. Redmond 
stated: 
I was thinking, it sounds altruistic, but I was 
thinking it/s time for me to move out and take a lot of 
the heat and hate away with me. As I look back now, 
sure, Bishop Cody had lowered the boom on the White 
Citizens Council Catholics. A good number of the 
people of New Orleans came to their senses and things 
settled down real quick. I don/t think my moving did 
much good. I think that if I would have stayed, it 
would have been the same. New Orleans is not redneck 
or reactionary, it has a liberal undertone to it. 82 
A MOVE TO THE EAST COAST 
• 
After leaving New Orleans, Red~ond moved his family to 
New York. He was hired as director of school administration 
services by Boaz, Al Jen, and Hami !ton Management 
Consultants. He stayed in this position for two years but 
left because he did not enjoy the sel I ing aspects of the job 
that a consultant must do in order to get work. He enjoyed 
the consulting because he was able to work with smart people 
who wanted to study their schools to be sure that they were 
functioning to the best of their ability. In addition to 
the selling, Redmond did not appreciate the travel that was 
necessary in the business.e?-
Redmond left the consultant business in 1963 to return 
to the superintendency of the Syosset Public Schools on Long 
Island, New York. Redmond refers to the Syosset 
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superintendency as "probably an ideal situation. There were 
10,000 students, you prepared your budget and it was 
accepted by popular vote after a New England-type town 
meeting. 1184 "The Syosset area developed mostly after World 
War II and was settled by young families who did not mind 
paying higher property taxes to provide a good education for 
their children. The per pupil expenditures in Syosset were 
three times as much as in New Orleans and twice as much as 
in Chicago. 118 ~ The district paid its teachers well. There 
were ten elementary schools, two junior highs and one senior 
high school in the district. Redmond jokingly referred to 
it as "a job you could do from ten to four. 1186 Redmond 
enjoyed his stay in Syosset but left to return to Chicago in 
August 1966. "I'd had other offers while ln Syosset, it was 
ideal, but Chicago was something special so I returned." 87 
The president of the Chicago Board of Education, Frank 
Whiston, called and he arranged to talk about the 
superintendency in Chicago. Redmond recalled: 
I'd known Frank because he was on the board for about 
a year before I left for New Orleans. I met with a 
board committee at a hotel for an Informal meeting. I 
was not offered the job at that time but I returned to 
Syosset with a very good feeling about it. Months went 
by and I did not hear anything until I was invited back 
to talk things over and I was offered the job. I came 
aboard in a very favorable sltuatlon. The vote was 
10-1 to offer me a contract. The only "no" vote was 
Mrs. Green who later told me she voted "no" only 
84 Ibid. 
8~Ibid. 
86 Ibld. 
87 Ibid. 
because she had never met me before the voting took 
place. 88 
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We have reviewed the experiences that helped make James 
F. Redmond the choice of the Chicago Board of Education to 
succeed Benjamin Willis. We have followed the development 
of his career from its' beginnings in Kansas City, through 
his big city experience in Chicago and New Orleans, his 
"ideal situation" in Syosset, and to his return ,to Chicago. 
We have gained an understanding of the situation that 
existed in Chicago's schools in 1966 and the need for a 
superintendent that could relieve the antagonism that 
existed in many communities. Redmond projected a fatherly 
image and had a calm demeanor about him. His previous 
tenure in Chicago was a definite advantage to his 
superintendency because he knew many of the personnel under 
his supervision and was familiar with the decision makers in 
the city. He was able to begin assessing the challenges 
that existed and offer solutions to them. Upon his arrival 
in Chicago in October 1966 Redmond faced the long standing 
challenges of desegregation of the schools and a response to 
the demands of the civil rights movement. He would also 
need to carry out a decentralization plan developed by the 
Booz. Al Jen. and Hamilton Report. Later, he would decide 
the fate of a shared time program with parochial schools. 
However, a more immediate challenge quickly became his first 
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priority, he was to be the first superintendent to negotiate 
a collective bargaining agreement with the Chicago Teachers 
Union. 
60 
CHAPTER III 
A FIRST: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WITH THE TEACHERS UNION 
James F. Redmond began his first term as General 
Superintendent of the Chicago Public Schools on 3 October 
1966. He was not availed the ~honeymoon period'' that many 
administrators meet when they enter a new position. Instead 
he walked into a situation that would effect 
employer-employee relationships within the school system for 
years to come. Although the challenge of finding a solution 
to the problem of desegregating the schools was a priority, 
it had to be deferred until RedTiond and the school board 
could negotiate the first collective bargaining agreement 
with the Chicago Teachers Union as the sole bargainer for 
Chicago/s teachers. The only action that the Board had 
taken was to appoint a negotiating committee. Red~ond 
offered to work with this committee and spent many days 
doing so. Redmond realized that teachers would be demanding 
a salary increase which he believed they deserved. His job, 
however, was not only to administer the educational program 
and create a good working environment for the teachers, he 
had to be fiscal Jy responsible to the Board and the 
taxpayers and not spend more money than the Board had. 
In this chapter we shall discuss the contract 
negotiations which took place during the Redmond 
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administration. We shall discuss contracts negotiated for 
the years 1967 through 1974. The reader will learn about 
problems that arose in early negotiations with an emphasis 
on the negotiations for the 1969 contract. This particular 
contract created several scenarios that were not encountered 
before, including the first strike. We shall discuss the 
four phases of the negotiations examined by Francis M. 
Landwerermeyer, S.J., in his dissertation "Teacher Unionism, 
Chicago Style: A Histo~y of the Chicago Teachers Union, 
1937-72". 1 We conclude with summaries of the negotiations 
through the 1974 contract. 
But first, in order to get a better understanding of 
the development of the Teachers Union to the point that they 
were able to win an election to become sole bargaining agent 
for the teachers, we shall take a brief look at the history 
of teacher organizations in Chicago. 
TEACHERS ORGANIZE TO SEEK COMMON GOALS 
The first teachers to organize in Chicago were the 
elementary school teachers, mostly women, who met to take 
action against their common grievances: low salaries, no 
tenure protection, and a pension system that was falling 
apart. A small group of teachers met on 16 March 1897 at 
the Central Music Hall and began an organization that became 
1 Francis M. Landwerermeyer, S. J., "Teacher Unionism, Chicago 
Style: A History of the Chicago Teachers Union, 1937-72." 
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1978) 
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known as the Chicago Teachers Federation CCTF). By December 
1897 the CTF had grown to a membership of 2,567, more than 
one-half of all the teachers in the public schools. ? In 
its/ earlier years, the CTF had as its major objective the 
securing of a stable pension fund. Under the leadership of 
Catharine Goggin and Margaret Haley, attempts to secure the 
help of the Board of Education in lobbying for better 
pensions were considered successful. In 1907, I l l in G is 
enacted legislation that contained a compulsory pension 
contribution clause and established a pension board of 
trustees .• The board of trustees consisted of two school 
board members, the board secretary as an ex officio mewber, 
and six elected teacher representatives. 3 
The desire to increase the salary of the average school 
teacher Jed to the next crusade for Goggin and Haley. Haley 
had overheard a conversation concerning the fact that 
certain large corporations had failed to pay property 
taxes. 4 Since the property tax was the basis for funding 
the schools, any additional funds col Jected could possibly 
be used for pay increases. Haley sought and received the 
support of Board President Graham H. Harris to pursue the 
collection of these taxes through the courts. The dogged 
persistence of the CTF and their attorneys finally won the 
suit and the taxes were eventually paid to the Board of 
2 Herrick, Joe.cit., p.96. 
3 Joan K. Smith, Joe.cit., p.137. 
"I bi d . , p • 1 27 . 
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Education. The Board, however, decided to use the money 
collected to pay bll ls and perform building maintenance. 
Finally, in June 1906, the new mayor, Edward Dunne, 
appointed new board members who voted to use the delinquent 
tax money for teachers back salaries. 5 
The election of William Hale Thompson as Mayor in April 
1915 led to the disintegration of the relationship between 
the Board of Education and the Chicago Teachers Federation. 
Thompson/s desire to bring more politics into the Board 
angered the Federation. On 1 September 1915, the 
Thompson-appointed Board of Education added more friction to 
the bad feelings between the two groups. Board member Jacob 
Loeb introduced a board policy that forbade "Membership by 
teachers in organizations affiliated with a trade union, or 
a federation or association of trade unions, as wel 1 as 
teacher organizations which have off leers, business agents, 
or other representatives who are not members of the teaching 
force." 6 After much criticism regarding the "Loeb Rule," 
the Board limited the restrictions to membership in the 
Federation. The Chicago Teachers Federation appealed the 
rule to the court and it was eventually found to be 11 legal 
but the Board found a way to circumvent the rule. At the 
Board meeting of 27 June 1916, the Board refused to renew 
the contracts of sixty-eight teachers all of whom were 
~Ibid., p.132. 
6 Proceedings of the Board of Education, 1915-16, p.734, cited 
in Herrick, Joe.cit., p.122. 
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either past or present members of the Federation. The Board 
refused to give a reason for the f irings. 7 The Federation 
appealed the firings but the co~rt ruled that the Board had 
the absolute right to deny employment to anyone for any 
reason whatsoever or for no reason. 8 
In April 1916 the Chicago Teachers Federation, having 
previously In 1902 Joined the Chicago Federation of Labor, 
decided that it would further increase its ties to organized 
labor. The Federation Joined with the Men's Teachers Union, 
the Federation of Women High School Teachers, and four 
smaller unions and petitioned the American Federation of 
Labor <AFL) to charter a new national labor organization, 
the American Federation of Teachers <AFT>. As the oldest 
and largest local of the AFT, the Federation became Local 
One."" 
The efforts of the CTF to obtain a protected teacher 
pension fund and higher salaries had been successful. Their 
next goal was to obtain the protection of tenure. In 1917 a 
combined effort by the civic groups, board members, and the 
Federation resulted in sufficient pressure on the 
legislature to pass legislation known as the Otis Law which 
reorganized the school system and granted tenure to teachers 
after a three year probationary period. Membership on the 
Board of Education was decreased to eleven members and their 
';""Herrick, loc.clt., p.128. 
e I b I d. , p • 1 29 • 
. ,,, I bi d. , p • 1 27. 
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appointment was for five year terms. The Board was given 
additional taxing and borrowing po~ers. and the right of 
eminent domain. 10 
In the spring of 1917 the Federation began to lose its 
power. On 21 May 1917 the Federation withdrew its 
affiliation with the American Federation of Teachers and 
the Chicago Federation of Labor. Many reasons for the 
disaffiliation were speculated including the rumor that 
Haley had made a deal with Loeb that he would make peace 
with the Federation if they left the labor affiliations. 
Other reasons for the move were a depleted treasury due to 
the cost of suits and salaries of the suspended teachers, 
and the Joss of half of its membership during the 1915-16 
period. 11 
THE CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION IS FORMED 
The economic depression of the 1930/s brought new 
problems to the teachers in Chicago. In Apri 1 1931 the 
Board of Education/s financial resources were depleted. The 
April salary came in late May. The July and August salaries 
were paid in scrip or tax warrants. These warrants could be 
used to pay taxes at their face value but would only bring a 
percentage of their face value when teachers tried to sell 
them or pay a debt with them. From March 1930, to September 
1 0 Ibid. , p. 134. 
1 1 I bi d . , p . 1 35 • 
66 
1934, there were only eight paydays on time, and seven in 
the four years were paper, not cash. 12 In 1933 the 
Volunteer Emergency Committee was formed and headed by John 
Fewkes. The purpose of the Committee was to unite several 
organizations in a protest until pay days were restored 
properly. On 21 March 1933 the Committee planned a march on 
city hal 1 to protest the lack of regular paydays. The 
Committee also researched and found businesses that were 
delinquent in payment of taxes and suggested that no one do 
business with them. 13 
In May 1936, the Men Teachers Union elected John Fewkes 
of the Volunteer Emergency Committee to the office of 
president. His election platform cal led for the immediate 
amalgamation of the teachers unions. 1 ~ Letters were sent to 
every teacher organization to meet and discuss the 
possibility of uniting into one organization. After months 
of discussion, a meeting was held on 28 October 1937 and the 
four teacher unions <Men Teachers Union, Federation of 
Women High School Teachers, Playground Teachers Union, and 
the Elementary Schoo 1 Teachers Uni on) surrendered the.Ir 
charters to the AFT and John Fewkes as their president 
received a charter for their new union. The new 
organization was cal led the Chicago Teachers Union and was 
1 2 I bi d . , p • 1 90 . 
I =·Ibid. , p. 239. 
141.Ql.Q.' p.241. 
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issued the charter as Local One. 1 ~ The Union grew steadily 
and by April 1938 total led 8,200 teachers- more than 
two-thirds of the entire teaching staff. 16 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS 
It is difficult to separate the process of collective 
bargaining from the development of unions. Prior to the 
formation of the AFT in 1917, other labor organizations 
had tried to gain wages and benefits for their members. We 
know the legal status of collective bargaining was 
established in 1935 with the National Labor Relations Act 
which set down conditions and requirements for 
employer-employee bargaining in the private sector. 17 
According to the United States Constitution teachers have a 
right to join labor organizations as part of the right of 
association. However, legal control of labor organizations 
is reserved for the states through the tenth amendment. The 
issue of collective bargaining in the public schools was not 
addressed before 1959, when Wisconsin passed the first 
bargaining Jaw for the public sector. 16 The first 
collective bargaining contract for public school teachers 
was an agreement between the American Federation of Teachers 
15
"History of the Chicago Teachers Union," Chicago Teachers 
Union Collection, Chicago Historical Society, Box 51. 
16Herrick, Joe.cit., p.243. 
17Anthony M. Cresswell and Michael J. Murphy, Teachers, 
Unions. and Collective Bargaining in Pub! le Education. 
CBerkeley: Mccutchan Publishing Corporation, 1980), p.19. 
18 Ibid., p.20. 
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Local of Cicero, Illinois and the Cicero Board of Education 
in 1944. 1 9 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COMES TO CHICAGO 
In an article In the Chicago American on 22 January 
1965, Marty O'Connor reported that "organized labor will ask 
the legislature to permit government employees to bargain 
col lectively. 1120 The Sun Times later reported that Governor 
Otto Kerner promised organized labor that he would fight for 
the collective bargaining bill . 21 Kerner later withdrew his 
support f~r the bill. The Chicago Board of Education 
decided to collectively bargain in 1966 even though there 
were no state laws regarding col Jective bargaining for 
public employees. 
On 30 October 1963 President Claire Roddewlg reported 
that the General Committee of the Board of Education had 
considered the matter of a collective bargaining agreement 
with representatives of teacher organizations and that the 
Committee recommended that the Board not enter into such an 
agreement. 22 On 8 January 1964 Board member <and labor 
union official) Thomas J. Murray introduced a resolution 
that would have al lowed the Chicago Teachers Union to become 
1
""'Ibid., p.21. 
20 Marty O'Connor, "Labor Wil I Seek to Bargain for Public 
Employees," Chicago American, 22 January 1965. 
21 Bernel l Heinecke, "Kerner Vows Fight for Bargaining Bi 11," 
Sun Times, 25 February 1965. 
22Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 30 
October 1963, Chicago, II., p.605. 
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a collective bargaining agency for the teachers and 
educational personnel who had indicated a desire to have the 
Teachers Union represent them. The vote on the motion was 
deferred to 26 February 1964 whereupon it passed by a vote 
of seven to one. 23 At this same meeting Board member 
Raymond Pasnick asked for a deferment. until the meeting of 
11 March 1964, of a resolution that would grant collective 
bargaining rights to the Chicago Education Association 
CCEA), a division of the Illinois Education Association. 
Pasnick noted that if the Board recognized the union as a 
bargainer for its members, it was only sensible that other 
groups be allowed to bargain for their members. This 
resolution passed by a six to two vote with two passing.~4 
At the very next Board meeting President Roddewig notified 
the Board that he had received a letter from John M. Fewkes, 
the President of the Chicago Teachers Union, asking the 
Board to conduct an election among the teacher organizations 
to determine whom they would want to represent them as an 
exclusive bargaining agent. 25 The Board deferred discussion 
of the issue at thls meeting and at subsequent meetings 
until 23 September 1965. At the Board meeting on 23 
September 1965, after three hours of discussion. the Board 
23Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 26 
February 1964, Chicago, Il .• p.1952. 
24Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 11 March 
1964, Chicago, Il., p.2013-14. 
25Mintues of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 25 March 
1964, Chicago, II., p.2116. 
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passed by a vote of six to two a resolution that called for 
an election by the members of the various teachers 
organizations to select a sole col lectlve bargaining 
agent. 26 Union President John M. Fewkes wrote to Board 
President Frank Whiston and suggested that the election be 
held on 28 or 29 October and offered the Teachers Union 
help ln determining who should vote and who shouJd conduct 
. 
the election. 27 While considering the possibility of ar 
election for the right to serve as sole col lectlve 
bargaining agent, the Board entered into Memorandums of 
Understanding with both the Chicago Teachers Union and the 
Chicago Education Association. 
The Chicago Education Association CCEA) ti led suit in 
the Circuit Court of Cook County on 18 October 1965 seeking 
a temporary lnJunctlon against the collective bargaining 
election. The CEA filed on the grounds that the election 
resolution breached the Board's agreement with the CEA and 
gave preferential treatment to the Chicago Teachers Union. 
Judge Cornelius Harrington requested that the CEA pursue 
such administrative remedies as were provided In the 
Memorandum of Understanding and continued the case until 28 
26Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting of 23 
September 1965, Chicago, Il .• p.725-746. 
~ 7 Letter from President John M. Fewkes of the Chicago Teachers 
Union to Board President Frank Whiston, Chicago Teachers 
Union Col Jection, Chicago Historical Society, Chlcago,Il ., 
Box 51, File 5. 
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October 1965. 28 The Board met in General Committee on 4 
November 1965 to hear the complaint of the CEA regarding the 
election. After listening to the presentation by the CEA, 
the Board denied the complaint and reaffirmed its resolution 
regarding the election. The Board did amend the resolution 
to make it clear that they did not intend to discriminate in 
any way between the organizations. 2 ~ In a Jetter from John 
Fewkes to President Frank Whiston, Fewkes told Whiston 
that the Union would welcome the CEA/s participation in the 
election for collective bargaining. 30 On 23 February 1966 
Judge Harrington ruled that the Chicago Board of Education 
had the right to authorize a referendum for a sole 
collective bargaining agent, but that no new bargaining 
agreement could be entered into until after 12 November 1966 
when the current agreements expired. He further ordered 
that any items in a new agreement applied to both union and 
non-union members, and that the agreement include a no 
strike and no picket clause. 31 
The committee established to oversee the collective 
28Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 27 
October 1965, Chicago, Il ., p.829-30. 
29Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 4 
November 1965, Chicago, II., p.939. 
30 Letter from John Fewkes, President of the Chicago Teachers 
Union, to Board President Frank Whiston, 20 October 1965, 
Chicago Teachers Union Collection, Chicago Historical 
Society, Box 51, File 5. 
31
"Court OK/s Single Agent for Teachers," Chicago Tribune, 24 
November 1966. 
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bargaining election selected 27 May 1966 as election day. 82 
The guidelines for the election were accepted by the Board 
on 18 May 1966. They included: eligibility for voting 
Cassistant principals, elementary and high school teachers, 
and truant officers), notice of voting and eligibility in 
schools and offices, method of casting ballots (mailed), 
ballot form, supervision of the election by the Statlstica1 
Tabulating Corporation, and that the winner would need a 
simple majority of the votes cast. 83 The election was held 
on 27 May 1966 and Statlstlca! Tabulating Corporation 
reported the results to the Board shown in flgure 3.1. 
RESULTS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ELECTION34 
Bal lots mailed 23,455 
No/Wrong Address 1,267 
Postmarked late, not counted 587 
Chicago Education Association 364 
Blank 781 
Chicago Teachers Federation 16 
Miscellaneous 111 
Chicago Teachers Union 10936 
Total Votes Cast 
Could not be counted 
Grand Total 
Figure 3.1 
12208 
587 
12795 
Since the Chicago Teachers Union won more than fifty 
.-
percent of the votes cast, they were declared the winner of 
the election. At the Board meeting of 13 July 1966 Thomas 
Murray moved that the Board of Education officially 
82Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 28 Apr i 1 
1966, Chicago, I 1 . , p.3078. 
88Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 18 May 
1966, Chicago, I 1 . , p.3158-59. 
$= 4 Mi nutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 22 June 
1966, Chicago, I 1 . , p.3534. 
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recognize the Chicago Teachers Union as the sole bargaining 
agent for assistant principals, teachers, and truant 
officers. The motion carried by a seven to two vote with 
o~e abstention. 3 e 
THE FIRST CONTRACT - BOTH SIDES LEARN ABOUT NEGOTIATING 
The stage was now set for the first collective 
bargaining sessions between the Board of Education and the 
Chicago Teachers Union. Chicago, fol lowing New York, became 
the second large city to col lective]y negotiate. At the 
f lrst negotiation session on 4 October 1066, the Board was 
represented by Superintendent James F. Redmond and his 
staff, Board members Judge Edward S. Scheffler, Mrs. Lydon 
Wild, and Mr. Thomas Murray; while the Union was represented 
by President John E. Desmond, Ms. Vivian Gal Jagher, Robert 
Healey, and other union staff members. At this first 
session the Union refused to negotiate because there were 
members of the press in attendance. 26 Board member and 
acting chairman of the Employee Relations Committee, Thomas 
Murray, acknowledged at a later Board meeting that the 
Union/s position was indeed correct and that a negotiations 
meeting did not constitute a public meeting because no legal 
actions would be taking place. Mr. Murray referred to his 
3~Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 13 July 
1966, Chicago, Il ., p.593-594. 
3 ~"CTU begins negotiations," Chicago Union Teacher 32 
COctober 1966): 1. 
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experience as a labor leader who had been through 
negotiations before. 37 At the fourth meeting the Union 
presented to the committee the preliminary wording of their 
preferred labor contract. The document was presented in 
several parts containing proposals concerning wages, working 
conditions, fringe benefits, and a grievance procedure. The 
Board committee suggested that discussion of all union 
demands be carried out in a systematic and orderly manner, 
subject by subject. 38 In a Jetter to Union members on 14 
October 1966 President Desmond notes that there had been no 
progress rn negotiations but that the Union was continuing 
to negotiate for them in good faith. 3 Q 
On 30 November 1966, the Board of Education presented a 
list of its demands to the Union leadership. The Board 
demanded that the negotiated agreement include a clause that 
cal led for no strikes or picketing. The Board also demanded 
that any item negotiated for one employee be negotiated for 
all employees. The Board also insisted that they have the 
authority to assign any teacher to any position as they see 
fit as long as it is based on aptitude, talents, and 
expertise. 40 Additionally, the Board noted that non-union 
members must be granted the same grievance procedure as 
37Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 13 
October 1966, Chicago. II., p.594. 
38 Ibid., 593. 
39 ttLetter to the Membership from President John Desmond,u 
Chicago Union Teacher 32 <October 1966): 1. 
40
''Negotiations 1967 Contract," Chicago Teachers Union 
Collection, Chicago Historical Society, Box 52, Folder 4. 
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union members. The Board noted that if they feel that the 
Chicago Teachers Union does not represent the majority of 
the members of the teaching force they, the Board, can call 
for a collective bargaining electlon.~ 1 Negotiations 
continued throughout December without much progress. 
Teachers were sent home for a Christmas vacation with little 
hope for a settlement. 
On 5 January 1967, Union President John E. Desmond 
cal Jed for a strike to begin on Monday, 9 January 1967. 
This announcement and its approval by union delegates sent 
the Board into closed door sessions to discuss its options. 
Negotiations even took place over the phone with Board 
President Whiston and Union President Desmond discussing the 
possibility of diverting money from educational programs to 
meet union demands for salary and benefit increases. The 
Board rejected Desmond/s proposal • 42 The Board also 
considered seeking a court injunction to halt the strike but 
the majority decided that they would wait until the strike 
actual Jy took place before seeking help through the 
courts. 43 
The Citizens School Committee asked the Board of 
Education and the Teachers Union to joln forces with them to 
ask the state legislature for emergency financial 
411..Qj_g. 
42
"School Strike Stil I On; Delay Injunction Move," Chicago 
Tribune, 7 January 1967, p.1. 
431..Qj_g. 
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assistance. Mayor Daley also noted "that there can be help 
and assistance from the legislature, and that eventually is 
the place I suppose they wll 1 go.''·~ 4 Robert J. Ahrens of 
the Citizens Schools Committee suggested that the Union 
postpone the strike and support a proposed referendum of 28 
February 1967 for a fifteen cent property tax increase. 4 ~ 
Superintendent Reduond had earlier noted that the schools 
would remain open under the supervision of non-s~riking 
teachers, principals, and other supervisory personnel. 
Redmond also urged parents to volunteer to help care for the 
children. The Illinoia Congress of Parents and Teachers 
refused to take an official role in keeping the schoo!s open 
in the event of a teachers strike. Mrs. Arnold Streigh, 
Chicago Region president of the PTA, noted "it is up to the 
individual PTA's, the individual pa~ents , whether they will 
help to keep the schools open." 46 The Chicago Education 
Association denounced the strike and announced that their 
3,000 members would report to work on Monday. 47 
The Chicago Tribune in an editorial on 7 January 1967 
chastised all parties in the predicted strike. Although the 
editorial noted sympathy for teachers as individuals and 
agreed that there was a need for better pay and working 
441.Q.j_Q., p.2. 
4 ~Ibid. 
46
"PTA Avoids Stand on Strike," Chicago Tribune, 7 January 
1967, p.4. 
47
"Teacher Pay Plan Rejected," Chicago Tribune, 7 January 
1967, p.2. 
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conditions, it denied that the teachers union had as much a 
right to strike as did teamsters, janitors, or 
steelworkers. 48 It criticized the Board of Education for 
not fol lowing the advice of their attorney, James W. Coffey, 
who told the Board that it would be illegal to grant 
exclusive bargaining rights to one teachers/ group. The 
editorial noted that the legislature had refused to approve 
bargaining rights to unions representing public employees. 
The editorial repeated the words of the Il llnols Supreme 
Court that ttthere ls no Inherent right in municipal 
employees to strike against their governmental emp;oyers .. 
and that a strike of municipal employees for any purpose ls 
lllegal." 4 "' 
As the eleventh hour approached, both sides said that 
they were stil 1 open to further negotiations but they each 
huddled in their own meeting places. Finally on Saturday, 
7 January 1967, Mayor Richard J. Daley cal led for a meeting 
of school and union officials in his city hall office for 
Sunday at 1:00 p.m. Mayor Daley invited Superintendent 
Redmond, President of the Board Frank Whiston, Board 
attorney James W. Coffey, and Harold Ash of the AFT, CTU 
f lnancial secretary Vivian Gal Jagher, CTU attorney Martin 
Burns, and CTU President John Desmond. 50 At 5:30 p.m., 
•sttstriking the Publis Schools," Chicago Tribune, 7 January 
1967, p.8. 
491.Q.l_g, 
50
"Board, Union Representatives O.K. 20-Million-Dollar Pact," 
Chicago Tribune, 9 January 1967, p.1. 
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Daley summoned reporters to announce that the Board and the 
Union had "reached a meeting of the minds." Daley refused 
to be specific but noted that the Board and the Union would 
meet separately to disc~ss the proposed settlement. 51 Ten 
and one-half hours after Daley had called the meeting, the 
strike was over. CTU President Des~ond made the first 
statement announcing an agreement ~nd said there would be no 
strike on Monday. In his announcement, President Frank 
Whiston noted that the agreement had been approved by a f lve 
to four vote with new Board member John D. Carey driving In 
from out of town to cast his vote for the package. Whiston 
stated, "We have agreed to increase our b~dgetary estimates 
of Income from state and federal ald ln the amount of twenty 
million dollars in 1967."~ 2 
This first agreement between the Chicago Board of 
Education and the Chicago Teachers Union contained the 
fol lowing provisions: 
1. A raise of $500.00 for all teachers. 
2. A new medical plan. 
3. Two personal business days for each teacher. 
4. A re-opener to the contract if excess funds e~ist 
after the fiscal year, with the Union having input 
on how these excess monies are spent. 
5. A transfer and assignment pol icy for teachers ~as 
established. 
6. A grievance procedure was established.~ 3 
At 10:40 p.m., the Board voted to accept the agreement by a 
~'Ibid., p.2. 
52 Ibid., p.1. 
~ 3 "List of Union Gains," Union Teacher CSpeclal Issue), March 
1967, p.1-2. 
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five-four vote. Voting for the agreement were: John D. 
Carey, Mrs. Wendell Green, Thomas J. Murray, Mrs. Lydon 
Wild, and Frank Whiston. Voting against the pact were: 
Bernard S. Friedman, Warren H. Bacon, Cyrus Adams, and Mrs. 
Louis Malis. Once the vote was passed, the executive board 
of the Union adopted a resolution that "all teachers report 
to their schools tomorrow and conduct class in a normal 
manner." 54 
The contract was formally accepted by the Board of 
Education on 10 May 1967 by a nine to one vote. 55 The 
re-opener clause of the contract was put into effect in 
August 1967. The only new monies that surfaced were 
generated from the fifteen cent local levy approved on 28 
February 1967. The Employee Relations Committee and the 
Union agreed to use the money to hire 375 new teachers, 1200 
teacher aides, pay teachers for extra-curricular activities, 
and pay for a five day Christmas vacation for all full time 
teachers and personnel .~ 6 
In November 1967, school clerks, school library clerks, 
vision testers and hearing testers asked the Board for the 
right to select a collective bargaining agent. Their 
request was granted. 57 The election for bargaining agent 
54
"Board-Union Pact", p.2. 
~ 5Minutes of the Chicago Board of Edcuation Meeting, 10 May 
1967, Chicago, II., p.2985. 
56Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 27 
September 1967, Chicago, II., p.590. 
57Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 8 
November 1967, Chicago, II., p.831. 
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for school clerks was held on 30 January 1968. The Board 
was notified of the results which showed the Chicago 
Teachers Union winning by a two-one margin over the 
Educational Secretaries of Chicago, Inc. The Board accepted 
a motion by a nine-one vote that Chicago Teachers Union 
would become the bargaining agent for school clerks.~ 8 By 
the time the 1968 contract was signed, the Chicago Teachers 
Union was the representative for teachers, ful I-time truant 
officers, assistant principals, school library clerks, 
hearing testers, vision testers, and school clerkS. 59 
• 
ROUND TWO - NEGOTIATIONS 1968 
The first negotiations for the 1968 contract took place 
on 13 November 1967. At this meeting the Board presented a 
list of sixty demands, including modifying or deleting 
articles already in the contract.~·c• When serious 
negotiations began in late December, the Union demanded a 
$150.00 per month increase in salary, a ten-step salary 
schedule, a paid spring vacation, and three personal 
business days. The Board responded with a two percent 
increase in salary, a weakening of the grievance procedures, 
and elimination of transfer rights. After John Desmond 
58Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 14 
February 1968, Chicago, Il., p.1481. 
~·"Agreement Between the Board of Edcuation of the City of 
Chicago and the Chicago Teachers Union," Article 1.1, 1968. 
•
0
"Negotiations Begin", Chicago Union Teacher, November 1967, 
p. 1 
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referred to the Board's counter proposal as an insult, he 
down graded the salary increase request to $125.00 per month 
but the Board refused to change. 61 The Board and the Union 
continued to make proposals and counter proposals into 
January 1968. Finally on 4 January 1968 the Union's House 
of Representatives set a strike date of 9 January 1968. The 
representatives directed the president to announce the 
strike date to the membership at a meeting at the Opera 
House on 6 January 1968. 6 ~ 
The scenario is similar to the previous year. The 
Board and the Union appeared on a course of no compromise 
until Mayor Richard J. Daley again entered the picture. 
With negotiations going on at Board headquarters only two 
blocks from City Hall, the Mayor was notified by the Board 
that no progress was being made. Both parties had agreed to 
use the Mayor as a court of last resort, so the Mayor cal led 
both sides to meet with him. The Mayor was informed by both 
groups of the status of the negotiations and then sent the 
union officials to another room. 63 Daley promised the Board 
that he would muster his political forces to seek a fifteen 
cent Increase per $100.00 of assessed valuation and that the 
61 Stewart Weinstein, "Collective Bargaining: The Quest for 
Power in the Chicago Publ le Schools" <Ph.D. dissertation, 
Loyola University of Chicago, 1988), p.125. 
02
"Notes from the Chicago Teachers Union House of 
Representatives Meeting", 5 January 1968, Box 54, Folder 25, 
Chicago Teachers Union Col lectlon, Chicago Historical 
Society, Chicago, II. 
63
"How Daley Averted Strike,'' Chicago Daily News, 8 January 
1968, p.1. 
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Board could count these new monies. He also promised to 
seek more local school ald from the state legislature that 
would meet !n Mar-ch.·', 4 He then ·,.;ent to the Union and told 
them he would work to get the money that they deserved and 
the assistance to cope with the needs of inner-city 
students. He stated to both groups that his primary concern 
was for the school children of Chicago. 65 It was another-
case of Mayor Daley making promises that both groups felt he 
could fulfill. After six hours of negotiations with Daley 
as mediator, the Mayor, Board President Whiston and Union 
President Desmond announced that with the Mayor?s help a 
strike had been averted. 
The settlement of these negotiations included: 
A salary increase of $40.00 per month immediately 
for teachers. and an additional increase of $60.00 
in September. 
2. Civil Service personnel received an immediate raise 
of five per cent. 
3. An additional week of paid vacation. 
4. One additional personal business day. 
5. Severance pay equal to one-third of accumulated sick 
leave. 
6. Hiring of 600 teacher aides for elementary schools. 
7. Hiring of additional teachers in September 1968 in 
order to provide elementary teachers with two 
preparation periods per week. 
8. The Union agreed to discuss changes in transfer 
policy with the Board so that there would be an 
equalized assignment of certified teachers 
throughout the city.e0 
The Mayor had a perfect record. His two attempts to 
·""'41..Q.iQ., p.6. 
'-"·~Ibid. 
·"",-:'"Here/s How Teachers Fare in New Contract", Chicago Daily 
News, 8 ·January 1968, p. 5. 
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mediate disputes between the Board and the Union resulted in 
settlements without losing one school day due to teacher 
strikes. Daley had shown his ski 1 ls as a mediator, his 
power to influence the Board of Education, and his ability 
to influence the state legislature. 
NEGOTIATIONS 1969 - A DIFFERENT SCENARIO 
PHASE ONE: 
Negotiations for the !969 contract did not reflect the 
previous two negotiations. There was no last minute 
settlement orchestrated by city hall. Francis M. 
Landwerermeyer, S.J., discussed the four phases of the 1969 
contract negotiations.~ 7 He notes that the first steps in 
preparation for negotiations began on 10 August 1968 with 
the Union Steering Committee meeting and ended with the 
Union House of Representatives accepting the final package 
on 2 September 1969. 68 The Union presented it's "package" 
of demands to the Board negotiators on 8 October 1968 
but did include it's salary proposals, fringe benefits, or 
certification demands. These later proposals were finally 
presented on 4 November 1968. At the beginning of the 
negotiations, Union president John Desmond commented that in 
order to get a good contract for his membership it would be 
necessary for the legislature to incre~se state aid to the 
67Landwerermeyer, Joe.cit., p. 361. 
68 Ibid., p.454. 
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Chicago schools. He also noted that "future contract 
settlements wil 1 no longer be reached in the mayor/s 
office." 69 These comments and others by both sides of the 
bargaining table led reporters and the public to believe 
that the possibility of a strike was great. 
Desmond/s leadership within the Union was opposed by 
the Teachers Action Committee CTAC). TAC president John 
Kotsakis voiced the organization/s priority demands for a 
maximum c1ass slze of twenty-f lve. a duty free preparation 
period. ful 1 implementation of the 1968 agreements about 
in-service programs. and revision of the teacher 
certification policy. TAC would support Desmond if he 
negotiated these items as priorities but vowed a organized 
opposition if he did not. 70 In a speech to the Citizens 
Schools Committee CTU president Desmond mentioned all of 
TAC's demands except revision of the certification policy. 
He also mentioned an effort to move the starting salary of 
teachers to $8500.00. 71 
In the early stages of negotiations both the Board and 
the Union received favorable comments from the newspapers. 
All four daily papers noted the needs of the teachers and 
the financial problems of the Board. Each paper urged the 
69Henry De Zutter. "School Strike Possible Here Next January," 
Chicago Daily News. 12 September 1968. p.5. 
70 Stewart Weinstein. "Collective Bargaining: The Quest for 
Power in the Chicago Publ le Schools" <Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation. Loyola University of Chicago. 1988>. p.136. 
71
"Ralse for New Teachers Sought," Chicago American. 20 
November 1968, p. 3. 
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Union to concentrate on educational improvements rather than 
salary increases. Each of the four papers editorialized 
that the solution to the problems of the Board and the Union 
could only be found with help from the state legislature. 
The first negotiation session between the Board and the 
Union took place on 22 November 1968. The Board/s 
negotiating team was headed by Mrs. W. Lydon Wild, with 
Thomas Murray and John Carey, both union leaders, serving as 
team members. The Board team were joined by Superintendent 
Red~ond, Deputy Superintendent Manford Byrd, Jr., Board 
Attorney James Coffey, and several members of Redmond/s 
staff. John Desmond headed the Union team with 
Vice-president Vivian Gallagher, Attorney Joseph Jacobs, 
Recording Secretary Jacqueline Wright Clater Vaughn>, 
Financial Secretary Robert Healey, and Treasurer Glendis 
Hambrick. 72 Desmond opened this first session with a 
statement that the first topic on the table would be the 
ful 1 implementation of the 1968 contract. Mrs. Wild 
responded by asking the Union to consider the financial 
problems of the school system and to review and prioritize 
their demands. Desmond/s response to Mrs. Wild/s request 
was that he could prioritize but that he owed it to his 
membership that al 1 items be dlscussed. 7 ~ The last item of 
business for discussion in the first session was Mrs. Wild/s 
72 Landwerermeyer, 1 oc. cit. , p. 372. 
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8 Ibid. , p. 373. 
86 
request that Redrnond/s place at the negotiation table 
could be taken by his deputy. Manford Byrd, and that Board 
members would not have to attend every negotiating session. 
Desmond agreed to permit Byrd to sit at the table but he 
insisted that the Union would not negotiate without at least 
one Board member present. 74 
One of the agreements reached at this first session was 
that President Desmond and Deputy Superintendent Byrd would 
meet in order to clarify the Union's demands. The Board 
needed this clarification so that they could develop an 
estimate ~f the cost of the Union,s package and to prepare 
its response to the proposal . 7 ~ As a result of these 
meetings, the Board was to prepare written responses to the 
Union demands and establish a set of demands of their own. 
During this period of negotiations, it was necessary 
for the Superintendent to present his budget statement to 
the Board of Education. In his presentation, Redmond 
prepared three alternative plans he had for submitting the 
budget. One was to prepare a balanced budget that included 
reduced programs to absorb a $33 mi Ilion shortfall. The 
second was to anticipate monies that would come from state 
and federal governments and prepare a budget on that basis. 
The third approach, and the one adopted. was to cut the 
present educational programs beginning in September 1969. 
74 Ibid. 
7 ~Ibid., p. 373. 
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This last plan would make the public aware of the need for 
additional assistance from the legislature and he could 
solicit their assistance in getting the help. 76 In his 
statement to the Board, Redmond was trying to galvanize 
support for additional school funding from the legislature. 
Redmond noted "we are presentlng this Tentative Budget in a 
manner which we trust wil 1 be bring home to the citizens of 
this city the stark reality of the fiscal problems facing 
the Chicago Board of Education in 1969." 77 Redmond 
continued in his address to announce class size Increases to 
45, less paid vacation and personal business days, and a cut 
in extra-curricular compensation. 78 
On 27 November 1968, the Board submitted proposals and 
corr~ents to the Union negotiators. This was a first for the 
Board/s negotiators who had never before submitted proposals 
for inclusion in the contract. In a sense this innovation 
showed that the Board was beginning to understand that 
contract negotiations involved a give-and-take process, with 
compromises and concessions on both sides relative to the 
needs of both parties. 7 ~ The new Board proposals contained 
thirty-three new Items and forty proposed changes in the 
contract. Most of the proposals tried to lessen the 
influence of the CTU in school affairs. This new 
76 Ibid., p. 376. 
77Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, November 
27, 1968, Chicago, II., p.11. 
'7e!bid., p.23. 
7 ~Landwerermeyer, loc.clt., p.378. 
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understanding of the negotiation process was in part due to 
hiring of a consultant, Dr. Wesley Wildman. Wildman was the 
Director of Labor-~anagement Studies at the Industrial 
Relations Center of the University of Chicago. 80 
At the next negotiation session on 29 November 1968, 
Union President Desmond and his attorney, Joseph Jacobs, 
both expressed surprise over the number and types of changes 
that the Board was seeking. These leaders complained t~at 
the Board WctS trying to re-write the whole contract and no 
issues were agreed upon. Issues discussed included 
representation by the Union of certain teacher certified 
positions that the Board considered administration, 
scheduling of professional problems committee meetings, and 
a requirement that the Union president inform the school 
principal when he intended to visit a school . 81 
During the morning session of 29 November, Desmond 
became frustrated by Dr. Byrd/s hand! ing of negotiations and 
asked the Deputy Superintendent, "Can you make decisions at 
this table today or are we just talking?" This question of 
whether Dr. Byrd had authority to negotiate would complicate 
the negotiation sessions. 82 The afternoon session continued 
to be very adversarial and the CTU protested the Board/s 
attempt to re-write the grievance procedure that had already 
existed for two years. Talks lasted nine hours on 29 
80.l.l;;U_Q. 
81 Ibid., p.380. 
82 Ibld. 
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November and the only item agreed upon was one that limited 
the materials that could be placed in teacher/s mailboxes in 
the schools to official Union materials. 83 Negotiations 
continued but no serious discussions took place untl 1 
mid-December. 
The Union announced Its demands to the public on 12 
December. Peter Negronida of the Tribune noted that the 
Union demands Included ''substantial progress toward a goal 
of a salary schedule beginning at $8500.00, reduced class 
size. reduced teaching loads for high school teachers. more 
teacher aides, FTB certification. and no reduction in the 
teaching force." 84 
The major difference between the Board and the Union 
was not that they disagreed on how much revenue was 
avai Jable from current sources, but the Union wanted the 
Board to consider budgeting with revenue gains that were 
anticipated. The idea of considering anticipated revenues 
from an increase in the school formula was encouraged by 
state legislators. The Union was notified by the Chairman 
of House Committee on Education that the formula would be 
raised by $100.00. Both the Board and the Union encouraged 
parents to contact their legislators regarding the suggested 
increase. A Chicago American editorial suggested that 
9 ~.l.Ql.d. p.381. 
84Peter Negronida. "Teachers Ask $285Mil1 ion from 
Board/Demands Cal led Impossible," Chicago Tribune. 12 
December 1968, sec. 1, p. 1. 
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the Board put the responsibility for the budget right where 
it belonged, in the hands of the state legislature. 9 ~ Board 
member Marge Wi Jd reminded the public that "Illinois ranks 
forty-sixth in the nation in the amount of state aid to 
schools while being ranked as the third wealthiest state."~ 6 
As the bargaining sessions continued into December, 
very little of substance was considered. Most items 
proposed by the Board were rejected by the Union because the 
Board failed to prove that the proposal responded to a real 
problem. In responding to the Union/s proposals the Board 
rejected most because their implementation would cost money. 
The Board also objected to some proposals on principle and 
to others as "non-negotiable." These "non-negotiable" items 
included the Union/s attempt to write job descriptions 
(which the Board had to keep flexible), tried to change 
certification status (the responsibility of the Board of 
Examiners), and suggested modifications of the civil service 
regulations (the prerogative of the Civil Service 
Commlssion).e 7 
There were only seven negotiation sessions held on five 
different days ending on 16 December. Each side accused the 
other of refusing to bargain. One of the major roadblocks 
for the Union was the fact that on two of the negotiation 
85
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days. December 10 and 16, no Board member was present as had 
been agreed upon previously. The Union interpreted the 
absence of Board members as a sign that true collective 
bargaining was not taking place. 8 ~ A second complaint 
regarding the negotiating team involved the Union's feeling 
that Manford Byrd Jr. did not have the statutory authority 
to negotiate. Union leader Desmond continually referred to 
fact that he felt that in the end the Union would have to 
negotiate with Redmond. 
By mid-December the Union leaders notified their 
membership:; that "the organization faced a crisis in its 
collective bargaining negotiations with the Board of 
Education." 89 Desmond appealed for unity among the various 
factions in the union. Desmond was able to abort an 
attempted split by the members of TAC when he reminded them 
that the Union had listed all of their concerns as part of 
the demands In the December issue of the Chicago Union 
Teacher. 
This first phase of the 1969 contract negotiations 
ended on 19 December with both sides realizing that little 
progress had taken place. As of this date, only three Items 
had been agreed upon: 1) use of teacher/s 8Chool mailboxes 
for official material only, 2) the need for swimming coaches 
to obtain Red Cross life-saving certification, and 3) phones 
89 !bid. 
8
°Chicago Teachers Union, "Press Release," , 23 December 1968, 
Box 55, Chicago Historical Society Archives. 
92 
would be made available to elementary schooi adjustment 
teachers. 90 On 19 December, the Board requested a priority 
list of the Union/s demands. Union President Desmond 
immediate] y responded with a statement. Desmond stated: 11 r 
will be very happy to respond to you. I intend to do that 
on December 26, but I intend to do it with the 
Superintendent of Schools, Mr. Murray, Mr. Carey, and the 
Chairman of their committee. 11 '"' 1 
PHASE TWO: 
The second phase of the 1969 negotiations began with 
the return of Redmond to the bargaining table on 27 December 
1968. Desmond stil 1 faced opposition from within the Union 
with TAC's leader, John Kotsakls, saying that the bargaining 
did not do enough to improve the schools, and McWhirter of 
the FTB's demanding more changes in teacher certification. 
With the beginning of this second phase of negotiations, 
Desmond presented a 1 i st of 11 vi ta I issues" and exp 1 a i ned 
each of them to the bargaining teams. The 1 ist of issues 
included ful 1 implementation of the 1968 contract, an 
increase of 794 teacher aides, in-service training for 
inner-city teachers, two weekly preparation periods, a 
program for maladjusted children, and implementation of 
class-load recommendations. Other priority items included: 
revision of certification procedures, upgrading of school 
90 lbid., "A Chronology of Events," 21 May 1969. 
91 Landwerermeyer, Joe.cit., p. 390. 
clerks. provision for substitute playground teachers, 
implementation of severance pay, and compensation for 
extra-curricular activities.•= 
The stage was now set for the Board's response to the 
Union's list of "vital issues." On 30 December. the Board 
announced that it estimated the cost of the Union's request 
to be $194mi1 lion. The Board had previously requested 
improvements that totaled only $15.5mil1 ion, considera~ly 
less that the Union's request. The Board also opposed any 
salary increase for the 1969 contract. The Board's main 
complaint was that the Union dld "not really focus on the 
problem at hand" and was clearly "unrealistic considering 
the financial circumstances of the Board." 98 The Union 
responded that the estimated cost of the new programs would 
be $127 mil I ion, but this did not include the cost of 
implementing the 1968 contract. 94 
In the afternoon, the Union submitted a written 
response to the Board's counterproposal. The response was 
basically the same position the Union had given earlier. 
The two parties continued to maintain their position 
throughout the day. The dlscusslons changed later when 
Union attorney Jacobs raised the possibility of a 
97 Chicago Teachers Union, "CTU's Vital Issues," 27 December 
1968, Chicago Historical Society Archives, Box 55. 
93Chlcago Board of Education, "Response to the Chicago 
Teachers Union's 'Vital Issues' Documents of 27 December 
1968," 30 December 1968. 
"""'Landwerermeyer. I oc. cit. • p. 396. 
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supplemental budget. At first Wild and Redmond refused to 
discuss the posslbi l ity, but later Board member Murray asked 
"if the Union would settle for no wage increase for now ... 
but in the supplementary budget defer the possibi llty of a 
wage increase."•e Desmond chose to ignore the question and 
announced that the Union would revise its counterproposal. 
Negotiations continued on 31 December with the Union 
presenting a second counterproposal. The Union estimated 
the cost of the new package at $32 million by the Union, but 
it again did not consider the cost of fully imp:ementlng the 
1968 contract. During this session, Board member Murray and 
Union attorney Jacobs began to discuss the difference 
between labor negotiations in business and in public 
agencies. Murray, a union leader as well as Board member, 
saw the difference in the fact that in the private sector 
both sides know the ability of businesses to secure the 
money needed to finalize contract negotiations; but in the 
public sector, getting the addltional monies was a real 
problem. 
The afternoon session was marked by a heated discussion 
between President Desmond, Superintendent Redmond and 
Chairman Wild. Mrs. Wild told Desmond that the Board 
negotiators would have to go to the full Board to discuss 
the current status of the negotiations. Redmond claimed 
that going to the Board was me~ely for guidance and was 
·~Ibid., p.399. 
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necessary since the Board is "the source of our 
authority." 96 He continued: "! think that we are in a 
position to do no more until we have touched base with our 
Board." 97 This infuriated the Union negotiating team. 
Union attorney Jacobs replied. "The Board of Education ls 
not prepared to bargain collectively because it will not 
give its committee the po1~1 cr to bargain with our Union.""''"' 
This was affirmed by a remark made by Board member Thomas 
Murray, "We haven't got the full power to negotiate, Joe, 
you know that."""'? Redmond concluded this session with both 
sides agreeing not to comment to the press on other than 
non-informative observations. He remarked to the parties 
that "we are finally within an area where we can go to our 
Board and say we are within throwing distance of each 
other . 11100 
On 2 January 1969, negotiations continued after the 
Board met to discuss the status of negotiations. Mrs. Wild 
presented the Board's latest counterproposals. The Board 
presented four points for discussion: 1> implementation of 
the school improvement programs of the 1968 contract, 2) 
restoration of cuts in the educational program, 3) deferral 
of salary and new educational programs until July, and 4) 
"""'·Ibid., p. 400. 
97 Ibid., p.401. 
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continuance of negotiations on non-monetary items. 101 
Desmond/s immediate reaction to thls proposal was one of 
disappointment and he vie;Jed it as a complete rejection of 
the Union/s requests. Red~ond noted that the new proposals 
offered two changes in the Board/s position: the Board was 
now willing to discuss salary Increases after the state 
legislature had acted on increased school ald; and the Board 
was now will Ing to negotiate all non-monetary ltems. 10 ? 
Desmond was irritated at the Board's offering beca~se 
the cost of the package was already considered in the 
Board's November budget, and the new budget included an 
Increase of $6.5 mi 1 l Ion for increased administrative costs. 
Desmond felt that the increased funds should be allocated to 
Union priority items. 
Desmond presented the Union's counterproposal on the 
evening of 2 January 1969. His new offer included: 1) the 
complete implementation of the 1968 contract, 2) acceptance 
of the Union/s certification demands, 3) an immediate $40 
per month increase in salary to cover the cost of living, 
and 4) all items specified "effective September 1, 1969" to 
be discussed later in the summer. 103 
The Board/s new counter of fer on 3 January was rejected 
because it provided additional monies for Board not Union 
programs. The negotiation session on 3 January lasted only 
101 Chicago Board of Education, "Counter-Proposal," 2 January 1969 
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twenty minutes. Later in the afternoon Desmond went before 
the CTU/s House of Representatives and asking for a 
rejection of the Board'. s proposa 1 and recommended a st r l :..~e 
vote. Earlier in the day Desmond had persuaded the members 
of TAC to support his request for a strike vote. TAC had 
attempted to set a date in April for the start of the stri~e 
but this was defeated when it was argued that such a move 
would destroy the Union/s flexibility during 
negotiations. 10 "" 
The next negotiating session began on 4 January at 3:35 
p.m. and ~8journed at 11:45 p.m. This session fol lo~ed a 
three and a half hour executive session of the Board of 
Education in which the negotiating team's r·ecommenda ti ons 
were discussed. The majority of the negotiating session was 
spent in off-the-record discussions and caucuses.' 05 The 
thirteen points mandated by the Union/s House of 
Representatives were discussed but only four had been agreed 
upon before adjournment. However, the Board did offer the 
CTU discretionary power over $17.4 mill ion previously 
included as a committed sum. Although the Union felt some 
progress had been made, they still were disappointed. There 
were three reasons that the Union was stil 1 Irritated by the 
negotiations at this time. The Board/s offer of 
discretionary power over part of the budget was not a Union 
10
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demand. Second, the Board was still refusing to consider a 
cost of living increase. Third, the Board was still 
insisting on a full year contract. 106 
Negotiations resumed the next day, Sunday, 5 January 
1969. Discussions lasted nearly thirteen hours, nine of 
which were off-the-record. Desmond was upset that after 
eight hours of oft- the-record discussions, the Board was 
stil 1 proposing a twelve-month contract without any 
immediate pay raise for teachers. Additionally, the Board 
had included ten proposals that the Union had never 
accepted. Desmond reminded the Board that the Union 
Representatives had recommended a strike at their last 
meeting. He reminded the Board that they had agreed to 
"fashion a sufficiently satisfactory paci<.age with respect to 
the vital lssues 11107 that would be acceptable to the Union 
membership. Board member Murray countered with his own 
criticism of the Union/s refusal to negotiate on the ten 
proposals submitted previously by the Board. Heated 
discussions continued both on and off-the-record. Both 
Desmond and attorney Jacobs, arguing for a slx-month 
agreement, promised there would be no strike for the 
six-month period. 
As the session continued, there were several points at 
which It appeared an agreement would be reached, but due to 
10
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the Board/s insistence on their ten non-monetary proposals 
the negotiations stopped. Finally, the Board agreed to put 
the!r proposals aside and discuss the two monetary, demands 
that had not been agreed upon. This discussion centered 
around the Unlon/s demand for a $40 cost of Jiving increase, 
effective 1 January. Both sides spoke to the issue and gave 
sound reasons for their stance. Finally, Redmond asked the 
Union leaders if they would accept a $40 increase effective 
1 September. The Union/s answer was no. 108 This session 
continued with Jacob/s plea to the Board team to return to 
the Board to request a salary increase because it was 
necessary for the Union leadership to be able to say that 
they had again asked for an increase. Jacobs told the Board 
team that it was in their best interest as wel 1 to keep the 
present Union leadership in control. The final argument of 
the session revolved around Reduond/s announced intention tc 
co~~unicate with the teachers prior to the Union meeting of 
6 January. The Union so strongly opposed this suggestion 
that Redmond decided not to do so. 
The Union had felt that their request for a $40 cost of 
living request was reasonable, espec!al ly since a quote from 
Board member Murray In the Sun-Tlmes the day before stated 
that he felt the Board could compromise, perhaps offering a 
$40 a month cost-of-Jiving lncrease. 109 In the early 
108 Ibid., p. 412. 
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morning of 6 January, the Board/s negotiating team used a 
telephone pol 1 to solicit support to include the salary 
increase. The pol 1 resulted in a 5-5 tie since one me~ber 
could not be reached. One reporter, Hope Justus, speculated 
that if he had been reached, the vote wo~Jd have probably 
been 6-5 in favor of the pay increase. 110 Later on the same 
day when the full Board met, the members returned to their 
hard-line stand and rejected the proposal. The Board, 
however. offered to Increase educational program funds by 
$1 . 7 mi l 1 ion . 
Phone negotiations on 6 January were carried on between 
Board headquarters and the Union. Desmond agreed to take 
the Board/s amended offer to the membership. The amended 
offer included: freezing class size as of September 1, 1968: 
a planning project for federal funding of three inner-city 
schools, and hiring of additional substitute teachers. In 
addition, the Board would consider certlflcation procedure 
changes, further sa:ary advancement for FTBs, and 
implementation of the 1968 contract clauses regarding 
teacher aides, teacher workshops, and a pilot program for 
socially maladjusted students. 
Arguing for accepting the proposal "as the best we 
could get from the Board of Education," Desmond recommended 
110 Hope Justus, "Board Tried to Avert Strike Vote," Chicago 
Dai Jy News, 7 Janurary 1969, sec. 1, p, 1. 
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acceptance of the contract fer the good of the children." 111 
Opposition to the Board/s proposal was strong and vocal. 
Kotsakis and TAC, reminding the membership that the Ho~se of 
Representatives had recommended a strike unless substantial 
progress had been made, he claimed that there had been 
1 ittle progress. Roy Stell and seventy-five members of 
Operation Breadbasket walked out of the meeting to protest 
the absence of automatic certification of FTBs. As a result 
of these factions within the Union, the membership rejected 
the Board/s offer and authorized the House of 
Representatives to set a strike vote. The vote count was 
1368 to reject the Board/s offer to 1148 to accept it. 117 
Several reporters gave their opinion as to why the 
proposal was rejected. Al 1 of the opinions seem to have 
some merit. Havemann suggested that poor attendance at the 
meeting Cless than 15 percent of the membership) and the 
presence of a disproportionate number of Union militants 
caused the defeat. 112 Dorfmann noted that those members who 
voted against the contract did not all vote to reject the 
proposal for the same reason. 114 Hope Justus claimed that 
Desmond/s belief that the contract as presented was the best 
the Union could do, was supported by several factors. She 
111 Ron Dorfmann, "Members Reject Plea to Accept Board/s Offer," 
Chicago American, 7 January 1969, sec. 1, p. 1. 
112Landwerermeyer, Joe.cit., p.416. 
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noted that: 1) two new Board members were "reformers'' rather 
than pro-union; 2) the Board had hired a professional 
negotiator in Wi ldrr,an; 3) some Board members felt that a pay 
raise would not sit wel 1 with the legislature when the 
Board asked for more funding; and 4) the solidarity that 
Desmond had pleaded for did not rnaterialize. 11 ~ A fourth 
reason could have been Desmond/s inability to conduct an 
effective meeting. 
Upon the Union/s rejection of the proposed contract, 
Superintendent Redrriond addressed a letter to the teachers. 
The letter noted that prior to its . L • reJec~ron by the 
membership, the contract proposal had been accepted by the 
negotiation committees and met all of the Union/s priorities 
except a salary increase. The Board members were Joined by 
members of the media who suggested that a Union-wide 
plebiscite on the contract would result in the contract/s 
acceptance. 
On 8 January, the Board, in executive session tried to 
rework their offer, but failed when they were informed by 
Desmond that any new offer would have to include some sort 
of pay raise. The Board voted 9-2 against such action and 
voted against resuming negotiations. Later in the day, 
Desmond made it clear that he wanted another chance to 
discuss the contract with the Board/s negotiating team. 
115Landwerermeyer, Joe.cit., p.417. 
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Negotiations would take place on the next day. 11 ~ 
Negotiations resumed on 9 January, but no progress was 
made because the Union continued to insist on a raise. Mr2. 
Wild rejected the idea immediately and called the move "an 
Impasse to a settlement". S;.;per-'.r.tendent Redmond intervened 
and promised to report the situation to the ful I board. 
This move by the Super!ntende~t enabled Des~cnd an 
opportunity to dlsal low the strike matter to come up at the 
House of Representatives meeting that afternoon and give 
Union negotiators more time to reach an agreement. 117 
The •Union returned to negotiations on 11 January with a 
counterproposal that included a package of educational 
Improvement items and nine additional Items not Included In 
the previously accepted package. The new offer did not 
contain a salary request. The Board countered by accepting 
only three of the Union/s new items and asked the CTU 
leadership to arrange a referendum to approve the ... en~;re 
package and authorize a six-month continuance of the present 
con tract. 1 1 8 
The Union leadership was angered and noted that if their new 
package was not accepted the leadership would have to call 
for a strike vote. Redmond Insisted that the Board could 
not afford the additional $2 million in its budget and that 
he felt the addition of the three items to the package was 
11
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enough to call for a referendum. Before adjourning this 
session. Desmond offered another counterproposal which fell 
upon deaf ears. Desmond then asked for and was grudgingly 
granted a caucus. Upon their return. the Union made a 
formal statement to the Board negotiators requesting that 
they present the Union's counterproposal to the entire 
Board. Red~ond agreed to submit the proposal to the 
Board. 11 "" 
The full Board met on the afternoon of 11 January. At 
this meeting, the Board approved its 1969 budget of $472 
mill ion by a vote of 9-1. After passing the budget, they 
developed a new counterproposal to submit to the Union. 120 
The new offer included: 1) a six month extension of the 
fully implemented 1968 contract; 2) in September 1969 an 
additional fifty adjustment teachers would be hired; 3) 
in-service training for physical education teachers; 4) 
compensatory time for publications sponsors; 5) special 
counseling services for students suspended from school; and 
6) a contract re-opening clause for salaries and educational 
improvements when the supplemental budget was submitted in 
August 1969. 1 21 
On 12 January. the Union's Executive Board met and 
decided to recom~end acceptance of the interim agreement. 
Desmond noted that acceptance of the agreement would protect 
119 Ibid., p. 423. 
':c·o Ibid. 
121 Ibid., p. 424. 
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the Union by a written contract. Desmond also noted that 
the CTU would have the right to strike after the agreement 
ended on 13 June if the Board did not negotiate in good 
faith or failed to implement fully the items agreed upon. 
Kotsakis and members of TAC worked for the defeat of the 
referendum on 20 January. The vote to accept the contract 
was 9622 to 5206. 177 The Un!on quickly made it known 
that they would seek greater salary increases effective,1 
September 1969. The Chicago Union Teacher made the point 
bluntly when an editorial noted, "CTU members have given a 
mandate to President John Desmond and the negotiating team 
to continue negotiations for educational improvements and a 
substantial salary increase for September." 122 
PHASE THREE: 
In the time between the signing of the interim contract 
and the resumption of serious negotiations in mid-May, there 
were many new participants who would affect the Board-Union 
negotiations. After the signing, we see a spirit of 
cooperation between the Union and the Board in their attempt 
to influence the state legislature. Shortly after the 
interim agreement was affirmed, on 24 January 1969, 
Superintendent Redmond appeared before the Illinois School 
Problems Commission CSPC) and asked the legislators to 
double the state aid formula and that the formula basis be 
1 2 2 Ibid. , p. 426. 
123Editorial, Chicaoo Union Teacher, January 1969. 
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changed fro~ average daily attendance (ADA> to average dally 
enrollment (ADE). Redmond also noted that he felt that 
teachers did deserve a sa1ary increase. Desmond also 
appeared before the SPC and echoed Redmond's requests. 
These requests were genera1ly well received. 124 
It was not until 24 March that the SPC made its 
recommendation to the legislature when it requested an 
increase in the foundation level to $550 and that average 
daily enrollment should be used as the basis for computing 
the aid. Both Desmond and Redmond criticized the increases 
as a ''token'' and desc::-lbed the action as "significant but 
not enough." 1 2 ~ On 2 ,Zl,pr i l, Governor Ogilvie recommended 
raising the foundation level to $500, st11 l short of the SPC 
recommendations. 126 On this same evening, WBBM-TV 
editorialized that It disagreed with Governor Ogilvie's 
recommendation. The station noted that one of the reasons 
Ogilvie had been elected was his statement that education 
would be his administration's first priority. Yet, his 
funding proposal to the legislature was at least $50 short 
of the School Problems Commission 1 s recommendation. 127 
The funding crisis facing the Chicago public schools 
caused the Union leadership to threaten a strike if the 
legislature did not appropriate enough money to enable the 
124Landwerermeyer, Joe.cit., p. 428. 
17 ~Hope Justus, "Teacher Union Chief Raps School-Aid Plan," 
Chicago Daily News, 25 March 1969, sec.1, p. 5. 
126Herrlck, Joe.cit., p. 374. 
127Lanweremeyer, Joe.cit., p. 430. 
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Board to give teachers a pay raise. The CTU/s House of 
Delegates voted to vacate classes on 22 Apri 1 to travel to 
Springfield as a group to try to Influence the leg!s!ature. 
The Board of Education denounced the plan as depriving the 
school children of Chicago of a day of education. CTU 
President Desmond asked the Board to close school on 22 
April so that teachers could march on Springfield. He 
added. "if the Board refuses to shut the schools the 
teachers wil ! close them themselves." 128 The Board of 
Education ref used to c 1 ose the schoo Is and Recfrnond noted. "I 
think that anything that deprives children of even o~e day 
of school is unfortunate." 12 • The plan for a protest march 
to Springfield was altered at the CTU House of 
Representatives meeting on 11 April. when it postponed the 
march from 22 April to 29 April. Additional 1y, they voted 
to set a strike date for 2 June. Desmond opposed setting a 
strike date because he feared the legislature might be 
angered by the action. This feeling was also noted in a 
Chicago Tribune editorial on 16 April. 
.-
The march on Springfield on 29 Apri I had no irr~edlate 
impact. Teachers returned to Chicago and openly prepared 
for a strike. They felt that they had been ignored by the 
legislators and used by the governor who used their march to 
appeal for support for the four percent income tax program 
128Hope Justus, "School-Aid Protest March Set," Chicago Dally 
News, 3Apri1 1969, sec. 1, p. 1. 
12
"''Ibi d. 
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that was to result in higher state aid to schools. On 7 May, 
Ogilvie recommended a raise in the foundation level to $520. 
an increase of $20, but still Jess than what the House 
Education Committee, the CTU, and the Board of Education 
insisted they needed. 130 
Since there was l lttle progress to report, Desmond 
announced that he would recofilmend at the 9 May meeting that 
the House of Representatives call for a strike vote by the 
teachers. Prior to the meeting the Board and Union 
negotiating teams met on 7 May to discuss the Union's "final 
offer". The CTU presented a package that included 
provisions for Union approval of any layoffs, no cutbacks In 
educational programs, and a $150 monthly increase in 
salary effective September 1969. The Board team rejected 
these demands.'~' The Union leadershlp was well prepared 
for its meeting on 9 May and the House of Representatives 
voted 297-3 for a strike by the Union membership. The House 
did not accept the !eadershlp's suggested strike date but 
opted for 22 May, the date proposed by the militant 
factlons. 13 ? The stage was now set for a strike. 
After the vote, the reaction of the various actors was 
predictable. Desmond noted that the teachers had threatened 
to use a strike before but this time it was apparent that 
the threat must be fol lowed through. 
180 Ibid., p. 435. 
181 Ibid., p. 436. 
182 Ibid., p.437. 
Governor Ogilvle told 
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the press that "If they walk out, they're going to stay out 
because I am not going to give them any help." 133 Mayor 
Daley let it be known that he was anxious to mediate a 
settlement and prevent a strike. He openly declared that he 
favored a pay raise. An appeal was made on 13 May by 
Operation Breadbasket, the Black Teacher Caucus, and the 
United Educational Employees to keep Biack schools open in 
spite of the vote by the House of Representatlves. Despite 
this opposition, the strike vote on 16 May passed by a 
two-one margin (10,944-5,438). 13 ~ The CTU was now committed 
to strlke~n 22 May. 
Reaction to the strike vote included editorials by the 
daily papers asking the parties to get together. Governor 
Ogilvie asked Desmond to meet with him in Springfield. The 
Union requested a meeting with the ful J Board of Education 
on 19 May to present its case. As in the past, Mayor Daley 
offered to serve as a mediator. 
Support of the strike within the Union varied greatly. 
TAC and John Kotsakis supported the strike and asked their 
members to stay out until significant gains had been made. 
Hard-line Black teachers, following the leadership of 
Operation Breadbasket, promised to keep Black schools open. 
Redmond noted that with the support of Black teachers many 
133David Young, "Desmond Defies Governor/ He Urges City 
Teachers to Back Strike/ Union to Vote in Schools Friday," 
Chicago Tribune, 12 May 1969, sec. 1, p. 12. 
13
""Herrick, Joe.cit., p. 375. 
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classrooms could remain open. The Union/s reaction to this 
strike boycott was not to schedule picketing at any school 
where Black teachers had not promised the Union their 
supper t. 1 35 
Two attempts to avoid the strike were made. On 19 May, 
the full Board of Education met with the Union negotiators. 
After the session, Board President Whiston reported that the 
Board had made a substantial offer to the Union. However, 
two major omissions in the offer were pay raises and 
certification of FTBs. Desmond and the Union rejected the 
offer.'~~ The second attempt was made when Mayor Daley 
called both parties to his office at 10:00 a.m. on 21 May. 
The Board and the Union both sald they appreciated the 
Mayor/s assistance but no new offers were made. After the 
meeting, Superintendent RedTJond announced that the schools 
would be closed during the strike. 
The first teacher strike in Chicago's history began on 
22 May 1969. Almost 18,600 teachers honored the strike and 
did not cross the picket line. More than seventy-five 
percent of the elementary and high school teachers honored 
the strike. However, the boycott of the strike by Black 
teachers was more successful when forty-f lve percent of the 
teachers showed up for school . 137 
13 ~Sam Washington, "Inner City Teachers Defy Union's Order to 
Strike," Chicago Sun-Times, 23 May 1969, sec.1, p. 52. 
1 
"''"' Landwerermeyer, J oc. cit., p. 442. 
137 lbid., p. 443. 
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Again Mayor Daley offered hls services as mediator and 
sought the governor/s support in solving the school problem. 
Negotiation sessions were lengthy and after two days o~ 
negotiating, a settlement was reached. At 10:00 p.m. on 
Friday, 23 May, the Board voted 6-5 to accept most of the 
demands of the Union, including a $100 monthly raise, 
guarantees against cutbacks and layoffs, some educational 
Improvements, and certification of FTBs after three yea1·s of 
satisfactory ratings. The Mayor had assured Board members 
that he would get the money to implement the settlement. It 
ls thought that the breakthrough occurred during a 
conversation between the Mayor and the Governor when the 
Mayor offered Ogilvie support for his tax plan. 138 
On Saturday, 24 May, the Union House of Representatives 
voted 285-30 to end the strlke and accept the settlement. 
Union membership was as~ed to vote In area schools on 
Sunday, 25 May, and they overwhelming approved it by a vote 
of over 9,000 to 585. 18 ~ Classes resumed on Monday, 26 
May. Two days later the Board formally approved the 
contract by a 6-4 vote. Although it appeared that the 
salary issue was the main item discussed, probably the most 
significant advance made by the Union was the new 
certification procedure for FTBs. This new system placed a 
new burden on principals when rating their FTBs. A third 
188 Ibid., p. 444. 
189Herrick, Joe.cit., p. 376. 
favorable rating could mean the certification of a FTB 
'1...., l J. "'-
teacher who previously would not have been able to meet the 
Board's requirements. 
PHP-.SE FOUR: 
The settlement of the contract in May did not end the 
problems for the Board and the teachers. In a shm,' of 
unlty. Board President Whiston, Union President Desmond, and 
Superintendent Red~ond all agreed not to get involved ir. the 
fight for the income tax bi 11. It is speculated that the 
Mayor suggested to the three leaders that they al low his 
supporters to carry on the battle in Springfield. Chicago 
Today reported that the agreement between Daley and Ogilvie 
included the fol lowing: 1) Daley would furnish support for 
the Governor's income tax plan, 2) the Republicans would 
help the Democrats increase Chicago's share of the sales 
tax, 3) the school aid formula would be increased to $550 
and based on enrollment, and 4> Republican bl lls aimed at 
dismantling the Chicago machine wouid be defeated. 140 The 
spirit of cooperation between Democrats and Republ leans 
began to erode when Ogilvie complained that the Democrats 
had failed to support his flat-rate income tax. The 
legislature passed a dual-rate income tax C2.5 percent 
personal and 4.0 percent corporate> Just two days before it 
adjourned. Further problems developed when the Senate 
140
"Bi-Partisan Furor over Ogilvie-Daley Tax Bill Unequalled," 
Chicago Today, 15 June 1969, sec.1, p. 3. 
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changed the schoo1 aid base to enrollment rather than 
attendance as suggested by the House. 141 With these and 
other conflicts continuing in Springfield, the Chicago Board 
had good reason to wonder if state monies would become 
available to meet their May settlement. 
By mid-sumrner it was evident that the Board would have 
financial difflcu;ties ln meeting its contract requirements. 
On 10 July 1969, Mayor Daley informed the Board that 
revenues that the city had planned to give to the Board 
not materialized and that the city's share of the sales tax 
would not be aval I able untl I the fol lowing year. Daley 
advised the Board that they should still honor the terms of 
their contract. On 5 August Redmond offered the Boa::-d five 
possible budget plans at a specla! meeting cal led to resolve 
the school system's financial crisis. The Board was $30 
mil lion short of funds needed to support all of its 
committed programs. The Board approved a plan that included 
cutting the salary increase in half, cutting vacation pa/, 
and reducing transfer rlghts. 1 ~ 7 
The Board realized that any cuts would raise the ire of 
the Union. The next day Red-:-;ond invited the Unlon 
leadership to discuss the crisis. The Union protested the 
cuts and argued that changes ln the agreement must be agreed 
upon by both parties. Vivian Gallagher, Vice-president of 
141 Herrick, Joe.cit., p. 378. 
142Landwerermeyer, loc.clt., p. 450. 
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the CTU, wrote to the membership to explain the situation 
and solicit wide-spread Union support for a rejection of the 
Board's action. When Desmond returned fro~ a short 
vacation, the Board and Union negotiating teams met for a 
two hour session on 13 August. The two sides remained apart 
with Redmond and the Board insisting that cuts must be :nade 
so that a supplemental budget could be passed by. 15 August. 
After the budget was passed, the Union House of 
Representatives voted overwhelmingly to begin a strike 
beginning 3 September. 148 
The ne~spapers in Chicago supported the teacters and 
asked the Board to honor its contract. Daley again offered 
to mediate but lt beca~e unnecessary. On 28 August, the 
negotiation teams met and as a result of new monies ~ade 
available, the Board agreed to lrnplement the 1969 contract 
to the Union's satisfaction. Some ite~s of the original 
agreement were postponed untll 1 January 1970 but these 
changes were mlnor and acceptable to the Union. Jn 20 
August, the Board passed a resolution of intent to fulfl 11 
the agreement reached by the negotiations committee. The 
Union membership voted on 2 September to postpone the strike 
to give the Board time to Incorporate the settlement In Its 
official budget. 144 With this action, the schools were able 
to open without the immediate threat of a strike. 
143 Ibid .• p. 453. 
144Chicago Teachers Union Collection, Chicago Historical 
Society, Box 56. 
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NEGOTIATIONS 1970 - SETTLEMENT BEFORE A STRIKE VOTE 
After the previous year/s negotiations, those of 1970 
were much less stressful. Since 1969 negotiations actually 
lasted until September, there was 1 ittle time to set 
priorities for the 1970 contract. The Union negotiation 
team remained the same. The Board team included Dr. Wesley 
Wildman Ca professional negotiator), Guy Brunetti, Dr. 
Eileen Stack, and Thomas Murray of the Law Department. The 
Board members of the Employee Relations Committee included 
Mrs. W. Lydon Wild, Mrs. Carey Preston, and Mr. Thomas 
Murray. Negotiations were cordial throughout the month of 
December. Their was one exception to this feeling of 
cooperation. The December issue of the Chicago Union 
Teacher had an editorial that cal led for no contract, no 
work. 14~ The Union leadership felt that there was 
sufficient progress to return to work after the Christmas 
holiday without the threat of a strike. The Union/s House 
of Representatives rejected a Board proposal on 7 January 
and called for a strike vote on 1~ January with the strike 
beginning the fol lowing day. 146 
In an effort to avoid a strike vote, both negotiating 
teams met on Saturday, 10 January, and negotiated throughout 
the night and arrived at an agreement twenty-three hours 
14~"No Contract, No Work", Chicago Union Teacher, Editorial, 
December 1969, p.2. 
146
"House Rejects Board Proposal", Chicago Union Teacher, 
January 1970, p. 1. 
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later. Superintendent Redmond informed the press that 
proposed budget cuts would make the Union package possible. 
Items that were eliminated for the last half of the year 
included non-classroom personnel, summer school, supplies, 
and materials.t 47 Redmond assured the public and the 
Teachers Union that "this proposal does not envision the 
reduction of teachers who face children in the 
classroom." 149 In order to finance the package agreed upon, 
it was necessary for the Board of Education to adopt a 
fiscal pol icy that financed the first half of the school 
year and depended upon seeking more funds from Springfield 
to finance the second half of the year. 
The Union/s House of Representatives approved the 
Board/s package but only after a two and a half hour debate. 
Union President Desmond urged for contract acceptance and 
noted, "You told us you weren/t interested in salary 
increases as much as you were in reducing class size, and we 
got what you wanted." 149 The new package included salar~. 
increases ranging from nothing for new teachers to $1250 for 
teachers with fifteen years or more experience. Among the 
items negotiated by the Union were: 
1. Reduction of class size in 150 schools in May, 100 
more in October, and 50 more in November. 
2. Employ 50 more EMH teachers. 
147Casey Banas, "School Pact Gets First OK," Chicago Tribune, 
12 January 1970, p. 1. 
1 4 e lJ;;U,g • 
149Stan Ziemba,"Hot Debate Accompanies Teacher Vote", Chicago 
Tribune, p.1. 
3. Provide summer school for EMH students. 
4. Compress the salary schedule from 36 years to 15 
years. 
5. Increase salary lane differential by $15 a month 
beginning in September. 
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6. A 5% increase in salary for civil service personnel. 
7. Payment of 1/2 of family hospitalization insurance. 
8. Restore two weeks of paid vacation. 
9. Restore lost adjustment teacher and teacher aide 
positions. 
10. Extension of FTB certification by three year 
satisfactory experience. 
11. Allow the Chicago Teachers Union to participate in 
hearings to integrate school personnel. 
12. Consideration by the Board to allow teacher aides to 
vote for a collective bargaining agent. 1 ~ 0 
After the teachers voted to accept the new contract, the 
Board of Education approved the contract by 6-5 vote. 
Members voting for the contract were: Carey, Preston, 
Friedman, Wild, Murray, and Whiston. Members voting against 
were: Malis, Witkowsky, Bacon, Boutte, and Cerda. 1 ~ 1 
In order to comply with an agreement reached with the 
Chicago Teachers Union, it became necessary for the Board of 
Education to offer teacher aides the right to select the 
Chicago Teachers Union to act as their collective bar~aining 
agent. On 14 October, the Board authorized such an 
election. The results of the election are shown in figure 
3.2. 
1 ~ 0 "Provisions in Pact OK'd By Leaders of Teacher Union," 
Chicago Tribune, 12 January 1970, p.2. 
1 ~ 1 Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 28 
January 1970, Chicago, Il., p.2857. 
RESULTS OF TEACHER AIDE ELECTION 1 ~ 2 
Ballots mailed 
Ballots cast 
Ballots returned as undeliverable 
Results: 
Chicago Teachers Union 
No Representative desired 
Spoiled or invalid ballots 
Total 
Figure 3.2 
1863 
1339 
1 1 
1013 
92 
~ 
1339 
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This election resulted in an increase of over one thousand 
new members for the Chicago Teachers Union. 
PICKET LINES AGAIN AS 1971 NEGOTIATIONS FAIL 
Contract negotiations began again in the fa! I for the 
contract year 1971. Initially the Board produced a budget 
that had eliminated teacher vacation pay, personal leave 
days, and "automatic" pay increments based on tenure. The 
Board later restored these items. This act would become 
controversial because the Board considered the restoration 
of the items as part of their new contract package while the 
Union considered these items as part of the master contract. 
Both the Board and Union negotiators continued talking 
throughout December and into January. The Union/s House of 
Representative/shad established 12 January 1971 as the 
strike date and a membership referendum authorized the date 
by a 16,706 to 1,493 vote. 1 es Long hours of negotiations 
1 e 2 Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 18 
November 1970, Chicago, II., p.830. 
ie 3 "Annual Strike Threat", Chicago Tribune, 11 January 1971, p.16 
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did not bring about an agreement. Union president Desmond 
presented the Board/s latest offer to the House of 
Representatives at a 4:30 p.m. meeting on 11 January and it 
was "unanimously rejected". The strike began on Tuesday, 12 
January, and depending upon whose statistics you select it 
was between 91.6 and 98 per cent effective. However. both 
sides continued to negotiate after the strike began. Mrs. 
Lydon Wild, Board negotiator, made a positive statement 
following a three and one-half hour negotiation session. 
Wild noted, "It/snow safe to say that we are trying our 
level best to solve some of these problems. 111 !!5 4 Desmond 
followed a harder line after the session. He listed 
differences in educational improvements, fringe benefits, 
and class size. He pessimistically said that "The teachers 
wil 1 remain out until these issues are settled. 111 !!5!!5 
The Union estimated the cost of their demands at $42 
mil lion, while Redmond estimated the package at over $64 
mil lion. Redmond told reporters that "the Board sincerely 
regrets that the Union negotiating team continues to demand 
a financial package that the Board cannot meet." 1 !!5 6 He 
noted that the Board/s latest package restored all previous 
reductions and included a 4 per cent cost of I ivlng pay 
increase. 
1 !!5 4 Edith Herman, "Union House Rejects Bid from Board," Chicago 
Tribune, 12 January 1971, sec.1, p.1. 
1 ~ !!51...Ql.Q • 
l!!5 6 Ibid.; p.2. 
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The first hint that the feuding parties might seek help 
from the mayor came on 12 January when Mrs. Wild said, 
"Mayor Daley may be the answer to this." Desmond responded 
by saying that negotiations were not yet at an impasse and 
he could not discuss whether the mayor would be asked to 
help. 1 ~ 7 Mayor Daley declared that his office "would be 
open" to both sides if they wished his aid in solving the 
dispute. This offer was not appreciated by al 1. The 
Citizens Schools Committee urged the mayor "to refrain from 
participating in salary negotiations, and to allow the Board 
to exercise their legal right to make crucial salary 
decisions without outside interference." 1 ~ 9 
Although the Board presented a new offer to the Union 
on 13 January, it was rejected because it was "very 
inadequate" and "does not even meet the cost of Jiving 
increase." 1 e 9 
Mayor Daley again became involved with negotiations 
when he summoned both sides to his off ice at 2:00 p.m. on 
Thursday, 14 January. After twel.ve hours of shuttling 
between the two parties the mayor announced an agreement had 
been reached at 2:00 a.m. the following morning. Mayor 
Daley was joined by Superintendent Redmond, Board President 
Carey, and Union President Desmond to announce that a 
1 ~ 7Edith Herman, "Teachers' Strike Goes into Second Day," 
Chicago Tribune, 13 January 1971, sec.1, p.1. 
1ee.l..l;;ti_Q. 
1
e 9 Edith Herman, "Teachers Reject New Bid." Chicago Tribune, 14 
January 1971, sec.1, p.1. 
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settlement had been reached. Terms of the agreement were 
not announced until after the House of Representatives 
meeting late~ that day. 
On Saturday, 16 January, the House of Representatives 
approved the package by a 2 to 1 margin and the general 
membership approved the contract the next day by a vote of 
7,429 to 1,290. 160 The package worked out in the mayor/s 
office was truly unique in that it covered a period of two 
years. The Board of Education gave its/ preliminary 
approval with an 8-2 vote. The two year contract was 
officially approved on 17 February 1971 by a 7-2 vote. 
Member Sbarboro voted against the contract noting that he 
did so only because he questioned the legality of the length 
of the contract. 161 Union Attorney Joe Jacobs told 
reporters that the legislature wi11 be asked to make a 
simple amendment to the school code, and that the contract 
wi I I be legally sustained. 11162 'The package included the 
fol lowing provisions for 1971: 
1.Salary increase of 8 per cent for teachers. 
2.Salary increase of 7 per cent for civil service 
employees. 
3.Salary increase of 10 per cent for teacher aides. 
4.Full premium cost for individual and family health 
insurance. 
5.Lower class size in 150 schools. 
6.Expanded special education summer schools. 
16011 Contract Approved", Union Teacher, Special Edition, 17 
January 1971, p.1. 
161 Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 17 
February 1971, Chicago, II., p.2742. 
162Edith Herman, "Teachers/ House Accepts Pact", Chicago 
Tribune, 16 January 1971, sec.1, p.1. 
7.Additional supplies for practical arts classes. 
8.Col Jective bargaining representative vote for 
ESEA teacher aides. 108 
The second year of the package will be discussed 
separately because of the difficulties the Board of 
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Education faced in late 1971. The Board-Union agreement had 
provided for the reopening of contract talks after 1 July if 
either side had items that they felt must be discussed. 
A CONTRACT COLLAPSES - STRIKE IS THREATENED 
A salary freeze, benefit cut-backs, early closings, 
class size increases, and teacher layoffs were among the 
suggestions offered by the Board of Education during 
contract discussions in the winter of 1971. Although the 
contract reached in January provided for additional salary 
increases of 8 per cent for teachers, and 7 per cent for 
other civil service employees, the Board found itself 
without the necessary resources to provide the increases and 
asked the Union to re-negotiate. After over a month of 
negotiations with the Board, Union president Desmond 
announced that he would ask the Union representatives to set 
a strike date against the Board. "The Union dispute with 
the Board ls not over salary increases alone. The Board at 
this tlme ls also proposing to lay off more than 1,800 
classroom teachers and a large number of civil service a~d 
103
"Teacher Pact Data", Chciago Tribune, 16 January 1971, 
sec.1, p.2. 
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other personne 1 • "u. 4 Desmond a 1 so noted threatened cu ts in 
teacher/s fringe benefits. 
The Chicago Teachers Union House of Representatives 
voted overwhelmingly <314-14> to begin a strike on Tuesday, 
18 January 1972. 10 ~ A strike vote was held in the schools 
on 11 January and the strike date accepted by the general 
membership. On the same day, Board member and negotiator 
Wild announced that a new offer was going to be made to the 
Union. Although this attempt to appease the Union failed, 
negotiations continued. The Board postponed the passing of 
the 1972 budget while bargaining sessions were taking place. 
On 14 January a compromise was reached and the Union 
House of Representatives recommended acceptance by a 158-133 
vote. 106 The compromise restored al 1 benefits to the 
teachers but lessened the salary increase to 5.5 percent. 
The offer was financed by cutting the school year by eleven 
days, depending upon at least $29.5 mil lion in additional 
aid from the legislature, and cutting 1,036 positions. 167 
Union president Desmond said that the Union would seek 
arbitration for restoration of the salary increase and 
would seek additional help in the legislature for funds to 
keep the schools open in June. Union membership voted to 
104Edith Herman, "Union President to Recommend City Teachers 
Vote for Strike," Chicago Tribune, 9 January 1972, sec.1, p.1. 
10~Edith Herman, "Teacher Delegates Ask for Jan.18 Strike," 
Chicago Tribune, 10 January 1972, sec.1, p.1. 
160Edith Herman, "Union Urges Teachers OK Compromise," Chicago 
Tribune, 15 January 1972, sec. 1, p.1. 
1 6 ?' .l.bl..d . 
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accept the contract settlement by a vote of 11,416-7,394. 16 ~ 
Desmond defended the relatively close vote by saying there 
was a high teacher absentee rate and that members did not 
understand the Board/s budgetary practices. The vote 
al lowed schools to remain open, at least for the time being. 
Another surprise was given to the teachers by the Board 
of Education when on 1 February it announced its intention 
to demote 668 special service teachers and return them to 
the classroom in a cost cutting move. These demotions 
resulted in the firing of 600 classroom teachers. The Union 
and a group of those demoted filed for an injunction in 
Circuit Court but were denied. The Union declined to call 
for a strike over the matter but noted that they would file 
an appeal of the court/s decision. 
At the 14 April meeting of the Union/s House of 
Representatives, an overwhelming vote was taken to issue a 
warning resolution to the Board of Education regarding the 
proposed eleven day school closing. The Union announced 
that they would take "any action necessary, including a 
strike, to prevent these and any other contract 
violations." 1 '• These words were carried into action in 
mid-May when the Union Executive Board and the House of 
Representative recommended that the membership hold a strike 
1
•
9 Edith Herman. "No School Strike, OK Pact," Chicago Tribune, 
18 January 1972, sec. 1, p.1. 
16~Edith Herman, "Teachers Union Threatens Strike," Chicago 
Tribune,·· 15 April 1972, sec.1, p.1. 
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vote on 22 May and set a date for the strike of 25 May. 
As the referendum day approached, Superintendent 
Redmond wrote a letter to teachers asking for their support 
and understanding of the Board/s current financial position. 
The strike vote was approved by the closest margin in the 
history of Teachers Union voting - 10,391 to 10,193. 170 
Negotiations were resumed the morning after the 
referendum. The Board offered to cut the eleven day school 
closure to six days in June and five in December. This 
would give the Board some more time to seek new funds. 
Additionally, they offered to restore some of the cut 
positions it money became available. Contract negotiations 
continued and resulted in an agreement reached late in the 
evening on 24 May. The agreement contained the following 
items: 
1.Cutting the 11-day closing to 5 days and paying the 
teachers for six extra days. 
2.Restoration of proposed September cuts in music, art, 
and physical education. 
3.Restoration of al I fringe benefits. 
4.Restoration of special teachers who were displaced in 
January. 171 
The agreement was narrowly approved by the Board with a 
6-5 vote. Board member Warren Bacon warned that "the 
language was not clear in its intent," and indicated that he 
"feared the Union would demand all restorations whether or 
170 Edith Herman, "Slim OK for School Strike," Chicago Tribune, 
22 May 1972, sec.1, p.1. 
171
"Facts of Settlement at a Glance," Chicago Tribune, 25 May 
1972, sec.1, p.1. 
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not state aid comes through." 172 Redmond said that he was 
pleased with the offer because it was a victory for the 
school board which basically gave up nothing but made 
everything contingent on the possibility of additional state 
aid. 17~ The school year ended five days early and both 
sides awaited help from the legislature. 
NEGOTIATIONS 1973- A NOVELTY AND ANOTHER STRIKE 
In one sense, the Board-Union negotiations for 1973 
began on 26 January 1972. It was on this day that Warren H. 
Bacon first introduced the idea of conducting contract 
negotiations in public. 174 A committee was established to 
meet with Superintendent Redmond and his staff, as well as 
with President Healey and his Union staff, to discuss 
guidelines for conducting public negotiating sessions. 
Members of the committee included Warren H. Bacon as 
chairman, Thomas Nayder and Catnerine Rohter as members. 
At a meeting on 11 September 1972, President Healey· 
indicated that he opposed public negotiations because of 
what he considered the potential of a circus atmosphere and 
the difficulty of changing bargaining positions once taken 
in public. He felt that both parties should be better 
informed about the progress of negotiations and this could 
172Edith Herman and Clarence Page, "Teachers to Vote on New 
Offer," Chicago Tribune, 25 May 1972, sec.1, p.2. 
173.I..bl.d· 
174Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 26 
January 1972, Chicago, II., p.2853. 
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be achieved by timely news releases and press 
conferences. 17~ At this same meeting, a committee member 
moved that public negotiations not be considered by the 
Board. The motion carried 2-1. The chairman noted that 
the committee would bring the question of public 
negotiations to the full Board for its official action. 176 
Hope Justus, a Tribune columnist, reported that Wesley A. 
Wildman, the Board/s labor relations consultant, also 
advised against public negotiations. 177 At the Board 
meeting of 11 October 1972, the ful 1 Board voted to hold 
open negotiations by a vote of 7-3. 179 
At later meetings guidelines were established for the 
public negotiations. Among the items included in the 
guidelines were specific deadlines for Board proposals, 
prohibition of electronic equipment, provision for private 
meeting rooms for caucuses, and reserved seats for eight 
city-wide organizations. Negotiations were to begin on 4 
December 1972. 179 
As noted earlier, the Union, the Board/s labor 
relations consultant and at least three Board members were 
opposed to public negotiations. Superintendent Redmond also 
17~Minutes of the Chciago Board of Education Meeting, 27 
September 1972, Chicago, II., p.828. 
176 Ibid. 
177Hope Justus, "Contract Talks Going Public", Chicago Tribune, 
20 October 1972, sec.1, p.20. 
179Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 11 
October 1972, Chicago, II., p.835. 
179Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 29 
November 1972, Chicago, II., p.1357-58. 
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opposed "negotiations in a fishbowl". In an interview with 
Superintendent Redmond on 28 July 1989, he recalled that "I 
objected to the public negotiations and to the Board/s 
participation In them rather than staff members. When they 
did decide to conduct public negotiations, I gave them Guy 
Brunetti to advise them. When the Board began these 
negotiations al 1 that they did was to take a stance and make 
speeches. They never got down to negotlate." 190 Redmond 
continued to recal 1 the negotiations when he noted, "you 
can/t yell and get down to real negotiations when the public 
was present. Bob Healey agreed and he told me he was going 
to use the meetings to make speeches to support his 
proposals." 101 Redmond stayed away from the public 
negotiations and left the Board and Brunetti handle them. 
As negotiations continued with little progress, Redmond was 
eventually able to convince the Board that it would be more 
constructive to negotiate in an executive session which they 
did. Redmond noted that he remained with the Board members 
while Brunetti and the Union negotiated. 
As mentioned earlier, negotiations began on 4 December 
1972 but there was no critical moment until 2 January 1973 
when the Union leadership offered to scale down its salary 
demands from ten to two and one-half per cent. The Union 
leadership also called on the Union House of Representatives 
180 Redmond Interview, lac.cit. 
161 Ibid. 
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to recommend a strike date of 10 January and for a strike 
vote in the schools on 5 January. 1 ~~ Progress prior to the 
strike vote was limited to an offer to extend the present 
contract to the end of the school year. Healey flatly 
rejected the offer and called for teachers to support a 
strike vote. Teachers listened to their leadership and 
approved the strike date by the largest margin ever in a CTU 
vote, 16,565 - 2,997. 19 ~ 
Both Union and Board leaders asked to meet with 
Governor-Elect Dan Walker to discuss the possibility of 
state assistance in overcoming the negotiations deadlock. 
The governor-elect was not available for discussion until 
the day before the strike date. President Healey asked 
chief Board negotiator, Mrs. Wild, to assemble the full 
Board for discussions on the weekend prior to the strike to 
consider a new offer from the Union. Mrs. Wild refused to 
cal 1 the ful 1 Board together before the meeting with 
Governor-elect Walker. 
After meeting with the governor-elect, the two sides 
had somewhat differing opinions as to what took place. Mrs. 
Wild noted that "nothing the governor said today wil 1 allow 
us to give one more dollar to the teachers tomorrow." 184 
182Edith Herman, "Union Leaders Urge Strike, but Lower Demands 
on Wages," Chicago Tribune, 3 January 1973, sec.1, p.1. 
103
"Strike vote, Walker to Join Teacher Talks," Chicago 
Tribune, 6 January 1973, sec.1,p.1. 
184Edith Herman, "No Time Set for Renewed Negotiations," 
Chicago Tribune, 10 January 1973, sec.1, p.1. 
130 
Healey disagreed with the Board about the outcome of the 
meeting. "The governor obviously is committed to leading 
the way for more aid to the schools," he said, "that should 
be enough to get the Board back to the bargaining table and 
make an agreement with us." 19~ As a result of their 
continuing disagreements, the strike began as planned on 10 
January 1973. 
Negotiations over the next twelve days continued with 
no real progress being made. Some minor issues were 
resolved but as of 22 January the major issues of reduced 
class size, teacher preparation time, and a shortened school 
year remained. The inevitable happened, Mayor Daley cal led 
the sides together to see if he could help find a 
settlement. Although no solution was found immediately, 
some new inroads were made. The final issues, shortening 
the school year and the hiring of additional teachers, 
were solved in the early hours of 25 January 1973. 
The Union membership was asked to vote on the contract 
that increased their salary by t~o and one-half percent, 
shortened the school year to 39 weeks, extended class size 
limits to all 600 schools, gave an additional preparation 
period in elementary schools, and provided seven make up 
days to offset salary lost during the strike. The 
membership vote of 8,145 to 1,012 ended the longest school 
strike in the history of the Chicago schools after sixteen 
1 9'!1.lli.d. 
13~ 
days.' 8~ 
The brief experiment with Board members serving as 
negotl3tors left much to be desired. The Board realized 
that fact ~nd on 28 March 1073 Introduced a motion 
~uthorlzlng the staff to lnvestlgate alternatives for future 
~egotiations. The motion was adopted by a 10-0 vote. 18 ~ 
The Board had obviously learned from this experience because 
at it/s 25 April l073 meeting it accepted the fol lowing 
recom~endation from Superintendent Redmond: 
It is recommended that the day-to-day collective 
negotiations be the direct responsibility of the 
General Superintendent of Schools, util !zing an 
administrative staff team, a Board of Education 
attorney, and a negotiations consultant. <Mr. Wesley 
A. Wildman, who is also an attorney is currently 
serving in this capacity.) 
The General Superintendent of Schools and appropriate 
members of staff involved in the negotiations will meet 
with the Board of Education to establish prior 
positions. During the course of negotiations, the 
General Superintendent and appropriate staff will meet 
with the Board to keep the Board advised of the 
progress of negotiations and to secure additional 
input from the Board. The Board shall be involved in 
the final agreement. 108 
As a result of the collective bargaining agreement of 
1973, the Board held an election to determine it ESEA 
teacher aides would be represented by a col lectlve 
bargaining agent. The election held on 18 April resulted in 
186Edith Herman, "Teachers OK New Pact 8-1," Chicago Tribune, 
26 January 1973. sec.!, p.1-2. 
187Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 28 March 
1973, Chicago, Il .• p.2377. 
18 ~Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 25 April 
1973, Chicago, Il .• p.2506. 
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the Chicago Teachers Union being named the agent for over 
800 teacher aides. 189 The Teachers Union gained further 
strength to be used in future negotiations. 
EIGHT MONTH CONTRACT REACHED WITHOUT STRIKE THREAT 
Negotiations for 1974 began in October and continued 
through the end of the year without any strike threat. 
Union President Robert Healey noted that "The Board has been 
negotiating in good faith, and there/s no need to threaten a 
strike to get action at the table." 190 By January, both 
sides had agreed on a reduction in maximum class sizes and 
the hiring of 400 new teachers. 
The term of the contract was set at eight months 
because the Board of Education was changing its fiscal year 
to coincide with the school year. Contracts would begin to 
coincide with the school year rather than the calendar year. 
The negotiating teams for the Union and the Board reached an 
agreement for the period 1 January 1974 to 31 August 1974 
on 17 January 1974. The new contract cal led for a salary 
increase of 6.3 per cent for most teachers and Union civil 
service workers. Also included in the settlement was an 
additional preparation period per week in January and a 
second period beginning in June. Union members also 
199Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 23 May 
1973, Chicago, II., p.2980. 
19
°Connie Lauerman, "Teacher, Board Talks Stalled," Chicago 
Tribune, 4 January 1974, sec.1A, p.6. 
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received increased medical and life insurance benefits. 191 
A period of relative calmness had arrived in the Chicago 
Public Schools. 
NEGOTIATIONS 1974-75 - UNION WILL WORK RATHER THAN STRIKE 
In late August Union President Healey announced that 
the Chicago Teachers Union would continue to work on a day 
to day basis as long as current contract talks continue. He 
announced that Union demands would include salary increases, 
improved fringe benefits, and reduced class size. 
Negotiations continued into mid-September without any strike 
threat. However, the Union House of Representatives voted 
<302-2) on 14 September to set a 19 September referendum 
to begin a strike on 23 September. 192 After the House vote, 
both Healey and Superintendent Redmond issued press releases 
that indicated that both sides were still optimistic towards 
avoiding a strike. Redmond said, "I think a strike vote is 
absolutely unnecessary. I recognize it as part of a 
technique of the bargaining process. I am confident that 
there will be no need for a strike." 19 s 
Negotiations continued through the 19 September 
referendum. Superintendent Redmond spoke to the press on 
Thursday morning and said that tentative agreements had been 
191 Connle Lauerman, "Teachers, Board OK Tenative Pact," Chicago 
Tribune, 18 January 1974, sec.1, p.5. 
192Casey Banas, "Teacher Strike Vote Ok'd," Chicago Tribune, 15 
September 1974, sec.1, p.1. 
19Sl..Qj_g. 
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reached on al 1 issues except salaries. He noted that the 
Union/s "salary demands are indeed excessive" but he 
remained hopeful that negotiations would continue and a 
settlement reached. 194 
The final negotiation session began at 4:00 pm Saturday 
and ended with an agreement at 7:30 am Sunday. President 
Healey spoke to reporters after the agreement and said, "It 
was a tribute to the collective bargaining process that we 
reasoned out our differences without a strike. 1119 ~ Among 
the items in the settlement were: 
1. The hiring of 200 elementary school and 100 high 
school teachers to cover additional preparation 
time. 
2. An increase in major medical benefits to $40,000. 
3. Individual teacher supply accounts of $28. 
4. Salary increases ranging from 4 to 11 per cent. 196 
The Union membership overwhelming voted to accept the 
contract by a 18,037 to 1,676 margin. 197 
THE REDMOND APPROACH TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Redmond/s interest in collective bargaining was 
witnessed in the topic of his dissertation, Administrative 
Factors Affecting Teacher Strikes, written in 1947. In 
studying Redmond/s approach to collective bargaining during 
194Dave Schneidman, "School Strike Vote Today; Redmond Asks 
More Talks," Chicago Tribune, 19 September 1974, sec.1, p.1. 
19~Casey Banas, "Avert Strike; School Today," Chicago Tribune, 
23 September 1974, Sec.1, p.1. 
1
""
611 Special Report: 1974 Contract," Union Teacher, Seeptember 
1974, Vol .XL, No. 19. 
197
"Chicago Teachers Union Members Vote to Accept New 
Contracf, 11 Chicago Tribune, 26 September 1975, sec.2, p.8. 
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his tenure as Superintendent in Chicago, we can compare his 
findings in 1947 to the situations he encountered during his 
negotiations with the Teachers Union. Redmond listed seven 
factors that contributed to teacher strikes in his study. 
They are: 
1. The lack of channels of communication between 
teachers and administrators, and between the boards 
of education and the citizens of the community. 
2. The lack of an opportunity for teachers to 
participate in the determination of policies which 
affected them. 
3. The imprudent discharge of obligations on the part 
of status leaders, both the leaders within the 
school system and the leaders of the teacher 
organizations. 
4. The lack of fiscal independence of the boards of 
education. 
5. The injudicious methods of bargalning practiced by 
both the boards of education and the teacher 
organizations. 
6. The lack of understanding of how to use the power of 
organizations. 
7. The lack of provision for effective Jay 
participation in educational planning. 199 
Communication between the Union and the Board of 
Education was wel 1 established after the initial collective 
bargaining agreement. Grievance procedures were spelled out 
in the contract and refined by both sides during future 
negotiations. The Board had established an Office of 
198James F. Redmond, "Administrative Factors Affecting Teacher 
Strikes," <Unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Teachers 
College, Columbia University, 1947), p.56. 
Employee Relations which was used for general as well as 
contractual discussions. The public/s access to Board of 
Education meetings provided a means for citizens to voice 
their concerns to the Board of Education. The press and 
electronic media kept the public informed about actions 
being considered by the Board. 
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The advent of collective bargaining provided teachers, 
through their union, an avenue to participate in determining 
some of the policies that affected them. Teachers were able 
to negotiate sick leave, personal leave, transfer policy, 
and many other policies that affected them. 
Although at times Redmond and his counterparts in the 
Union were not discreet in their actions or criticism, 
negotiations generally were carried out in a professional 
manner. Each side tried to appear as the prudent leader who 
wanted only what was best for the children. Redmond 
admitted during his interview tnat negotiations sometimes 
became personal and bitter but that these blow-ups were 
quickly forgotten. 
The lack of fiscal independence of the Chicago Board of 
Education was evident during each negotiation under 
Redmond/s leadership. Since Chicago never seemed to have 
enough money to appease the Teacher/s Union and avoid a 
strike, the Board was continually asking for more support 
from the state. Redmond noted that he did not mind 
negotiating with the Union, but he greatly disliked the 
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interference created by Mayor Daley who felt that the Board 
could give the Union whatever it asked for financially as 
Jong as a strike was avoided. Daley always promised that he 
would help the Board get additional funding but was not 
always able to fulfi I 1 his promises. Redmond noted that he 
would rather settle with the Union on a compromise rather 
than go to the Mayor/s off ice for a settlement because he 
knew that he would lose there. Redmond noted that the only 
times Mayor Daley interfered with his administration were 
during contract negotiations and the implementation of the 
Redmond Plan to intergrate the schools. 
The maturing of both the Union and the Board during 
Redmond/s administration was quite evident. Both sides 
learned to use the press and pub! ic sentiment to their 
advantage whenever possible. Both sides learned the give 
and take of negotiations, that is, they developed an idea of 
what to offer and what to withhold. Redmond noted that he 
felt that as negotiations continued in the early to 
mid-seventies that he had the better negotiator in Guy 
Brunetti. Redmond felt that Brunetti could control his 
anger better than Desmond or Healey. Redmond, however, did 
praise the Union/s attorney, Joseph Jacobs as being the best 
negotiator for the Union. 
Again both organizations, the Union and the Board, 
developed a better understanding on how to use their 
particular strengths to enhance their positions in 
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collective bargaining. Through each of the negotiations, 
both organizations learned more about themselves and their 
adversary and were able to develop better negotiating skills 
for the next contract. 
We have seen how James Redmond reacted to the immediate 
problem of negotiating a teacher contract for the first 
time. After his administrative team had been through the 
process once they were able to learn and develop their 
skills so that later negotiations were a more familiar 
experience. 
Just as he finished the first collective bargaining 
agreement with the Chicago Teachers Union, Redmond was 
notified by the Office of Health, Education and Welfare that 
Chicago must begin to desegregate their schools. With no 
time to sit back and enjoy his successful negotiations, 
Redmond now had to attack the problem of a segregated school 
system and try to develop programs that would enhance 
integration. 
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CHAPTER IV 
REDMOND AND THE CHALLENGE OF DESEGREGATION 
After spending his first two months negotiating a 
collective bargaining agreement with the union and prepar!ng 
a budget for 1967 Redmond was finally able to return to his 
pursuit of solutions to the challenge of desegregation of 
the schools. Redmond received a letter from the Office of 
Health, Education and Welfare in January 1967. He reported 
that the Jetter was "polite yet firm, reminding me that the 
civil rights controversy was far from over. 111 Redmond was 
now under the questioning eye of the federal government and 
he and his staff had to create a plan that would help solve 
the problem of desegregation in the Chicago Public Schools. 
Redmond requested an appointment with Secretary Howe of the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare to discuss the 
problem. 
This chapter will discuss the development of 
segregation in the school system and how it reached the 
crisis situation that existed when Redmond arrived in 
Chicago. The reader will also learn about the plan 
developed by Redmond and his staff to alleviate some of the 
segregation in the schools and intensify educational efforts 
1 James F. Redmond, "Efforts to Desegregate and Decentralize 
the Administration of a Large City School System," Speech at 
Columbia University, New York, June 10,1968. 
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in those schools that could not be desegregated. 
BACKGROUND OF SEGREGATION - 1860-1950 
The first documented occurrence of a segregated school 
system in Chicago took place during the Civil War. There 
was conflict in the city between the Lincoln Unionist 
Pepubl leans and the Democrats. particularly the Irish, who 
were at the bottom of the economic strata and felt 
threatened by the possible economic competition of 
African-Americans. 2 The Irish rioted against a few 
African-American dock workers who had "taken the jobs of 
their brothers.'' The most serious result of this tension 
between these groups resulted in the city council passing 
the Black School Law of 1863. This law required that all 
African-American children attend a segregated school . 8 The 
parents of the African-American children in already 
established schools refused to send their children to 
another school and kept them where they were. Pressure from 
African-American citizens on the mayor and the Board of 
Education brought about the repeal of the measure in 1865. 4 
A study by the Chicago Urban League suggests that the 
elimination of legal segregation in Chicago public schools 
after the Civil War resulted in schools that were 
integrated. African-Americans were at the time residing in 
2 Herrick, Joe.cit., p.52. 
3 Ibid., p.53. 
4 Ibid. 
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many areas of the city.~ The formation of the homogeneous 
South Side community after World War I introduced de facto 
segregation. but even in 1920 there is evidence that from 
one-third to one-half of the African-American pupils 
attended integrated elementary schools. After 1920, 
racially mixed neighborhoods seemed to contract, partly as a 
consequence of restrictions upon the sale of housing to 
African-Americans and partly due to the influx of southern 
African-Americans who settled in the mixed areas. 6 The 
migration of African-Americans from the South mirrored in 
many ways the migration of European ethnic groups in the 
nineteenth century. Both groups of immigrants moved to 
areas of the city where relatives and friends lived. These 
newcomers could adjust to 1 ife in the city easier when they 
were with "their own kind." An observer at either Union 
Station or the Illinois Central Station could give an 
educated guess as to where newly arriving African-Americans 
were coming from and into which neighborhood they would· 
first settle. With this kind of migration it is easy to see 
why segregated neighborhoods developed and why the 
neighborhood school was also a segregated school. 
During the 1930/s and early 1940/s, It Is probable that 
~John E. Coons, Civil Rights U.S.A .. Public Schools in Cities 
in the North and West. 1962 - Chicago, United States 
Commission on Civil Rights, 1962, p.186, citing Baron, 
Chicago Urban League, "An Equal Chance for Education," 
<preliminary report), March 1962, p.7. 
~~. 
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administrative pol icy played a significant role in 
preserving the segregated character of Chicago schools. 
School zone lines were made to conform to the configuration 
of the African-American communities and. as these 
communities grew in population. the administration placed 
new schools within their boundaries rather than transfer 
African-American children to available space in white 
schools. It 0 was also fairly certain that white students 
assigned to African-American schools could easily obtain 
transfers to other schools. 7 In 1947, Superintendent Herold 
Hunt planned and executed the redistricting of 102 schools 
in an effort to end overcrowding. The Urban League 
characterized his efforts as "essentially an impartial 
application of the neighborhood school pol icy." Hunt also 
eliminated most of the neutral areas. Neutral areas were 
selected areas in which a student was given an option to 
attend one of two schools in his area. This was generally 
used as a way to keep the schools segregated. 8 
PARENTS QUESTION SEGREGATED SCHOOLS 
The first signs of discontent with the school situation 
in Chicago occurred in June 1955. The United States Supreme 
Court had already ruled that segregated schools were 
inherently unequal and must be desegregated "with all 
;c'.IQl.Q.' p. 186. 
'
03 Ibid. 
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deliberate speed."• In an article in the Chicago American. 
citizens from the North Lawndale area complained of badly 
overcrowded schools. Superintendent Wi 11 is responded to the 
group by pointing out that there were worse areas in the 
city. The parent group referred to a survey that noted that 
22 percent of their schools were on double shift and that 43 
percent of their teachers were substitutes. The group asked 
why it appeared that Hyde Park was being given preference 
with new schools, building additions, and new teachers. 
Wi l 1 is/ response to their request was that he must look at 
the needs of the entire city not just one neighborhood. 10 
In September 1961, the first legal action was taken by 
parents of African-American children attending various 
public schools in Chicago. In Webb v. The Board of 
Education 11 parents alleged deliberate racial segregation by 
the school authorities through gerrymandering of school 
boundaries, in choosing school location, by refusing to 
utilize space in white schools, and in applying a 
neighborhood school pol icy. The parents stated that their 
children attended double shift or overcrowded schools; that 
in some cases classes were as large as 60 students, 
instruction was inferior, and that space that was unfit and 
9 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686 
<1954) and Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 75 
S.Ct. 753 <1955>. 
10Wnek, Joe. cit., p.99. 
11 Civ. No. 61C1569 D.C., N.D. Ill., cited in Coons, lac.cit., 
p.209. 
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unsafe was used for classroom purposes. 12 After many 
pre-trial motions the case was disposed of in August 1962, 
upon a motion by the defendant to dismiss. The court held 
that the plaintiffs did not exhaust the administrative 
remedy available under the II l inois School Code. The remedy 
in the School Code provided that the complainant must file 
with the State Superintendent of Schools al legations of 
exclusion or segregation of any pupil because of race or 
religion. But the federal judge dismissed the suit saying. 
"Chicago can not deny the existence of /de facto/ 
segregation or excuse it on the pretext of benign 
indifference. . Separation can not be defended on the 
ground that it is the result of a high concentration of 
Negroes in a school distr·ict." 13 After rendering his 
decision, Judge Julius Hoffman noted that he had great 
confidence in Wil !is and that he was sure that Wil !is would 
see to it that the Chicago schools would be fully integrated 
and equa 1 • 1 4 
On 19 January 1962, a group of parents of 
African-American students at the Burnside School filed suit 
against the Board of Education. In Burroughs v. The Board 
of Education 1 ~ the parents charged the Board with deliberate 
racial segregation, and assignment of their children to 
12Coons, Joe.cit., p.209. 
1 
"'Herrick, loc.ci t., p.313. 
14 Ibid .• p.211. 
15Civ. No. 62C206, D.C. N.D. II 1. <1962), cited in Coons, 
1 oc. c i t ·; •. p. 212. 
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inferior schools. A request for an injunction was made that 
would end the all-white status of nearby Perry School. The 
plaintiffs presented evidence which measured the distances 
to the all- white Perry and the al I-African-American 
Gillespie from the plaintiffs' homes. They also focused on 
the degree of utilization of facilities, and the boundary 
changes ln the attendance areas made by the Board of 
Education. On 31 January, Judge Richard Austin denied the 
plaintiff's application for a temporary restraining order. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION POLICY ON INTEGRATION 
After the Brown decisions. civic organizations began to 
ask the Board of Education what itrs policy on integrated 
schools was? The Board appointed a committee to prepare 
It's statement and this committee heard from many 
organizations who offered input for the Board's 
consideration. The statement did not even mention 
integration or any other positive goal. Adopted by the 
Board on 14 January 1959 it bega.n: 
Better human understanding among all peoples, based 
upon deeper mutual understanding, is a primary 
objective of the entire educational program in 
Chicagors publ le schools. Al I activities under the 
jurisdiction of the Chicago Board of Education shall be 
so organized and all persons so directed as to bring 
this desirable objective to closer fulfillment, 
promptly and prudently.•• 
The organizations were greatly disappointed when the 
16Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, January 
14. 1959, Chi ca go, I 1 • , p. 830 . 
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official policy statement was presented and approved. 
Several civic organizations began to Issue statements 
regarding their support for Integration. In 1961 the 
Chicago Teachers Union, by action of its House of 
Representatives, had pledged Itself to work for integration 
within the system so as to equalize educational opportunity. 
The following year they presented specific proposals with 
the statement that the neighborhood school policy should not 
be used as an excuse for segregating children. 17 The 
Citizens Schools Committee continued to press for advisory 
committees, as well as an independent survey of the system. 
They advocated a pol icy of continuous redistricting and 
special aid for al 1 economically underprivileged children 
through reduction in class size. securing extra materials 
and auxiliary services, and for the assumption of 
integration as a positive and explicit goal. The Chicago 
Region of the P.T.A. took simil'ar positions. The Urban 
League issued a series of studies, and held a Schools 
Seminar in March 1962. The South East Community 
Organization, largely white, asked for a regional exchange 
for South East Side high schools to promote integration and 
to stabilize the already integrated schools. 19 
Board members themselves held varying views on 
integration. As early as 1956, Dr. Joseph Pois had spoken 
17Herrick, Joe.cit., p.315. 
18 Ibid. 
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to the Citizens Schools Committee on the importance of the 
schools in the necessary effort to make the city an 
integrated community. In the early 1960/s Board members 
Bacon and Friedman had clearly, courteously. and 
consistently urged action to integrate the schools. During 
his tenure as Board President <1962-64), Clair Roddewig met 
with sev~ral African-American groups to try to gain support 
for furthering the cause of integrated education. 19 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, in April 1963, 
the Board of Education enlisted the assistance of Professor 
Robert J. Havighurst to conduct a survey of the school 
system. The appointment of Havighurst did not sit well with 
Superintendent Wi Ills because he was aware of Havighurst/s 
rejection of the neighborhood school plan in favor of 
integrated education and regional high schools. The report 
called on the Board to take an active part in social urban 
renewal. The results of the survey reflected Havighurst/s 
philosophy of education and called for further integration 
of the schools and compensatory education for disadvantaged 
chi l dren. 20 
The Board of Education also responded to pressure put 
upon lt by the courts when on 28 August 1963 it agreed to 
establish a Five Man Panel of Educators to study the school 
system. The Board resolution read as fol lows: 
'~lbl.d. 
20 Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, November 
27, 1963, Chicago, Il .• p.746. 
148 
Be It Resolved: that this Board hereby reaffirms its 
policy to provide the best possible educational 
opportunity for all the pupils in the school system so 
that every child may achieve his maximum development, 
and to recognize and work toward the maximum resolution 
of every problem or inequity that may exist in the 
system, including ... schools in the system being 
attended entirely or predominantly by Negroes .... 21 
This panel later became known as the Hauser Panel. Their 
suggestions included an integration of all faculties, a more 
equitable distribution of experienced teachers, in-service 
training for teachers and educational opportunities for 
teachers to learn more about the students with whom they 
were working. The panel developed a clustering plan that 
enlarged attendance areas in contiguous neighborhoods so 
that the Black and White children would attend integrated 
schools. It further suggested open enrollment in general 
high schools within high school districts, and open 
enrollment in all vocational and special schools. 22 
As the conflict between the Board and Superintendent 
Wi 11 is continued, several Board members under the leadership 
of President Roddewig drafted and adopted on 13 February 
1964 a new policy statement on integration. The new pol icy 
read in part: 
The members of the Chicago Board of Education believe 
that this city and this country would be healthier 
economically, educationally, and morally if Chicago, 
Illinois, and al 1 sections of the country, reflected 
the kind of racial and ethnic diversity characteristic 
of the nation as a whole. 
21 Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, August 
28, 1963, Chicago, Il ., p.332. 
22 Herrick, loc.cit., p.325-26. 
We have already made clear our opposition to 
segregation or discrimination in planning attendance 
areas and educational programs. We believe the 
children of Chicago would be better prepared for 
today/s world if their classrooms and school staffs 
reflect a racial and ethnic diversity. 
149 
We shall continue to seek, and promptly take, any 
practical steps by which, in conformity with sound 
educational procedures, racial and ethnic diversity in 
schools and classrooms can be promoted ... 
Therefore. we affirm and publicly declare a policy of 
racial integration. We shall endeavor to effect the 
development of a continuous program to achieve this 
goal .z:c: 
This new policy could not be mistaken for the previous 
pol icy that failed to mention integration. In reading this 
new policy, one should certainly understand that it was now 
the Board/s policy to take a positive approach to 
integrating the schools. But as we shal 1 see, a stated 
policy is not always immediately acted upon. 
To further complicate the Board's policy on racial 
integration, an additional pol icy statement regarding the 
Board's commitment to neighborhood stabi I ization was issued 
on 12 November 1964. The pol icy read: 
While the Board continues to search for ways to 
increase the interracial association of students, it 
also has a responsibility to help preserve, as far as 
possible, such associations in areas where they now 
exist. 
Therefore, as one of our important objectives in the 
field of integration, the Board of Education hereby 
asserts that it is the policy to seek and take any 
possible steps which may help to preserve and stabilize 
23Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, February 
13, 196"4, Chi ca go, I 1 . , p. 1945. 
the integration of schools in neighborhoods which 
already have an interracial composition. 24 
In the 1960's, as well as today, these policies on 
integrat~on and neighborhood stabilization have come into 
confl let. History of the Chicago school system has shown 
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us that as schools integrate (following Board policy> they 
have tended to unstabi Jize the neighborhood (contrary to 
Board policy). There have been few exceptions to this 
trend. 
A NEW TRANSFER POLICY 
John E. Coons writes in his study for the United States 
Commission on Civil Rights: 
An official policy prohibiting transfers from assigned 
schools has been in effect for a number of years. The 
no-transfer rule has had two consequences. In a 
racially homogeneous area, coupled with the 
neighborhood school policy, it has tended to preserve 
the segregated character of the school. In integrated 
areas it has tended to preserve integration by 
preventing the transfer of white children. 2~ 
Finally, on 27 December 1961, the superintendent 
introduced the administration's .Plan to alter the transfer 
rules beginning in the fall of 1962. The new plan would be 
"permissive" or voluntary on the part of students and aimed 
at the better use of classroom space. The plan was limited 
to the issuance of temporary permits to students on double 
shifts to enrol 1 in elementary schools with available space 
24Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, November 
12, 1964, Chicago, Il ., p.542. 
25Coons, Joe.cit., p.191. 
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within their general area. Pupils who were granted 
transfers were responsible for their own transportation at 
no expense to the Board. If their home school reached 
average class size of less than forty then the chlld/s 
transfer was revoked and he must return to his home school. 
The plan also limited the number of transfers to any 
receiving school so that the average class size did not 
reach above thirty pupils. 26 The Chicago Urban League, a 
long-time advocate of a transfer policy, sharply criticized 
the superintendent"s plan. The League pointed out that the 
plan discriminated in that it set a higher enrollment number 
(forty) for the overcrowded schools Cgenerally 
African-American) and a lower enrollment Cthirty) for the 
less crowded schools (generally White). 27 Although the old 
rule of no transfers did not permit further integration, at 
least it did not discriminate against students, mostly 
African-American, in the overcrowded schools. 
The permissive transfer plan took effect in the 1962 
school year. The purpose of the plan was to relieve 
overcrowding and utilize available space. In the first year 
28 elementary school students were transferred at their own 
request from overcrowded schools. There was no program for 
the high schools during this school year. In the 1963 
school year elementary permissive transfers increased to 35 
2.$1.Ql.d. 
27 Ibid. 
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students. The permissive transfer program was extended to 
the high school during the same school year but included the 
proviso that students seeking to leave an overcrowded high 
school must be academically in the top 25 percent of their 
city-wide class. This proviso I imited the number of 
transfers to 58 students in 1963. 29 Hirsch became the first 
high school to take part in the permissive transfer after a 
parent group, f rem the school began to seek he 1 p to a 1 1 ev i ate 
overcrowding by appealing to the courts. 29 
In August 1963 Superintendent Wi 1 lis presented to the 
Board and received approval on a new "permissive transfer" 
plan that would allow honor students in crowded high schools 
to transfer to twenty-four less crowded high schools. 
Subsequently, Willis reduced the number of receiving schools 
to nine. At the 25 September Board meeting, President 
Roddewig suggested reinstating two schools that had been 
dropped. Wil 1 is made no objection and the two schools were 
reinstated. Willis balked at transferring 24 students who 
had requested placement in the two reinstated schools but 
finally conceded after a court order was issued for him to 
do so. 30 This overturning of Willis/ actions by the Board 
resulted in his resignation "over his principles and sense 
of professional integrity." After a short time an agreement 
29Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, Octriber 
13. 1965, Chicago, II., p.808. 
29Chicago Public Schools, Open Enrollment: A Progress Report. 
November 1972, p.19. 
80 Herrick, Joe.cit., p.316. 
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was reached between the Board and the Superintendent "to 
delineate areas for action" and Will ls rescinded his 
c-eslgnation. 31 
Wil I is del lvered a report on the permiss~ve transfer to 
the Board on 8 June 1966. Will ls noted that the program had 
relieved overcrowding in some schools to a significant 
degree. It had encouraged integration in some schools where 
African-American students were attending the school for the 
first time. Finally he noted that most students who had 
transferred had adjusted to their new schools. 32 At this 
same meeting Board member Cyrus Adams introduced a 
resolution that stated: 
A student who transfers from one school to another 
under cluster or permissive transfer plans must have 
earned and must continue to deserve the privilege of 
transfer. in terms of effort. achievement, and 
conduct. '33 
This resolution was modified and expanded in May 1963 
with the fol lowing revision so as to be less restrictive in 
determining student participation in the permissive transfer 
program: 
Students seeking to transfer to one of the receiving 
schools should be accepted with the following being the 
only exception. No child presently placed or 
recommended by a child study report for placement in a 
mentally handicapped division or social adjustment 
division should participate. 
Once a student is accepted by a receiving school he is 
31
.lill..d .• p.318. 
32Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, June 8, 
1966, Chicago, II., p.3302. 
331.QlQ. 
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to be considered as a member of that school/s regular 
body and therefore not unilaterally transferable. 
However. under extenuating circumstances, a parent may 
apply for a transfer for a child back to the school in 
the attendance district which the parent resides. 
Parents of children at the primary level or in grade 
four who can provide transportation and are available 
in case of an emergency should be notified that their 
children may participate in the permissive transfer 
program. "'34 
Further privileges were extended to elementary school 
students who participated in the permissive transfer 
programs including permitting the transferees the option to 
attend a high school in their home district or one in the 
district to which they were transferred. 3 ~ 
Below are listed the totals for student participation 
in the permissive transfer program for the period 1962-1974. 
PERMISSIVE TRANSFERS36 
YEAR NO. IN ELEMENTARY NO. IN HIGH SCHOOL 
1962 28 0 
1963 35 58 
1964 102 602 
1965 103 673 
1966 N.A. 1500 
1967 164 957 
1968 151 965 
1969 89 735 
1970 121 499 
1971 78 385 
1972 79 329 
1973 N.A. 500 
1974 N.A. 27 
~ 4Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting. May 
23,1973. Chicago. II .• p.2921. 
3~Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, April 26, 
1967. Chicago, II., p.2840. 
~ 6 Data collected from various Minutes of the Chicago Board of 
Educati~ri Meetings during the years 1962-1974. 
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The reader can see that participation in the permissive 
transfer program reached its high points in the mid to 
late sixties. The number of participants may appear to be 
sufficient unti 1 one realizes that during this time there 
were over 550,000 students enrol led in the Chicago schools. 
Upon further investigation it should also be noted that 
although over 8,000 students had utilized the program 
during these years. there were several times as many 
students eligible to participate. As an example in 1967, 
there were 7,380 high school students and 2,374 elementary 
students eligible under the permissive transfer program but, 
as noted above, only 957 high school students <12.9%) and 
164 elementary students C6.9%> took part in the program. 3 ? 
This year was typical of other years listed. The great 
majority of the student population remained in his/her home 
school even though some were extremely overcrowded. 
The permissive transfer program started by Willis was 
continued throughout the Redmond administration but reached 
its peak in 1966 and began to decline for the rest of 
Redmond/s administration. 
THE REDMOND PLAN: A RESPONSE TO WASHINGTON, D.C. 
James F. Redmond assumed the Superintendency of the 
37Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 27 
December 1967, Chicago, II., p.1037. 
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Chicago Public Schools ln October 1966. He immediately 
faced problems in preparing a budget for the 1967 schooi 
year. Moreover, he had to find ways in which to cover an 
existing five mi Ilion do11ar deficit in the 1966 budget. In 
addition he had to prepare a legislative package for the 
General Assembly which would help the Chicago schools. In 
an address at Teachers College of Columbia University he 
recalled his first months in office and in particular a 
letter he received in January, 1967. He noted, "As if 
waiting for me to take a deep breath, the Office of Health, 
Education, and Welfare sent a nice, polite but firm letter 
to me early in the month reminding me that the civil rights 
controversy was far from over. I was asked to immediately 
reply to their queries about desegregation." 39 The letter 
referred to a United States Office of Education report 
entitled Report on Office of Education Analysis of Certain 
Aspects of Chicago Public Schools under Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The report included a statement 
of findings and recommendations concerning the Chicago 
Public Schools. 39 
Redmond requested a meeting with officials from the 
38James F. Redmond, "Efforts to Desegregate and Decentralize 
the Administration of a Large City School System," Address 
presented at a Special Training Institute on Problems of 
School Desegregation, Teachers College of Columbia 
University, New York, July 10-12, 1968, p.1. 
39Board of Education, City of Chicago, Increasing 
Desegregation of Faculties. Students. and Vocational 
Education Programs, Board of Education, August 23, 1967, p.1. 
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Off ice of Education and members of his staff to discuss 
writing a grant that would study the areas of desegregation. 
In April the grant was approved and Redmond recruited some 
very able consultants to assist in the study. The 
consultants included university professors. school district 
officials. and public relations experts. One of the 
consultants was John E. Coons of Northwestern University who 
led the 1962 study of the Chicago Public Schools for the 
United States Civil Rights Commission. These consultants 
joined staff members of the Redmond administration and 
resource personnel from various local organizations to seek 
solutions to the problems facing the Chicago Public schools. 
Committees were formed to study four areas of concern 
mentioned in the Office of Education Report. The areas 
were: Faculty Assignment Patterns. Boundaries and Student 
Assignment Policies. the Apprenticeship Training Program. 
and Open Enrollment for Vocational and Trade Schools. 40 In 
addition to these areas identified by the Office of 
Education. Redmond/s staff added two additional areas to be 
studied: one was Research and the other was Public 
Understanding. 41 
On 23 August 1967 the Board accepted "in principle" the 
document entitled Increasing Desegregation of Faculties. 
40 .l.Qj_g. 
41 Redmond, "Efforts to Desegregate and Decentralize the 
Administration of a Large City School System". p.2. 
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Students. and Vocational Education Programs. 42 This 
document is generally referred to as "The Redmond Plan." 
The Board accepted the report in principle so that it could 
maintain control over it by insisting that any 
recommendations would be brought back to the Board in 
separate reports. 4 ~ The introduction stated the basic 
assumption on which the report/s recommendations were based: 
We see as a primary and urgent need the establishment 
and maintenance of the conditions in the Chicago 
schools that open up for al 1 young people meaningful 
life chances and that speed them on their way to 
acceptance and accomplishment. 
Particularly are we concerned about the racial and 
economic deprivation in our midst .... When a 
condition so pervasive in our city bears in upon the 
schools, the schools can not hope to solve the problem 
except in commitment and action shared by the community 
- a genuine shared commitment with al 1 groups who can 
make common cause with the Board of Education for 
quality education for al I .... We see an obligation 
to undertake a comprehensive educational program 
aimed at reversing a pervasive social condition that 
has become deeply rooted in our society ... and seek 
educational pathways to a better society. 44 
The report discusses each of the six topics addressed in the 
report and offers recommendations that should be implemented 
in order to make the plan a success. The writer will list 
some of the major recommendations for each area addressed. 
42Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, August 
23, 1967, Chicago, Il ., insert after p.534. 
4 :=:Redmond, "Efforts to Desegregate and Decentralize the 
Administration of a Large City School System", p.3. 
44Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, August 
23, 1967, Chicago, Il .• insert folfowing p.534, cited in 
Herrick, Joe.cit., p.344. 
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FACULTY ASSIGNMENT PATTERNS 
The committee on Faculty Assignment Patterns found a 
serious staffing imbalance in Chicago. Teachers in 
African-American schools and schools in low socioeconomic 
neighborhoods were younger and had less experience and 
formal training and were subject to more turnover. It was 
recommended that a new system of staffing be implemented. 
The instructional group would include highly qualified 
master teacher group leaders, less experienced teachers and 
aides, interns. and practice teachers. These teams would be 
offered a strong in-service program. The team members would 
work ln attractive conditions and be offered incentives that 
would make for more effective and stable staffing.•5 An 
in-service training program would be offered to principals 
about to assume positions in the inner city. The principal 
would be given the responsibility to reduce staff turnover, 
and develop an esprit de corp among the staff . 46 It was 
further recommended that it become a requisite that a 
candidate for the principalship examination have at least 
two years service in a low socioeconomic area. 47 Expansion 
of services for children who presented serious discipline or 
learning problems would be expanded. 46 A city-wide advisory 
4 ~Increasing Desegregation of Faculties. Students. and 
Vocational Education Programs, p.A-25. 
46
"Here/s Text of Redmond/s School Plan," Chicago Tribune, 
August 24, 1967, p.8. 
47 lbl.d. 
46 Ibid.·-
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committee representing community organizations and the 
school system would be established for the purpose of 
proposing ways in which inner city school communities and 
the staff of the schools would help each other in achieving 
and maintaining equitable staffing. 4 ~ The Board of 
Education should adopt policies and procedures on assignment 
and transfer which would result in having in each school 
the same percentage of regularly certified teachers as the 
percentage in the system as a whole. 50 The collective 
bargaining agreement signed by the Chicago Teachers Union 
has pledged that the union and the Board wil 1 "~erk 
cooperatively to develop and implement policies with respect 
to the assignment of teachers in such a manner as to lead to 
the achievement of representative social composition of 
school faculties and of a more equitable distribution of 
11 regularly assigned teachers."~ 1 A research study should be 
undertaken to determine financial and quasi-financial 
incentives which might be effective in securing and 
retaining experienced teachers in inner city schools.~2 
BOUNDARIES AND STUDENT ASSIGNMENT POLICIES 
The student population of the Chicago Public Schools 
increased an average of almost 14,000 pupils per year from 
49 Increasing Desegregation of Faculties, p.A-26. 
'50 Thi ..-1 ~-
~1Herrick, Joe.cit,, p.345. 
!"5 211 Here/s Text of Redmond/s School Plan, 11 p.8. 
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1951 unti 1 the time of the report. The increase in pupils 
was not spread throughout the city but in only 50 percent of 
the schools. In order to more equitably distribute the 
burden of the increase the Board of Education used norma1 
procedures such as: adjusting attendance areas. changing 
grade patterns in schools, renting community faclllties. 
using mobile units, and, lastly, bui !ding new schools and 
additions to existing buildings. 
Efforts had been made to further integration through 
attendance area adjustments, voluntary permissive transfer 
programs, open enrollment in vocational and technical high 
schools, and in the planning and building of new school 
facilities. City-wide programs had brought together 
students of al 1 races and cultural and socioeconomic 
backgrounds around a common area of interest and competence. 
The al 1-city chorus, al 1-city band, and the al 1-city 
orchestra met regularly throughout the year.~3 
Prior to discussing the recommendations, the committee 
that studied student assignment policies compiled a 1 ist of 
assumptions upon which they based their recommendations. 
They assumed that integration was desirable for both white 
and African-American children.~4 Every effort should be 
made to retain the white population and promote 
stabilization in integrated school situations. The 
~ 8 Increasing Desegregation of Faculties, p.B-4. 
~ 41..Ql.Q., p.B-6. 
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responsibility for integration should be shared by al 1 of 
the white community by maintaining fixed racial proportions 
in the schools. The transportation of students by the 
school system would be necessary to achieve racial 
Integration.~~ Since the existing housing segregation 
pattern in this city would continue for some time, it would 
be necessary for the Board of Education to continue to 
improve the·qual ity of education in all schools and 
particularly in the ghetto schools.~6 Finally, the 
committee noted that funds to implement the recommendations 
should be avai !able from state and federal sources as wel 1 
as local sources.~ 7 
Recommendations for student assignment policies were 
made in three categories. Short term recommendations 
included the recommendation that fringe area schools <those 
integrated schools located between African-American 
segregated and white segregated schools) should have a 
limited percentage of minority students. In outer area 
schools additional educational staff and services would be 
provided to meet the needs of the pupils who had been 
transferred in and this staff would be in-serviced in human 
relations.~e A voluntary permissive transfer would continue 
to relieve overcrowding, achieve stabi 1 ization, and promote 
~!5"Here"s Text of Reclmond"s School Plan," p.8. 
!5 61...b.1..d • 
~ 7' .l.tU...Q • 
~srncreasing Desegregation of Faculties, p.B-7. 
~63 
integration. Selection of sites and the bui !ding of new 
schools would be carried out In a way that would promote 
integration whenever possible.~· 
Intermediate plans suggested the establishment of 
magnet schools at the high school and elementary level, each 
to offer exemplary programs in special lzed fields. These 
magnet schools would have attendance areas large enough 
to insure that they would be integrated. 60 The magnet 
schools would have course offerings and instruction so 
outstanding that they could not be matched anywhere in 
the city. Transportation would be provided to students who 
live excessive distances from the school. Some 
consideration should be given to establishing magnet schools 
in a shared-time arrangement with parochial and private 
schools. 01 
The only long range recommendation regarding student 
assignment policies was to conduct a feasibility study on 
the possibilities of establishing educational parks or 
cultural-education centers. 62 
THE APPRENTICE PROGRAM 
The committee studying the apprenticeship program 
included both local and national leaders in education, labor 
~.,,. l.bl.Q. , p. B-8. 
""o.l.Qj_g., p.B-9. 
·=-
111 Here/s Text of Redmond"s School Plan," p.8. 
62l.Qj_g. 
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organizations, and civil rights. The committee established 
three objectives for their study. These objectives were: 
1. To cooperate with the U. S. Office of Education and 
the U. S. Department of Labor in a review of the 
Mayor/s program to increase enrollment of students from 
Negro and other minority groups in apprenticeship 
programs. 
2. To develop plans for working on a continuing basis 
with the Joint Apprenticeship Committees to assist in 
increasing minority representation in apprenticeship 
programs and to develop public confidence in the 
procedures of the committees. 
3. To develop an effective program of disseminating 
pertinent information to students from minority groups 
about apprenticeship opportunities and to plan 
additional programs to prepare minority group students 
to achieve eligibility. 63 
The committee of experts studied the apprenticeship 
program at Washburne Trade School and made recommendations 
to improve the program. They suggested that at least two 
levels of advisory committees or councils should be 
organized in order to get advice and counsel as to how 
Washburne could best serve the needs of industry and the 
needs of the community. The first level of the advisory 
committee would deal with policy matters as they relate to 
the school and to the community. The second level would be 
an advisory committee for each of the trades being taught at 
the school . 64 They also noted that the Board of Education 
should encourage the Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training, 
the Illinois State Employment Service, and other interested 
03 Increasing Desegregation of Faculties, p.C4-5. 
64 !bid., p.C-20. 
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community groups to make a study of job openings in each 
trade with a view of determining how many apprentices may be 
employed per year for the foreseeable future. Because of 
the charge that arose that certain ethnic groups dominate 
certain trades while others were excluded, the committee 
suggested that sponsoring agencies should be encouraged to 
accept a disinterested third party, such as the Illinois 
State Employment Service, into their screening and standards 
committee. 0~ They also noted that the Board of Education, 
with the cooperation of the advisory committees, should 
institute a study as to the effectiveness of the vocational 
programs in the vocational schools in regard to the placing 
of its graduates as apprentices in the trades.' 0 The need 
for an increase in personnel at Washburne was also noted, 
especially for counseling purposes, for a liaison with the 
high schools, and for curriculum development. Finally, a 
recommendation for increased public relations and 
communication so that more people would become aware of·the 
opportunities available at Washburne. 67 
OPEN ENROLLMENT IN VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS 
The fourth area of concern reported upon in "The 
Redmond Plan" was that of open enrollment in Chicago/s 
vocational high schools. The official Board of Education 
0 ~ 11 Here/s Text of Redmond/s School Plan," p.8. 
00 Increasing Desegregation of Faculties, p.C-21. 
67
.I.Q.l_g., p.C-22. 
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pol icy regarding vocational schools was that these schools 
had open enrollment, that is, any student who lived in the 
clty could attend any vocational high school in the city. 
Although this policy existed, students generally attended 
the vocational school closest to their home. This pattern 
of dttendance led to segregation in these schools. Of the 
ten vocational high schools listed in this section of the 
~eport, only· Chicago Vocational had an Integrated student 
body. Each of the other nine schools had racial majorities 
that made up between 80 and 98 percent of the student 
enrol lment.~ 8 
The committee on open enrollment in vocational 
education made twenty-four recommendations. I wil 1 mention 
some of them. The committee found that there was a great 
need to publicize the open enrollment pol Icy and to become 
aggressive In recruitment for program. They recommended 
that general admittance requirements for vocational schools 
be abolished and replaced by a list of prerequisites for 
admittance to the various programs. 69 The committee felt 
that students should be encouraged to attend their general 
high school for the first two years and then transfer to a 
vocational school at the eleventh grade. 70 They also felt 
that a survey should be conducted whereby job opportunities 
for vocational school graduates could be identified, thereby 
69 !bld., p.C-24. 
69 Ibid., p.C-27. 
701.Q.i.Q. 
167 
making it possible to institute appropriate preparation 
programs. 71 
It was further recommended that advisory committees be 
established to help staff develop a philosophy for 
vocational education in Chicago. Additional advisory 
committees should also be established in each of the career 
fields being taught in vocational education. 72 Immediate 
attention should be given to the construction and renovation 
of vocational facilities which will make them more 
attractive and up to date, and in turn will draw more 
students. 73 The committee also suggested a dropout 
prevention program for fifteen year olds and the need for 
city-wide recruitment to increase integration in vocational 
ski l ls. 74 
PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING 
In submitting their report to the Committee on Public 
Understanding, the consultants made the fol lowing statement: 
Our study revealed that, among the urban school 
districts in the nation, perhaps no other one at the 
present time is confronted with greater communication 
challenges than those which face the Chicago Board of 
Education in pursuing its objectives of integration of 
students and faculties, adequate financing, 
well-informed community attitudes, decentralized 
administrative services, high employee morale, and 
instructional improvement. 
?' 1 .I..Qjjj . 
72
.I..b..l..Q., p.C-28. 
? ::3 .l.Q.i.d • 
?' 4 "Here"s Text of Redmond/s School Plan," p.8. 
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.... We believe the Board and its new leadership can 
devise a system of communications and relationships 
with the community which wil 1 establish the essential 
understanding and support to bring success to Chicago/s 
important enterprise of public education. 7~ 
The committee studied the community relations and 
information services of other large cities and found Chicago 
greatly lacking. Other large cities had central office 
staffs of more than thirty people while Chicago operated 
with only four full time staff members. They also noted 
that the Booz. Al Jen. and Hamilton Report indicated clearly 
that a strong communication capability, internal and 
external, must be planned, developed, and made a reality in 
order to carry out the major recommendations of the 
report . .,.,.,.., 
The committee made suggestions that various positions 
be created under the leadership of an assistant 
superintendent for communications and community relations. 
The new positions included an associate director, an 
editor-writer, a community relations consultant, a writer, a 
radio-television liaison, a special events staff person, a 
photographer, a public inquiries service desk, and staff 
secretaries."'"' 
The committee further suggested that the General 
Superintendent immediately conduct a public opinion survey 
7~Letter from the Consultants to the Committee Chairman, 
August 16,1967, cited in Increasing Desegregation of 
Faculties, p.D-3. 
76 Increasing Desegregation of Faculties, p.D-8. 
77 Ibid.; p.D-10 - D-16. 
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to secure a profile of public attitudes toward the schools 
and toward integration. the level of information known about 
the schools, and areas of misinformation in the community. 79 
A brief alert bullet in should be sent weekly to al 1 news 
media outlets advising of coming events. Central office 
staff and the local schools should be informed weekly about 
the things happening in the schools as wel 1 as new policies. 
programs, and personnel changes. 79 
RESEARCH 
The last item to be studied in Increasing Desegregation 
of Faculties. Students. and Vocational Education Programs 
was the determination of areas that needed research. This 
section of the report discusses the methods of research used 
to develop researchable questions in each of the major areas 
of the study. Methodology oonsisted first of the scrutiny 
of working papers and committee minutes with some 
participation in committee discussions and then of the 
extraction of these documents of. researchable questions -
the answers to which contributed to a) the assumptions, b) 
the program requirements, or c> the purposes of explicit 
recommendations. 60 
76 !bid., p.D-18. 
79 lbid., p.D-21. 
90 Ibid., p.E-3. 
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REACTION TO THE REDMOND PLAN 
As mentioned earlier the Redmond Plan was accepted by 
10 to 0 vote with one abstention. Even strong neighborhood 
school pol icy supporters 1 ike Boardmember Thomas J. Murray 
voted in favor of the issue. On his vote he stated, "I have 
always supported the neighborhood school pol icy but I am not 
one who cannot change my mind. . I join with the rest. 
The recommendations are proper and right and should be 
implemented as soon as possible. 1181 
The four major daily newspapers (Sun-Times, Tribune, 
Daily News, and American) all carried banner headl Ines 
announcing the Redmond Plan. Each paper provided a synopsis 
of the plan on the first page. Each paper noted items such 
as educational parks, magnet schools, bussing of students to 
increase integration, teacher integration, and the expansion 
and improvement of vocational education. The topic of 
racial integration on a metropolitan basis was discussed in 
the American. The article told of the plan to have a 
metropolitan area educational council composed of educators, 
civic leaders, and student leaders that would help develop 
plans for teacher and pupil exchange programs between the 
city and suburban areas. 82 The editorial section of the two 
morning papers ran opposing editorials. The Tribune 
9111 How School Board Members View Plans." Chicago Tribune, 
August 24, 1967, p.1. 
82
"Main points of Program," Chicaqo"s American, August 
23 • 1 967 , p . 1 . 
1 71 
rejected the ideas of the plan on 24 August and 27 August 
1967. The Sun Times praised the plan and called it "an 
educational Burnham Plan for Chicago, a proposal for 
experimentation and innovation in keeping with the needs of 
modern urban living. 83 The Daily News, in it/s "Blue Dart" 
editions, ran a daily page on happenings in local schools in 
the Chicago area. In mid-September this edition ran a 
series of articles on the "Redmond Report" and explained the 
meanings of its various proposals. 94 
Public reaction was mixed. Edwin C. Berry, executive 
director of the Chicago Urban League, was quoted in the 
Sun Times as saying, "Its a good first step. It's the kind 
of thing I have been expecting from Redmond. I do think 
that he is taking some significant steps toward quality and 
equality in Chicago." 9 '!5 Berry was quoted earlier though as 
having some reservations when he said, "But I/m not 
endorsing the quota system. As a beginning, to gain 
integration In the schools, this is al 1 right to start with. 
In order to implement the educational system and get better 
education for our kids I have to go along with the plan at 
this polnt." 96 Meyer Weinberg, head of the Teachers for 
Integrated Schools, was considerably more critical. 
"'-'
3
"Redmond"s Courageous Plan, 11 Syn Times, August 25, 1967, p.33. 
84
"Redmond Report", Chicago Daily News <Blue Dart Issue), 
September 13 - 27, 1967, Education page. 
8~ 11 A Big Step Forward, Clty"s Leaders Agree," Sun Times, 
August 24, 1967, p.2. 
9
•
11 First Reactions: Hostility, OK," Chicago Dally News, August 
23 • 1 967 , p . 1 . 
172 
Weinberg concluded that "its tone is much more constructive 
than anything that came out from the office under Wil lls. 
The recommendations accept the goal of integration in a much 
more detailed way than under Willis, but the main question 
is whether the intentions wil 1 be carried out." 97 Weinberg 
continued, "No steps were outlined, nor was a timetable 
presented by Redmond for carrying out four chief 
recommendations of the U. S. Off ice of Education." 96 
Weinberg, who also served as head of the educational 
committee of the Coordinating Council of Community 
Organizations, said "the recommendations offer no basis for 
ceca, or anyone, to be assured that anything will change 
S. Thomas Sutton, an Elmhurst attorney who headed 
"Operation Crescent," an organization opposed to school and 
neighborhood integration, said that "the Redmond Plan may 
force the group to press Operation Withdrawal." Operation 
Withdrawal cal ls for whites to move en masse from their 
communities if public officials ignore pleas against 
lntegration. 90 State Senator Joseph Krasowski said, "This 
plan will force white families out of Chicago and will mean 
a loss of teachers. The school board has shown a total 
971.QlQ., p.8. 
ee.l.Ql..d. 
99..l.QJ..d. 
90.IJ;;tl,g. 
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disregard for community sentiment. 1191 Mattie Hopkins, 
president of Teachers for Integrated Schools, cal led the 
plan "ful 1 of pie-in-the-sky generalities. Real Improvement 
probably won't come for a generation." 92 John Desmond, 
president of the teachers union protested any change In the 
teacher transfer pol icy. "Now ls not the time to deny 
teachers the right to transfer. The critical shortage of 
teachers would be more acute If teachers were frozen in the 
schools where they did not wish to remaln.• 9 :'3 
The two University of Chicago professors who had 
earl ler studied the Chicago school system both had favorable 
reactions. Phil Ip Hauser said of the program: "It's a 
wonderful step In the right direction." 94 Robert Havighurst 
added, "the basic ideal of the Redmond Plan was very 
impressive and very desirable. I think the proposals are 
workable." 9~ 
The reaction to the plan from suburban educators 
reflects the reception received in general. Park Forest 
Superintendent Seymour Bixhorn said that a city-suburban 
exchange would be "a positive way of changing the 
educational opportunities of Negro youngsters. I think it 
would be a real advantage having teachers from the 
•
111 0pponents Hint Action At Blocking School Plan," Sun Times, 
August 24, 1967, p.3. 
9::2~. 
93 l..b..i_g. 
~ 4 "A Big Step Forward", Joe.cit. 
9~ ..I..Qj_Q •.. 
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advantaged schools teaching in the inner city for awhile. 119 ·6 
Everett Kerr. Blue Island Superintendent, thought the 
plan was worthwhile. 11 I think anything that gets on with 
lntegratlon is good. There/s no question we have the 
problem of achieving integration. This question is of 
degree and how fast. 1197 An opposing view was received by 
Berwyn Superintendent Robert Gentry who "doubted that an 
exchange is of sufficient advantage to children involved to 
warrant the administrative work. There are many areas of 
the city that students from the ghetto could be transferred 
to and not involve the suburbs in administrative 
headaches.""" 8 
PROTEST AND PROGRESS 
Redmond met with the press on Tuesday, 29 August 1967 
to review his first steps in his integration plan. He 
reiterated that the first steps would be to improve the 
staffing of inner-city schools, and develop a model 
educational program for a "magn~t" school. When asked what 
he would do if there were serious opposition to some phase 
of the plan, he responded: "I'm not so strong-headed that I 
can't compromise, as long as it isn't a compromise with 
principle. No one facet of the plan is important that the 
'"'
0
"What Suburban Educators Think Of Plan," Sun Times, August 
25. 1 967. p . 4. 
97.l..Ql.g. 
99 .I.Q.ld. 
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whole program will fail because of opposition to some aspect 
of it.""""' 
Within three wee.ks of its announcement. the Redmond 
Plan was placed in jeopardy when the Coordinating Counci I 
of Community Organizations <CCCQ), led by Al Raby, wrote a 
letter condemning the plan to U.S. Secretary of Health, 
Education and Welfare John Gardner. Raby/s Jetter to 
Gardner said, "We demand that you invoke the fullest 
resources of the law and immediately begin formal 
proceedings to cut off federal funds to the public 
. 
schools. 11100 The seventeen page CCCO report cal led the 
Redmond Plan "racist" and a "non-plan that is in no sense a 
plan for actlon. 11101 
The response to CCCO objections was delivered by U.S. 
Education Commissioner Harold Howe. On 24 October 1967 Howe 
endorsed the Redmond Plan for integration as a "major step 
toward correcting possible Civi'l Rights Act violations in 
Chicago schools. 11102 The correspondence from the U. S. · 
Office of Education and the Office of Civil Rights told 
Superintendent Redmond that federal assistance would be made 
available to implement the plan. The federal officials 
noted however, that "solutions or recommendations were not 
99
"Steps in Schools Plan Outlined by Redmond," Sun Times, 
August 30, 1967, p.3. 
10011 CCCO Asks U.S. to Bar Funds for Redmond Plan", Sun Times, 
September 10, 1967, p.1. 
t 0 1 .I..Ql.d • 
10211 U.S. Lauds Redmond School Plan," Sun Times, October 24, 
1967, p.3. 
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proposed for several areas and these problems must 
ultimately be grappled with." 10 ~ Howe continued by saying 
that "you and the Board of Education have recognized a 
serious problem facing the Chicago schools and have come to 
grips with it. We commend you and your board for the 
positive leadership positions you have taken." 104 
EDUCATIONAL PARKS - A MEANS TO INTEGRATION 
Developing out of the Redmond Plan, a group of 
educational consultants under the direction of Professor 
Donald Leu of Michigan State University presented a report 
to the Board of Education urging the construction of a 
series of "cultural-educational parks" for Chicago. 10 ~ The 
plan called for immediate action on a "prototype" complex 
that would serve up to 20,000 public, private, and parochial 
school students ranging in age from pre-school to college. 
Leu said that the parks "would cluster in one area large 
groups of students of wide age differences, and varying 
socio-economic, ethnic, and religious backgrounds." 10 "" The 
parks would include campuses for several kinds of schools, 
including pre-school centers called schemes, magnet and 
middle schools, and two or three high schools along with a 
college facility. Each park would be unique in reflecting 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
10 !5"Education Parks for City Urged," Chicago Daily News, 
December 13, 1967, p.1. 
100 Ibid. 
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the needs of its surrounding area and there would be no 
"model" to follow. 107 Sites would be located at points 
easily accessible by highways or boulevards. 108 
Although the concept of the "cultural-educational 
park" was not fully implemented, several of its ideas were 
put into effect. The clustering of schemes and elementary 
schools was made in several areas of the city. The 
development of the magnet school and the middle school also 
owe their beginnings to ideas brought out in the Candol i-Leu 
study. 
BUSING PLANS FOR AUSTIN & SOUTH SHORE 
The Board of Education voted on 27 December 1967 to 
provide $150,000.00 during the next year to bus 5,000 
elementary school students in South Shore and Austin in 
order to try to foster racial stabillty in those 
neighborhoods. 109 At the meeting Superintendent Redmond 
promised to hold public hearings on the plan. He said that 
the rapidly changing areas were selected because they asked 
for help to anchor the remaining white people. 110 The vote 
carried by a eight to two margin with Frank Whiston and 
107Ralph J. Cusick, "Implementation of the Leu-Candol i Report 
for Educational Change in Lincoln Park and Near North, 
Chicago, 1968 To 1973" <Unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, 
Loyola University of Chicago, 1985>, p.3. 
1os.l.b.l.d., p.5. 
109
"Busing Plan Wins School Board's O.K.," Chicago Tribune, 
December 28, 1967, p.1. 
1101..b..i.Q. 
178 
Thomas Murray casting the negative votes. In supporting the 
appropriation for the busing plan, Boardmember Warren H. 
Bacon noted that "busing i~ one of many, many tools in 
Redmond/s plans for quality education and integration." He 
warned that the Redmond Plan would be a sham if the board 
tied the superintendent/s hands by not al locating the busing 
funds. 111 
The initial plan called for African-American students 
in the Austin area who already attended integrated but 
overcrowded schools to be transported to schools with empty 
seats in outlying - stable- white areas. In the South 
Shore area both African-American and white students were 
bussed to equalize racial percentage. 112 At the Board 
meeting on 10 January 1968, fifteen hundred people protested 
the Board/s action on busing. As a result of pressure from 
these protestors the Board voted to defer action on the 
busing plan until after public hearings. 113 At the Board 
meeting on 28 February 1968, the Board failed to pass the 
Austin transfer plan when vote ended with a five-five split. 
The Board also voted nine-one for a revision in the South 
Shore pJan. 114 On 4 March 1968 the Board again voted on a 
revised Austin plan that al lowed African-American parents 
the choice as to whether their children should be 
111 Ibid., p.2. 
113Herrick, loc.cit., p.350. 
1 1 3 .l.b.l.Q • 
114 Ibid:, p.351. 
179 
transferred instead of marking off areas from which children 
would be transferred automatically. The revised plan was 
approved eight to one. 11 ~ On 10 July 1968, the Board 
approved a revised plan for South Shore in which some 300 
children would attend two new small "magnet schools," with 
smaller classes than other schools and special services and 
opportunlties. 116 
SUCCESSFUL MODELS FOR INTEGRATED EDUCATION 
Project "Wingspread" was first discussed by the Board 
of Education at the meeting on 8 June 1966 during the Willis 
superintendency. Will is warned his board that he felt that 
the program involved too many risks and involved the 
delegating of Chicago Board powers to suburban boards. He 
could not recommend participation. 117 
The "Wingspread" was revived by the Redmond 
administration and began during the summer of 1968 with five 
schools from the central city and f Ive "North Shore" 
suburban districts. The progra~ was funded under an 
E.S.E.A. Title III grant. 119 The program involved city and 
suburban students, teachers, administrators, and parents 
combining their resources and talents in an exploration of 
1 1 ~I bi d . , p . 353 . 
1 1 6 Ibid. , p. 353. 
1 . 1 ~Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, June 8, 
1966, Chicago, II., p.3303. 
118Davld U. Levine, ed., Models for Integrated Education, 
<Worthington, Ohio: Charles A. Jones Publishing Company, 
1971), p.98. 
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metropolitan living. The program was designed to promote 
mutual understandings among students of different 
socio-economic and racial backgrounds, it helped students 
develop new perspectives about the total metropolitan 
community. The program had three basic divisions: 
Direct School Exchange Programs, The Magnet or Central 
Site, and the Once-a-Week Interest Group. Through June 
1971, more than 4500 students and teachers from 46 Chicago 
and suburban schools had taken part in the "Wingspread" 
program. 1 1 "" 
In the fal 1 of 1970 Metro, the Chicago Public High 
School for Metropolitan Studies, opened its doors. Metro 
was an attempt to establish a "School Without Walls" 
patterned after Philadelphia/s parkway program. 120 The 
program multiplied the educational options available to the 
student and provided a much greater opportunity for the 
development of individual aptitudes and interests. It 
provided educational activities that were related to the 
student/s personal and vocational goals. Enrollment in the 
program was open to all high school aged students in the 
city. The program selected students in a manner which 
insured diversity. The program generated considerable 
support and enthusiasm among its students and in the city as 
a whole. 1 21 
1 1 9 .1Ql.g. , p • 99 . 
t 20 Thi ..-4 32 ~·· p •. 
1 21 ..I..Q.1Q. , p. 37. 
The concept of magnet schools as developed at the 
Disney Elementary, Hyde Park Career Academy, and Whitney 
Young High School has assisted in the integration of some 
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of Chicago/s schools. These schools attempted to implement 
some of the objectives of the Redmond plan and gave students 
of different cultures and ethnic groups the opportunity to 
share with each other the educational experience. The 
racially controlled enrollments of these schools made it 
possible for the citizens of Chicago to see integrated 
education work. 
The fatal flaw in the Redmond Plan was that the Board 
of Education accepted it "in principle" but never really 
supported it financially or theoretically. Redmond was able 
to show that the ideas in the plan could help provide the 
school system with integrated schools with the success of 
the magnet schools established during his tenure as 
superintendent. His plan for faculty assignment was similar 
to a plan that was later ordered by the federal courts and 
is stil 1 being followed today. The suggestions of open 
enrollment for vocational education and the apprentice 
program expan~ion were eventually carried out but vocational 
high schools today can still be categorized in racial terms. 
Although the plan was generally accepted it was never fully 
implemented and Redmond feels that the plan was not as 
successful as he would have 1 iked because the mayor and the 
machine politicians felt that it would lessen their 
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influence over various voting blocks. 
Redmond/s challenge of desegregating the schools 
continued throughout his tenure. Redmond also realized that 
the Chicago system was too large to be managed by only one 
pecson so he developed a plan to decentralize the schools 
and make them more accessible to local communities. The 
next challenge discussed by this study with be the 
decentralization of the public schools. 
!83 
CHAPTER V 
REDMOND IMPLEMENTS A DECENTRALIZATION PLAN 
As discussed ln the previous chapters, some members of 
Redmond/s staff were preparing their response to the federai 
government/s request for a desegregation plan and others 
were negotiating with the Teachers Union. A third group of 
staff members were providing input into a study of the 
organization of the Board of Education conducted by the 
management firm of Booz, Al Jen, & Hamilton, Inc .. Although 
this study began at the end of the tenure of Superintendent 
Benjamin Willis in May 1966, James Redmond/s administration 
would be responsible for finalizing the study and 
implementing the recommendations of the firm. 
But first, we must note that the term 
"decentralization" is sometimes ambiguous. We are 
introduced to two of its/ meanings in Fantini and Gittel l/s 
Decentralization: Achieving Reform. These authors tel 1 us 
that decentralization can be an administrative device that 
shifts administrative power from central administrative 
offices <I ike the Board of Education) to the field <local 
districts or schools). In this type of decentralization, 
the bureaucracy is reorganized to permit field 
administrators greater authority and power to act. Another 
definition asserts that decentralization plans embody a 
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design for meaningful shifts in power from central agencies 
to local communities. 1 In the former definition, the 
central administration distributes its power to local 
adrnlr.istrators who carry out the directives from above. 
In the later. the power base resides in the local community 
rather than from above. The local community is able to make 
decisions that effect them without getting prior approval 
from the central authority. 
This chapter discusses the decentralization of the 
Chicago schools that took place under the leadership of 
Superintendent Redmond. We wil 1 see that Redmond used a 
management consultant/s report to administratively 
decentralize. He later expanded the idea of district and 
local school advisory boards to provide an example of what 
could be considered political decentralization. But first. 
we wil 1 briefly discuss the history of school district 
decentralization in general and note some instances of 
Chicago/s prior experience with decentralization. 
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF DECENTRALIZATION 
According to Professor Jeffrey Mirel of Northern 
Illinois University, decentralization is one of the 
recurring elements of educational reform. Mirel notes that 
in the 1890/s there were over 100,000 school districts in 
1 Mario Fantini and Marilyn Gittel 1, Decentralization: 
Achieving Reform. CNew York: Praeger Publishers, 1973>, p.12. 
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the United States each governed by a separate board of 
education. 2 Parents and citizens had enormous control 
over these schools. They not only had the right to hlre 
teachers and principals but they also selected textbooks, 
set salaries, and made curriculum decisions. The schools 
were truly decentra1 ized. The problem with education in 
these schools was that teachers were 1 imited in thelr 
teaching. Schools had to reflect community attitudes and 
values, and this made education insular rather than 
cosmopolitan. A teacher had to be sure that what he or she 
taught and how he or she taught it were not contrary to the 
cornrnun 1 t y,. s idea of curriculum. If he or she was not 
careful to respect the cornmunity/s ideals, the teacher would 
be dismissed. These schools reflected the narrow range of 
ideas particular to a given community and the ideas of 
outsiders were not welcomed. An example of the community's 
outrage was the infamous Scope/~ Monkey Trial in Tennessee, 
when a biology teacher was jailed for teaching Darwln/s·. 
Theory of Evolution. 
Rural areas were not the only locations for 
decentralized school systems. Many of the urban areas of 
the 1890/s had a ward based school board. Each ward of the 
city would elect one or two board members for the board of 
education. These board members had almost complete control 
2 Jeffrey Mi rel. Wbat History Can Teach Us About School 
Decentralization, Presented to the Chicago Principals 
Association Conference, 23 March 1990. <Duplicated> 
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over educational matters within the ward. They could 
control the hiring and firing of educational personnel. 
select textbooks and decide curriculum, and even decide 
where schools should be built.~ 
Contemporary advocates of decentralization refer back 
to the 90,.s as a time when local communities were 
responsible for the education of their own children. They 
fai 1 to note 0 , however, that the reason the system became 
more centralized later on was because of the great amount of 
patronage and corruption that were found in the ward based 
school boards. In 1894, Detroit/s reform mayor Hazen 
Pingree went to a school board meeting with a squad of 
pol icemen and announced, "Quite a number of members of this 
board are going to jail tonight." Four members of the board 
were later arrested on charges of taking bribes for building 
contracts. 4 Twenty years later, after continued corruption, 
the people of Detroit voted to abolish the ward based school 
board in favor of an elected at large school board. The 
movement to centralization was designed to give more power 
to educational professionals. 
In the late 1960/s and early 1970/s, the cries for 
decentralized school districts were again heard. New York 
and Detroit both moved for sireater community involvement in 
3.llU_Q. 
4 M.G. Holli, Reform in Detroit: Hazen S. Pingree and Urban 
Politics. CNew York: Oxford University Press, 1969>, cited 
in Mirel presentation of 23 March 1990. 
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the schools. The new decentralized system in these two 
cities gave local citizens more control over their schools 
but also resulted in labor disputes and long teacher 
strikes. Conflicts over curriculum and teacher appointment 
in the local schools became a point of controversy. In 
1976, the citizens of Detroit declared decentralization a 
failure and voted to recentralize the system. New York 
maintains its/ decentralized system but it continues to be 
the center of controversy with twelve of the thirty-two 
regional boards under investigation for al Jeged corruption 
in 1989. ~ 
EARLY DECENTRALIZATION IN CHICAGO 
The first instance of decentralization in the Chicago 
Public Schools was based upon a recommendation of the Harper 
Report of 1898. Among the recommendations of the Report 
was a cal 1 for decentralization and involvement of lay 
citizens in the community. The Board of Education was asked 
to divide the city into special inspection districts to 
include not more than ten schools. The mayor would appoint 
six "resident commissioners" for terms of three years to 
visit the schools and report on discipline. sanitation, and 
the work of t~e schools to the Board.• The Report noted 
the "present tendency is to make the school system more and 
~Mi re 1 , 1 oc. cit . 
0 Herrick, Joe.cit., p.86. 
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more a matter of expert control." It continued, "If the 
system of public instruction is not readily affected by 
public opinion, a feeling of dissatisfaction naturally 
arises." 7 The Report outlined the legitimate role of a 
Board of Education. And it was curiously modern in its 
emphasis on community "inspectors" and the need for 
"community schools." Slowly many of its recommendations went 
i n t o e ff e ct . '3 
The next attempt to decentralize the schools came in 
the late 1920/s during the tenure of William J. Bogan. 
Superintendent Bogan divided the city into forty-one areas, 
and set about developing local community-school advisory 
committees in each area. These committees were active until 
they wer~ disbanded in the financial turmoil that occurred 
in 1932. ·:;> 
In 1961, Superintendent Willis increased the number of 
sub-districts to twenty-four and established districts that 
included both elementary and high schools with geography and 
population being the determining factors in district 
boundaries. Wil 1 is also asked each sub-district 
superintendent to appoint an advisory committee from the 
community. 10 
" lb i d . ' p . 87 . 
c.Ibid. 
·¥ .I.Q.lQ. , p . 227. 
10
.I.Q.lg.-; p.309. 
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BOARD AUTHORIZES BOOZ, ALLEN & HAMILTON STUDY 
At a meeting on 4 March 1966, the Board of Education 
voted to employ the management firm of Boaz, Allen & 
Hamilton, Inc. to study its own operation and that of 
non-teaching services. 11 Boaz, Allen & Hamilton responded 
with a proposal that included the study of five areas: 1) an 
administrative organization study, 2) a survey of the 
financial operations, the budget, and the budgeting process, 
3) a study of Board information requirements, 4) appraisal 
of the data processing activity, and 5) a review of 
purchasing practices and procedures. 12 Discussions 
regarding the study took place in committee meetings, 
resulting in formal Board approval of the Boaz. Al !en & 
Hamilton Report on 24 August 1966 at a cost of $193,000.00. 
The motion was passed with an 8-1 vote. 13 
It was fortunate in a way that the study was 
commissioned during the superintendency of Benjamin Willis. 
The use of an outside consultant made it clear that the 
resu 1 tant report was not some th i.ng designed by Redmond to 
carry out his own administrative re-structuring. Redmond, 
his staff, and Board members were interviewed by the 
consultants and their ideas considered. Additionally, the 
Booz, Al !en & Hamilton team visited school officials in New 
1 
.
1 
.l.Ql.d. , p . 330 . 
12Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 13 July 
1966, Chicago, II., p.83. 
13Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 24 August 
1966, Chicago, II., p.363. 
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York and Los Angeles to discuss their recent attempts at 
organizational reform. The team sought to iearn of the 
organizational practices employed and the problems 
encountered in these large systems. The first study. and 
the one that helped to decentralize the administration of 
the school system. was the organizational study. This study 
was chosen first because it effected all other parts of the 
proposed areas of study. 
The organizational survey itself was presented to the 
Board of Education on 24 May 1967 in a bound volume. The 
survey presented the Board with an evaluation of the present 
organization structure, noting areas of concern related to 
I 
both function and structure. Next, it discussed the 
environment in which the school system existed, the demands 
placed on it, the resources it had available, and the 
constraints under which it operated. These factors 
established further requirements that had to be met in the 
new organizational structure. The third section of the' 
survey presented the actual recommended plan of organization 
for the school system and a time line for its' execution. 
The time line began with the approval of the Basic 
Organizational Plan on May 24, 1967 and continued through 
the 1969 Legislative Session (January> during which the 
Board would ask the legislature to change the statute to 
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allow the Board to delegate certain personnel actions. 14 
The appendix contained job descriptions for each 
administrative position in the new structure and schematic 
drawings of the current <May 1967), an interim, and the 
proposed organizational structures <See schematic drawings 
identified as item 1,2, and items 3 a,b,c, in the appendix). 
The size of the Chicago school system dictated that a 
plan of organization be built around the work to be done-
the functions to be performed. The system was far too large 
to be organized around the talents of specific individuals. 
By organizing around function rather than personality, 
there could be continuity when the people in power positions 
change. People could be fitted to the position rather than 
the position fitted to the person. The consultant team 
noted that since the Chicago system had many dedicated and 
skilled administrators, it would be easier to help these 
people adapt to new functions rather than to try to fit the 
function to the person. 
The consultants reported that the essence of the plan 
ls: decentralization to an extent considered practical; the 
creation of tolerable work loads at al 1 levels, from the 
Board down; and the grouping of staff activities which have 
a natural kinship to each other into organizational units. 1 ~ 
The major elements of the recommended plan can be summed. up 
14
"Qrganizational Survey", Booz. Allen. & Hamilton Report, 
<Chicago: Chicago Board of Education, 1967), p.53. 
1 ~.lb...ld., p.iii. 
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in five statements: 
1. The role of the Board of Education as a 
policy-making and program approving body is 
underscored. Increased use of Board committees is 
proposed and the Board is provided with adequate 
staff support. 
2. The function of the General Superintendent is 
defined as that of chief administrative officer of 
the school system, with basic emphasis on planning, 
developing programs, and evaluating results. He 
also is provided with adequate staff in support of 
this role. 
3. Responsibility of the day-to-day management of the 
school system is delegated to a deputy 
superintendent who is, in effect, the chief 
operating officer. 
4. The city is divided into areas of manageable size, 
each headed by an associate superintendent with a 
ful 1 staff of his own. Each area associate 
superintendent has under his direction the 
organization equivalent of a major school system. 
5. Only those staff activities which are system-wide in 
nature or which can be most effectively performed at 
the headquarters level are carried at this level. 
These, and certain specialized operating functions, 
are retained in the central office. 16 
The recommended plan of organization required that one 
change be made in state law governing the Chicago Board of 
Education. The School Code of Illinois stated that 
appointment, promotions, and transfers of teachers and other 
personnel must receive board of education approval. This 
Jaw would have to be amended to allow the board to delegate 
most of these personnel appointments. The consultants 
suggested that the Board of Education retain the authority 
to review and approve appointments of personnel who report 
193 
to the Board, and heads of organizational units that report 
to the general superintendent or his deputy. The general 
superintendent should approve the appointment of district 
superintendents and key subordinates of staff directors. 
The deputy superintendent, as chief operating officer. 
should approve the appointment of principals, directors of 
field staff functions and their key subordinates. The area 
associate superintendent should approve appointment of 
personnel reporting to his staff directors and the 
assignment of teachers in his area. 17 The consultants 
suggested that the reorganization take place over a period 
of eighteen months. They suggested that key personnel be 
selected to fill new or modified positions and that an 
interim organization structure be designed until the new 
organization becomes completely operational. The Interim 
Organization Plan was submitted to and approved by the Board 
of Education on 28 June 1967. At the same meeting, the 
Board approved the appointment of two assistants to the 
General Superintendent, Manford Byrd, Jr. and James 
Moffat. 19 These positions were recommended by the Booz. 
Allen. & Hamilton Report to assist the general 
superintendent in the discharge of selected administrative 
activities as directed. They were to perform research 
assignments, help prepare materials and reports for the 
17lb..ld., p.iv. 
19Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 28 June 
1967, Ch·i cage, I 1. , p. 307-309. 
194 
general superintendent, and obtain data and information for 
special projects. 1 ~ Both of these men continued to be high 
ranking Board administrators for twenty years. Redmond 
said that he was generally happy with the selection of these 
two men over time. He noted great disappointment with the 
events that lead to the ending of Moffat/s career. 20 
The next phase of implementing the Interim Organization 
Plan was to divide the city into three administrative areas 
and select personnel to ti l I the position of Associate 
Superintendent in each of the areas. Redmond made the 
fol lowing recommendation for these positions: Dr. Curtis 
Melnick for Area A on the southside, Julien Drayton for 
Area B in the central city, and Dr. George Connelly for Area 
C on the northside. This new appointees were to help the 
General Superintendent develop the details for the 
decentralization of the school system while maintaining 
their current positions until the decentralization plan was 
ready to be put into effect. 21 
At the Board of Education ~eeting of 13 March 1968, 
Redmond recommended that the Board approve the revised 
administrative structure and approve changes in titles that 
reflected the reorganization as suggested by the management 
consultants. He added that he and his advisors recommended 
1 ~1..Q..l..Q., p. Appendix A (17>. 
20 Redmond interview, Joe.cit. 
21
"Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting", 13 
September 1967, Chicago, Il ., p.544. 
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the retention of the positions of Assistant Superintendent 
for Vocational and Practical Arts Education and the 
Assistant Superintendent for Federal-State Relations 
which were not included with the management survey. The 
Board approved both recommendations. 22 
The last major change in the structure of the 
administrative organization of the school system was the 
appointment of a Deputy Superintendent. As mentioned 
earlier, the role of the General Superintendent would become 
the "chief administrative executive" and that a new off ice, 
the Deputy Superintendent, would be charged with the daily 
operations of the school as "chief operating officer." The 
Deputy Superintendent would have the responsibility for 
managing the system on a day-to-day basis with the heads of 
central staff departments and Area Associate Superintendents 
reporting to him. 23 At the Board meeting of 13 November 
1968, Superintendent Redmond recommended the appointment of 
Manford Byrd, Jr. to the position of Deputy Superintendent. 
Byrd was approved by the Board and began his new position on 
1 December 1968. 24 He served in that position throughout 
the remainder of Redmond/s superintendency. 
In an interview. Redmond said that he felt the 
organization was right but that he should have considered 
22
"Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 13 March 
1968, Chicago, Il ., p.1569-60. 
23
"Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 13 
November 1968, Chicago, II., p.768. 
241.Ql.Q., p. 760. 
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making more than the three districts." 2~ In retrospect, he 
thought that generally the areas operated as they had been 
planned. He warned that decentralization had its/ good 
points but that districts like New York, have gone too far. 
He felt that educators should get input from all groups 
involved in the schools. but the input should be advisory 
only. The decisions must ultimately made by the school 
administration. 
POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION IN CHICAGO 
The idea of political decentralization of the Chicago 
Public Schools was first presented at a Board of Education 
meeting on 26 January 1966 when guidelines for the District 
Superintendents/ Educational Councils were first discussed. 
Although guidelines were established the development of 
councils was Jagging. 
On 29 March 1969, a Board report described the impetus 
and organizational pattern for the Districts/ Counciis. 
After the report was Issued, the Board made it clear that 
al 1 District Superintendents should form a councl 1 and if 
necessary continue to sol lcit membership on the council from 
persons and groups Interested In school affalrs. 20 A survey 
reported that only f lfteen of the twenty-seven districts had 
2~Redmond Interview, lac.cit. 
20Mlnutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 10 
September 1969, Chicago, II., p.362. 
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an advisory council of some kind. 27 Many of the councils 
deviated from the original guidelines which mandated that 
one-third of the council should be appointed by the District 
Superintendent and that these appointed members select the 
other two-thirds from business and industrial personnel who 
1 Ive or work in the community, from parents of children in 
the schools, from professionals such as principals and 
teachers, and from representatives of local youth service or 
community agencies. 28 
A report on the District Superintendents/ Educational 
Councils presented at the Board of Education meeting on 
10 September 1969 pointed out that the legal responsibility 
for al 1 decisions pertaining to school matters rests with 
the General Superintendent of Schools with the approval of 
the Board of Educatlon. 29 However, it is noted that it ls 
possible that District Educational Councils can make 
recommendations to the District Superintendent who can 
transmit their recommendations to the Area Superintendent, 
the Deputy Superintendent, the General Superintendent, and 
ultimately the Board of Education. 30 
This report noted areas of concern in which Educational 
Councils might make recommendations to the District 
Superintendent: 1) order of priorities with the district for 
27.l.bl.,g. 
28.l.b.LQ. 
29
.I.!2.1.Q., p.363. 
30.I.Ql.Q. 
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allotment of funds for purchase of educational equipment, 2) 
order of priorities for improvement or repair of facilities 
within the district, 3) qua! ities desirable in persons who 
might be candidates for administrative positions. 4) sites 
and educational specifications for school faci I ities, and 
5) attendance boundary adjustment. These powers of 
recommendation were granted to the councils by a 9-0 vote of 
the Board of Education.~ 1 
Prior to March 1970. the Board al lowed Educational 
Councils to advise District Superintendents on the qualities 
they felt were desirable in candidates for administrative 
positions in the district. In March 1970, the Board adopted 
a report by the Calumet-Hess Committee that recommended 
District Superintendents make available to advisory groups 
the names of eligible candidates to fil 1 the principal 
vacancy in their school. The committee also recommended 
that the advisory group be al lowed to interview candidates 
for the vacancy and recommend their selection to the General 
Superintendent. 32 
Beginning at the Board meeting of 14 March 1973, the 
Board was presented with a set of Guidelines for Operation 
of District Education Councils. Further discussions of 
these guidelines were carried on at subsequent Board 
meetings of 28 March, 11Apri1, and 25 April 1973. The 
31.l..b.1..Q. 
32Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 25 March 
1970, C~itago, Il ., p.3192. 
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guidelines were adopted under a omnibus rol I call vote on 25 
April 1973. 33 These guidelines for operation included the 
fol lowing items: 
1. Bylaws shal I be established with the rules and 
policies of the Board of Education by each council 
which will set criteria for membership, organizing 
patterns for the counci 1, including officers, terms 
of off ice, and methods for conducting business. 
2. Methods of placing items on the agenda will also be 
regularized. 
3. Minutes wll 1 be kept and distributed to members, 
Area Associate Superintendents, and District 
Superintendent. 
4. Counci I meetings wil 1 be held monthly and 
additionally as needed. Meetings will be held in a 
convenient location. 
5. District councils must have at least one member from 
each local school council. Sixty percent of the 
members must be parents of students in the district. 
6. District Superintendents and District Human 
Relations Coordinators shall serve as resource 
consultants for the councils. 
7. Meetings of the councils shal 1 be open to the public 
and announced one week in advance. Councils may set 
limits of participation by members of the public who 
are not members of the council. 
8. Agenda topics to be consldered at meetings of the 
councils shall focus more on district concerns 
including priority of items for budget consideration 
at the District level. 
9. The Chicago Region P.T.A. will see that a 
representative from one of its 18 P.T.A. Councils is 
named to each District Educational Council. 34 
These District Educational Councils were precursors of the 
33Mlnutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 25 April 
1973, Chicago, II., p.2682. 
34.lQ.i.Q. 
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next step in the political decentralization of the school 
system, the local school councl l. 
The idea of local school councils was the second form 
of political decentralization that arose during the Redmond 
administration. The first discussions concerning the 
establishing of the local school councils began in October 
1970. The Board of Education in general committee made 
several recommendations regarding the councils. 
Their first recommendation was that each principal, 
whether administrator of one building or buildings with 
branches, should establish a Local School Council. Schools 
that had active and effective PTAS, Concerned Parents, or 
other school groups could be selected as Local School 
Council members. The decision of using a current 
organization should be made at community meetings. 3 ~ 
The principal was asked to take the initiative in 
cal ling public, evening meetings with advance notice given 
by flyers sent home with students, and by publicity thr6~gh 
local newspapers or radio stations. Those eligible to vote 
in the election were parents of the children in the school 
and the faculty of the school. The principal was to act as 
the chairman pro-tern of the meeting until a chair could be 
elected. After this election, the principal was to act in 
an advisory or resource capacity only. The principal or his 
8~Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 9 
December 1970, Chicago, II., p.1037. 
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representative should attend al 1 Council meetings. 36 
The Board also listed what they felt the purposes of 
the Local School Counci 1 should be 1 isted as fol lows: 
1. To permit parents and school patrons to share in the 
process of arriving at decisions which affect local 
schools. 
2. To inform District Education Councils of the needs 
of individual schools and to suggest how these needs 
can be met. 37 
The Boa~d also suggested that membership on the Local 
School Council should be broadly representative of the 
community within the school attendance district and members 
should be residents of the community and representative of 
its institutions. A minimum of sixty percent of the members 
should be parents of children in the school. School 
personnel, representatives of the community, religious. 
civic, social-service, business, and youth serving agencies 
should be included. Each Council should decide the number 
of members on its Council. 39 
The Councils were also directed to elect officers, 
including a chairman or president, a vice-chairman or 
vice-president, and a secretary. By-laws were to be drawn 
up as soon as possible. These by-laws should include the 
provision that meetings be held at least monthly during the 
school year. The meetings were to be public meetings and 
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minutes were to be kept. 89 
In order to encourage night meetings of the Local 
School Councils, the Board of Education provided $150,000.00 
in operational funds so that each Council could have at 
least three evening meetings per year. 40 This funding was 
necessary because the Stationary Engineers Union was 
extremely powerful and demanded that their union members get 
paid for the additional hours work. 
Seven months after the initial adoption of the Local 
School Council guide! ines, several revisions were made. 
These revisions included the provision that the principal or 
his designee must be present at al 1 Council meetings. The 
principal was also given the right to serve as an officer if 
the Local Counci 1 wished. Additionally, representation of 
Local School Council to the District Education Council was 
to be equal, with each School Council having the same number 
of delegates. 41 
Further revisions included the provision that each 
Council should have representatives from PTA, Concerned 
Parents, or other established school-wide parent 
organizations. Terms of officers were also limited to one 
year. It was also noted that the Council may not interfere 
in the day to day operations of the school, but may include 
39Th; ,...j ~-
40Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 10 March 
1971, Chicago, Il., p. 2805. 
41 Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 28 July 
1971 , Chicago, I 1 • , p. 12. 
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any problems on its agenda. It also recognized that the 
principal should make every effort to comply with the 
Council/swishes but the Council members must recognize that 
the principal may not have all the administrative power to 
comply w1th all their resolutions. 42 
Other revisions of the guidelines for Councils were 
made on 25 October 1972. These revisions included the 
requirement that officers in the Councils must be parents of 
students in the school . 43 At this same meeting but deferred 
was a recommendation that the Board adopt guidel Ines for a 
Principal Nominating Committee of the Counci 1. These 
guidelines were debated and deferred for over a year. The 
Board finally approved and amended these guidelines on 14 
November 1973. 44 The Principal Nominating Committee was 
charged by the Local School Counci 1 to help select 
candidates for school principal. The guidelines noted that 
the Nominating Committee must include representatives of the 
PTA and/or local Concerned Parents Organizations. The 
committee must reflect the ethnic diversity of the school. 
The Nominating Committee must have at least five members and 
must reflect at least a sixty percent participation by 
parents. The Nominating Committee shal I be guided by the 
District Superintendent. The Nominating Committee may 
42.lblQ, 
43Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 25 
October 1972, Chicago, II., p.1044-45. 
44Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 14 
November· i973, Chicago, Il., p.1100-03. 
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nominate up to a maximum of three candidates from the 
eligibility list if they desire. 4 ~ The Nominating Committee 
must nominate at least two candidates for each vacancy. The 
committee must also realize that state law requires that the 
General Superintendent recommends and the Board gives final 
approval of all principal appointments. 4 • 
These moves towards decentralization made it appear 
outwardly that it was Redmond/s intention to spread out his 
authority and provide the public with a voice into the 
administration of the school system. In a way, these were 
both half-truths. Redmond/s plans for administrative 
decentralization were sincere. It was his intention to 
leave the daily operations of the school system to the 
Deputy Superintendent and the Area Associates. This sharing 
of powers would allow him more time to be a planner and a 
lobbyist for program improvements in both Springfield and 
Washington, D.C .. In fact, the political decentralization 
that took place with both the District Education Council and 
the Local School Councils could be considered merely "window 
dressing." Both of these Councils were basically advisory. 
In James Cibulka's "Obstacles to School Decentralization: 
The Chicago Case," it is noted that these Councils reached 
only the fifth level on Arnstein's "Ladder of Citizen 
Participation." This means, according to Cibulka, that the 
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Councils were created only to placate the citizens, and give 
them only advisory power. 47 The Board of Education did not 
delegate any real powers to these groups. The Councils did 
benefit in that they felt that they had input into some of 
the decisions of the schools. Since they felt that they had 
been empowered, they felt some responsibility toward their 
schools. In fact, they had little power and eventually 
would realize it. 
Redmond/s ability to make more people feel that they 
were involved in the running of the schools was a positive 
outcome. The increase in the power of local school groups 
to give input into the selection of their school leadership 
helped give these groups the feeling that they were able to 
have some control over there own schools. This distribution 
of power seems to coincide with Fantini and Gittel l/s 
definition of political decentralization of the schools. We 
must remember however, that the' councils could only advise; 
the final decision rested in the hands of the General 
Superintendent or his designee. He also tried to get 
support from the parents of parochial school students by 
establishing a shared-time program that would allow students 
from parochial schools to attend classes in regular public 
high school for part of the day. This idea of shared time 
4 ?James G. Cibulka, Obstacles to School Decentralization: The 
Chicago Case, Paper presented at the American Educational 
Research Association Annual Meeting, April 1974. 
will be discussed as the fourth challenge met by 
Superintendent Redmond. 
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CHAPTER VI 
REDMOND AND THE SHARED-TIME EXPERIMENT 
After meeting the challenges of Union negotiations, 
desegregation. and decentraiization. Redmond encountered a 
fourth challenge. the shared-time program. Redmond finally 
met a challenge that was not ordered by the courts. demanded 
by his employees, nor recommended by his consultants. Like 
desegregation, this program was inherited from 
Superintendent Ben Willis. The program began in September 
1965 at two Chicago public high schools. This was a program 
that was not extremely controversial and that in fact had 
some community support. Redmond/s task was to insure 
that the experiment continue and then, with his staff, 
analyze its results and plan for the future. Before we 
discuss the Chicago shared-time schools, we wi 11 present the 
background of the idea of shared-time. 
Shared-time is defined as an arrangement whereby 
nonpublic schools send their students to public schools for 
instruction in one or more subjects during the school day. 
The term was first heard in 1960 and the concept of 
shared-time has been called other names such as split time, 
reserved time, dual school enrollment, educational 
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co-operation, part-time enrollment, and dual registration. 1 
The United States Senate Education Sub-committee discussed 
the concept and in 1973 defined it in the fol lowing manner: 
... the term shared-time means an arrangement for pupils 
enrol led in nonpublic elementary or secondary schools 
to attend public schools for instruction in certain 
subjects ... regarded as being mainly or entirely 
secular, such as laboratory science and home 
economics. 2 
Although shared-time programs may take place in leased or 
rented parts of parochial schools, the instruction is 
provided by public school personnel. Usually the program 
provides secular courses such as industrial arts, science, 
anri ~~thematics with public school teachers, while subjects 
such as social studies, humanities, and literature are 
taught by private school teachers. 
The sharing of students between public and private 
schools has been defended in several ways. One defense is 
that the parochial schools relieve the public school from 
a substantial portion of its burden to educate society. 
Assistance to the parochial school in providing secular 
classes by public school teachers repays the parochial 
school for the relief it provides a burdened public school 
system. 
A second rationale for the use of the shared-time is 
1 Shared-Time Programs: An Exploratory Study <Washington: 
National Education Association Research Division, 1964), p.5. 
2 Martha M, McCarthy, A Delicate Balance: Church. State. and 
the Schools, <Bloomington, In.: Phi Delta Kappa Educational 
Foundation, 1983), p.103. 
209 
that it complies with regulations of federal categorical 
funding laws. Federal categorical programs usually provide 
for assistance to meet the needs of certain groups of 
children whether they attend public or parochial schools. 
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that 
state-supported remedial and therapeutic programs do not 
implicate the establishment clause as long as they are 
provided at religiously neutral sites, even if parochial 
school students are served in particular programs. 3 The use 
of federally funded auxiliary services has been endorsed 
even when the public school teacher ls assigned to the 
parochial school to provide the needed services. 4 
In a November 1963 survey conducted by the Research 
Division of the National Education Association, post cards 
were sent to 12,366 United States school districts that had 
minimum enrollments of 300 students. Responses were 
received from 7,410 superintendents, 280 of whom said that 
they had parochial school students come to the publ le school 
for instruction in one or more subjects. This response 
indicated that only 3.8 percent of those replying were 
implementing shared-time programs.~ Illinois 
superintendents responding showed that thirty-seven 
3 Mc earthy, Joe.cit., p.104, citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 
U.S. 229, 247 <1977). 
4
.lQl.Q., citing National Coalition for Public Education and 
Religious Liberty v. Harris. 489 F.Supp.1248<S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
~National Education Association Research Division, 
Shared-Time Programs: An Exploratory Study <Washington: 
Nationa1··Eduaction Association, 1964), p.7. 
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shared-time programs existed in Il I inois at the time of the 
survey. 0 The Chicago school district was not one of these 
thirty-seven respondents from Illinois. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION AUTHORIZES SHARED-TIME EXPERIMENT 
After being deferred three times by the Chicago Board 
of Education, the proposal for shared-time was discussed at 
the Board meeting of 23 April 1964. At this meeting, the 
first motion regarding shared-time was to further examine 
the issue and invite representatives from al 1 religious and 
civic groups to present their views on the issue. This 
motion was defeated by a 3-7 vote. 7 Fol lowing this vote, 
Superintendent Willis addressed the Board and reported 
on a study of the shared-time issue ordered by the Board on 
13 November 1963. He noted that parents of the John F. 
Kennedy High School (previously Kinzie High School) wanted a 
shared-time program and were willing to accept any workable 
plan that might be presented. 8 Willis reminded the Board 
that based on other similar programs throughout the country, 
parental support was essential for a successful program. 
Willis suggested a five-year experimental shared-time 
program beginning in September 1964 with 300 freshmen from 
the Kennedy area and classes of 400 students in each of the 
C•Ibid. 
7 Meeting of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 23 April 
1964, Chicago, II., p.2163. 
8
.I..Qj_g •• p.2164. 
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fol lowing years unti 1 1969. It was proposed that the 
students spend one-half to two-thirds of their time at 
Kennedy and the remainder of their time at St. Paul High 
School.~ 
Willis referred to a legal opinion given by Mr. Hutson. 
legal counsel for the State Superintendent of Publ le 
Instruction, that indicated his belief in the legality of 
the shared-time concept. Willis also stated that the United 
States Commissioner of Education favored such experiments 
and that similar programs were being tried nationwide. 
Wil 1 is reminded the Board that the program would be 
experimental only and that they would remain responsible for 
and keep control of the Kennedy High School. He reminded 
the Board that the students taking part in the shared-time 
program must live in the Kennedy school attendance area. He 
also assured the Board that if other communities wanted to 
investigate the establishment of experimental shared-time 
programs with other parochial schools they would assist ·them 
in doing so. 10 
After Willis~ comments, a resolution was presented that 
authorized an experimental shared-time program to begin in 
September, 1965 and not extend beyond the school year 
commencing in September, 1968. The resolution directed the 
General Superintendent to request private schools in the 
·rbid. 
10 Ibid., p.2164-65. 
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Kinzie area, other than St. Paul/s, to cooperate in the 
experiment and also stated that: 
... while the Board of Education and the Attorney for 
the Board are of the opinion that the experimental 
program does not in any manner violate the statutes and 
the Constitution of the State of II linois or the 
Constitution of the United States, nevertheless because 
there are people interested in the Chicago public 
schools who are fearful that the experimental program 
may be in violation of such statutes or constitutions. 
the Board wil I welcome the filing of a test case by 
such persons and in the event such a test case is 
fl led, it wi l 1 be the policy of the Board of Education 
to promptly respond thereto and to cooperate to 
the maximum extent for an early hearing, disposition 
and determination of any issues raised in such a test 
case. 11 
A rel 1 cal 1 vote was cal led and the resolution was adopted 
by a vote of 7-3. 
As was expected, a cha! lenge to the resolution took 
place within a month. A complaint was filed in the Circuit 
Court of Cook County which sought: 
to enjoin the Board of Education from maintaining 
the dual enrollment program on the grounds that the 
program violated statutory and constitutional 
provisions. 12 
The complaint was dismissed in January,1965, "with 
prejudice", and the court held that the dual enrollment 
program would not violate either statutory or constitutional 
provisions. The case was appealed to the Illinois Appellate 
Court on 18 February 1966, and the decree of the trial court 
was affirmed. It was stated in the opinion of the trial 
1 1 liU...d. • p . 2165 . 
12Morton v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 69 Il 1. 
App. 2d 38, p.42. 
213 
court that: 
We, cannot find any intention on the part of the 
legislature to limit the power of a school board to 
adopt and develop better methods of educating the 
children of this State. so long as the methods adopted 
are otherwise consistent with the provisions of the 
School Code. 1 ~ 
The Appellate Court also held that: 
The experimental dual enrollment plan adopted by the 
Chicago Board of Education is merely an attempt to find 
a better method for the education of the Chicago public 
school children at the option of the parents or legal 
guardians of those children. 14 
In July 1964, the Board established the attendance area 
for the new Kennedy High School. Construction of the new 
building continued throughout the 1964-65 school year and 
Ms. Dorothy Sauer of the Kinzie Elementary School was named 
principal. As classrooms became available, the nearly 1400 
students were gradually moved into the new building. 1 ~ 
In the spring of 1964, plans were being developed for 
the new St. Paul High School located three blocks away from 
Kennedy High School. Under the direction of the Christian 
Brothers and staffed by Christian Brothers and Sisters of 
the Order of St. Joseph, the school began recruiting 
students for the shared-time program from the area/s 
parochial schools. 16 
In the spring of 1965, the principals of Kennedy and 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
1 ~Joan M. Raymond, An Evaluation of the Experiment in 
Shared-Time, <Chicago: Department of Operations Analysis, 
1969), p.15. 
10 Ibid., p.16. 
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St. Paul/s met frequently to discuss the programming of the 
shared-time students and other details of the program. In 
concert with the school principals, the General 
Superintendent presented to the Board of Education the 
fol lowing guide] ines for the students in the shared-time 
program. Students in the shared-time program shall: 
- be accepted only upon written request of a parent or 
legal guardian 
- be in full compliance with the compulsory attendance 
laws 
- shal 1 be assigned to class schedules in accordance 
with the plan worked out by the principal of the 
school 
- shal 1 be assigned to a school division and school 
counselor on the same basis as pupils in ful 1-time 
attendance 
- shall meet the requirements for graduation and 
receive a diploma issued by the Board of Education 
- shall be offered al 1 subjects available to full time 
students except those mentioned below 
shal 1 receive credit towards graduation in English, 
Social Studies, Music and Art in a non-publ le school 
accredited by the North Central Association and the 
Illinois Department of Public Instruction 
- shal I fol low Chicago public school courses of study 
and utilize Chicago public school textbooks 
- shall be considered members of the public school 
student body with respect to athletic eligibility. 17 
In September 1965, the shared-time program for the 
students in the Kennedy-St. Paul area began. This was the 
first time in the history of the Chicago Public Schools that 
students were al lowed to split their school day between 
public and parochial schools. In the first year of the 
program 255 students from St. Paul/s participated in the 
17Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 25 April 
1965, Chicago, Il. , p.2489. 
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program. 18 Only one minor change was requested in the 
original program. The faculty of St. Paul/s realized that 
it could not offer art and music to their students and they 
requested that these classes be taught at Kennedy. The only 
classes that would be taught at St. Paul/s would be English, 
social studies. and religion. 1 ~ 
When James F. Redmond began his superintendency in 
October 1966. the shared-time program had been operating for 
over one year. The enrollment had increased to 398 students 
in freshman and sophomore year. 20 Enrollment increased to 
487 students in 1967-68 and to 535 students in 1968-69. 21 
In a Board author!zed stud;, An Evaluation of the 
Experiment in Shared-Time, Dr. Joan M. Raymond discussed 
several aspects of the shared-time programs, particularly 
the Kennedy-St. Paul program. 22 Raymond noted that students 
in the shared-time program met the same graduation 
requirements as the regular public high school student, were 
able to receive the support services available in the 
public school, and were placed in a homeroom at both 
schools. 23 The grading system in both schools was the 
same, but grade reports were originally sent out at 
different times. Problems arose the first year with the 
18Raymond, Loe.cit., p.22. 
1 ?Ibid., p.23. 
20 Ibid., p.22. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid .• p.24-25. 
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timing of grade reports. so it became necessary for St. 
Paul/s to adjust their marking periods to conform with those 
of Kennedy. Grades received by the shared-time students 
at St. Paul were transferred to Kennedy. except for 
religion. and entered as transferred credits on the 
students/ permanent record cards. Students who failed 
English or social studies were required to make up the 
fai iures during summer school . 2 ·" 
Another aspect of the Kennedy-St.Paul program was the 
discussion of serious discipline problems. Serious 
discipline problems were discussed informally between the 
staffs of the two schools. There were no official exchanges 
of information except when a student was suspended from 
Kennedy he was also suspended from St. Paul/s. The reverse 
procedure was not true because St. Paul/s did not use 
suspension as a disciplinary technique. 2 e As noted earlier. 
shared-time students were subject to the same rules as 
ful 1-time Kennedy students and were al lowed to participa:t.e 
in extra-curricular programs at both schools. However. 
there was one additional rule for shared-time students. 
They were prohibited from wearing any identification from 
St. Paul"s. 26 
24 Ibid .• p.26-27. 
:2!5Ibid:. p.28. 
2
""' Ibid. • p. 30 . 
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SHARED-TIME PROGRAM ADDS TWO SCHOOLS 
On 29 April 1965, when Superintendent Willis was asking 
for acceptance of the final guidelines on the Kennedy-St. 
Paul ·s program, he also requested that the Board approve a 
second shared-time program involving William Howard Taft 
High School and Luther High School North. In the original 
proposal it was mentioned that other school groups would be 
invited to participate in the experimental program and one 
group, the Lutheran Council of Greater Chicago, decided to 
ask to be considered as a participant. 27 
The proposal submitted by Luther North suggested that 
approximately thirty freshmen take social studies and 
religion at their campus and the remainder of their classes 
at Taft High School. The proposal for participation ln the 
shared-time program was developed by the Chicago Lutheran 
Shared-Time Education Committee. This organization was 
formed by representatives of the American Lutheran Church, 
the Lutheran Church in America, and the Lutheran 
Church-Missouri Synod in 1964 to "make it possible for 
public school students to be enrolled for certain courses in 
a non-public school . 2 e 
The Taft-Luther North program was to start in 
27Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 29 April 
1965, Chicago, Il ., p.2488-89. 
29Raymond, Loe.cit., p.31, citing U.S. Department of Helath, 
Education, and Welfare, Office of Education, Bureau of 
Research, Some Effects of Dual Enrollment Upon Students 
Enrol led in the Shared-Time Program, July, 1967. p.1. 
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September,1965, but scheduling difficulties delayed the 
program until September, 1966. The students who were to 
begin the program as freshmen in 1965 were selected to 
participate as sophomores in 1966. In comparison to the 
Kennedy-St. Paul program, the Taft-Luther North program was 
considerably smaller. The fourteen students who 
participated did so for only two years. 
The major difference between the Kennedy-St.Paul and 
Taft-Luther North was that the students at Kennedy were 
recruited for the program before they entered high school 
and they entered the two high schools simultaneously. In 
the Taft-Luther North program, the students were already 
ful I-time public school students who agreed to partic.ipate 
in an experimental program in which they would take one of 
their major subjects at a nonpublic school along with 
religious instruction. 29 
Another difference in the Taft-Luther North program was 
the proximity of the schools. Because Luther North is some 
distance from Taft, it became necessary for the fourteen 
shared-time students to have their classes at Our Savior 
Elementary School, a Lutheran school much closer to Taft 
High School. Two teachers from Luther North taught the 
fourteen sophomores religion and social studies in one 
classroom at the elementary school. These fourteen students 
29Raymond, Joe.cit., p.32. 
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continued In the program during their Junior year. 30 
The shared-time students took Modern World History 
during the first year and Contemporary American History 
during the second year. The course of study in these 
programs was reviewed by the Taft social studies department 
chairman. At Taft, these shared-time students were placed 
in classes in the same manner as all public school students. 
These students would take a full day/s program minus one 
major subject (social studies). The transfer of credit for 
classes taken from Luther North were carried out in the same 
manner as at Kennedy-St.Paul. An unique aspect of the 
Taft-Luther North program was that the shared-time students 
were transported from Our Savior Elementary School to Taft 
High School on a bus provided by the Chicago Lutheran 
Shared-Time Committee. 31 
The third parochial school that contacted the 
Superintendent and asked to participate in the shared-time 
program was the Chicago Jewish Academy (now cal led the Ida 
Crown Jewish Academy). The Girl/s High School Branch of the 
Academy had moved into temporary quarters near Von Steuben 
High School . 32 In August 1965, the Academy requested that 
eighteen girls be allowed to take some courses at Von 
Steuben which were not available at their school. The 
proposal was given tentative approval and guidelines for 
301Q.LQ,. p.33. 
:31 Th;,..., 36 ~·· p .• 
32 Ibid., p.36. 
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participation were establlshed.~ 8 
The Chicago Jewish Academy program differed from the 
other shared-time programs in some ways. Unlike the two 
other shared-time programs where the students were actually 
enro1 led in the public school for most of the day, the girls 
from the Jewish Academy attended Von Steuben for only one or 
two classes. These shared-time students/ records were kept 
at the parochial school rather than the public school. The 
credits earned at Von Steuben were transmitted to the 
Chicago Jewish Academy and were used toward meeting 
graduation requirements. Student attendance records were 
also maintained at the parochial school with daily reports 
forwarded from the public school . 34 
The Von Steuben-Chicago Jewish Academy program actually 
began two days before it was formally approved by the Board 
of Education. The Board stipulated, as it had done before 
in the other shared-time agreements, that students 
participating in the program must live in the attendance 
area of the public school they would attend. The students, 
with signed parental approval, were to be programmed into 
classes in chemistry, shorthand, and typing. The parents 
of the girls objected to the coeducational nature of 
instruction in the chemistry class and the Jewish Academy 
requested that the girls be withdrawn from that class. The 
33.I..bl.Q.' p.38. 
34.l.b..Ld. 
girls did remain in the typing and shorthand classes for two 
years. ·35 
The Von Steuben-Jewish Academy shared-time program did 
not have official exchange of information concerning either 
the students or the curriculum. Student grades were sent to 
the parochial school which notified the student's parents of 
the student's work. 36 The contact between the shared-time 
student and the pub! ic school was minimal in this case 
because the majority of time spent in school was in the 
parochial school r3ther the public school. 
SHARED-TIME PROGRAM ENDS AT TWO SITES 
Two of the shared-time programs, Von Steuben and the 
Taft, were participants for only two years. Although the 
program at Von Steuben-Jewish Academy started at the same 
time that Kennedy-St. Paul began. its program ended in June 
1967. 37 One of the reasons for· the program's 1 ack of 
success at Von Steuben could have been the smal 1 number·qf 
participants from the Jewish Academy. There were only 
eighteen girls who participated in the program. The girls 
also participated in an atmosphere that was quite foreign to 
them. They had been attending school in the segregated 
setting of an all Jewish girls school. Their parents even 
requested that they not take class with males and this 
35.lltl..Q., p.39. 
36 .lQ.l_g. • p. 40. 
:"37' .l.b..l.Q. , p. 149. 
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request was honored even though it restricted the girls to 
only two classes. 
The Taft-Luther North program had a simi Jar problem in 
that only fourteen students decided to participate in the 
shared-time program. These students took part in the 
program and were even provided transportation to the public 
school after their shared-time classes ended. We must 
recal 1 that these students were already enrol led ful 1 time 
at Taft when the program began in September 1966. This 
program lasted two years also and was terminated in June 
1968.::: 8 
Administrators at Taft, Von Steuben, and the Chicago 
Jewish Academy noted that the biggest disadvantage of the 
shared-time program was the difficulty it presented in 
programming students for classes. They also noted that in 
order to have a successful program the student body must 
show an interest in the program and cooperate with it. 
These administrators did note that since the program was 
able to function wel I for two years, it ii lustrated both 
the feasibility and the possibility of more shared-time 
programs. All of the administrators interviewed about the 
program noted that they did not experience any serious 
difficulties in the operation of their programs and 
did not observe any harmful effects to their schools 
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or their students.~~ 
KENNEDY-ST. PAUL PROGRAM CONSIDERED SUCCESSFUL 
In Joan Raymond/s study, An Evaluation of the 
Exoeriment in Shared-Time, we can read a complete analysis 
of the academic achievements and extra-curricular 
participation of the graduates that attended the 
Kennedy-St.Paul program for four years. Raymond considered 
only students that attended Kennedy for four years. This 
included students that attended Kennedy only, students that 
participated in the shared-time program for some time but 
withdrew and became ful 1-time at Kennedy, and students that 
were enrolled ln the shared-time program for all four years. 
Raymond/s study considered achievement tests scores, subject 
taken in school, grades in all major subjects, grades in 
each major subject, grade point averages, class rank, post 
high school plans, ACT scores, attendance patterns, 
participation in extra-curricular activities, and service 
jobs at Kennedy High School . 40 On the basis of statistical 
analysis of the data related to the school performance of 
graduates who attended Kennedy High School for four years 
and those who attended Kennedy on a shared-time basis for 
four years, the fol lowing summary profile emerged. The 
39
.l.b..l..d •• p.147. 
40 Ibid., p.48-77. 
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shared-time graduates: 
- possessed, on the average, greater general ability 
- took more college preparatory courses 
- ceceived high grades 
- were in fewer honors classes 
- earned about the same grade point averages 
- had similar class ranks 
- were more college oriented 
- received about the same scores on the ACT 
- were absent less 
- participated in fewer extra-curricular activities 
- had fewer service Jobs at Kennedy 
- received fewer honors at Kennedy 
- were elected to fewer off ices at Kennedy. 41 
Raymond reminds us that it matters little if the 
program is administratively feasible and has no harmful 
effect on the students if there was an adverse reaction to 
it by those who were directly involved in its operation. 
In fact. the opinion of the participants might be the most 
crucial factor in the evaluation of the shared-time program. 
We must therefore, consider the reactions of the parents, 
students, teachers. and administrators who participated in 
the program. 42 
The opinions of the administrators involved in the 
shared-time program were favorable. The three programs 
involved six administrative teams, all having varied 
experiences with the program but al 1 noting a favorable 
reaction to the program with no indication of any serious 
difficulties in the shared-time operations. 43 
41 Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 25 June 
1969, Chicago, I I., p.3151. 
42Raymond, Loe.cit., p.156. 
4 
:::i Ibid. ; - p . 157. 
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The author of this dissertation had the opportunity to 
interview a former administrator of the St. Paul High 
School. Brother Konrad Diebold, F.S.C., is now the 
president of St. Patrick High School on the northwest side 
of the city. Brother Konrad served as both a teacher 
C1966-69) and principal (1970-74) at St. Paul/s. He felt 
that the program was indeed a success. He noted that 
administrators and staff at both schools worked hard to 
make the program succeed. The enthusiasm of the students 
and the concern of their parents fostered the growth of the 
program. 44 
Brother Konrad related that although there was apparent 
support from the Board of Education/s central off ice. most 
of the management decisions regarding the two schools were 
made locally by the principals involved. He noted the 
problems of scheduling classes and adopting a common school 
calendar were settled locally. He felt that the reason that 
St. Paul was able to remain open for twelve years was the 
fact that the shared-time progra~ was functioning wel 1 and 
allowed the non-public school to operate on a minimum 
budget. 4~ The shared-time program ended in 1977 when St. 
Paul's made what their administration refers to as an 
educational rather financial decision. Brother Konrad noted 
that the opening of Curie High School in 1975 significantly 
44Personal interview with Brother Konrad Diebold, F.S.C., 
Chicago, II .• 27 February 1991. 
4 ~Ibid. 
226 
students. We must recall that the Board of Education 
limited participation in the shared-time program to those 
students who iived the Kennedy High School attendance area. 
With the opening of Curie, the Kennedy attendance area was 
cut in half. Since the area from which St. Paul could 
recruit potential students was cut in half also, their 
incoming student population was greatly decreased. Since 
less students meant wider varience in student abilities 
within each class. the administration of St. Paul decided it 
would be better to close than to operate a program that did 
not meet the needs of each individual student. 46 
The parents and students who participated for four 
years in the Kennedy- St.Paul program also reacted favorably 
to it. Some parents had minor complaints while other 
parents viewed the same issues as pluses <e.g. homework). 
The biggest problems indicated -were that the school day was 
too long and that there were conflicts in some students· 
extra-curricular activities. Most parents did note that 
they would recommend the shared-time program to friends and 
relatives. 47 
The teachers assigned to Kennedy were in general 
agreement that the shared-time program did not create 
46 Ibid. 
47Raymond, Loe.cit., p.157. 
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additional work or problems for them. Moreover, they did 
not observe any harmful effects either to the school or to 
the students because of the shared-time program. 48 
In summary, Raymond noted that from the point of view 
of the Chicago publ le schools, the shared-time programs were 
administratively feasible and not detrimental to the program 
of education in the publ le schools. Raymond recommended to 
Superintendent Redmond d.nd the Board uf Education that the 
shared-time program at Kennedy-St. Paul continue as long as 
St. Paul authorities concur. She recommended that the Board 
consider additional programs with other non-public schools. 
These recommendations were accepted by the Board of 
Education with a 10-0 vote. 4 ~ 
Redmond noted in an interview that he continued the 
program which was in place when his superintendency began 
but that his participation In the program was minimal. He 
felt that although he was a Catholic, he had a hard time 
developing a philosophical argument for shared-time but that 
he also found it hard to argue with parents who wanted to 
try shared-time for their children. He supported the 
parents in thei~ desire for continuing the program and noted 
that part of his support was due to the legal opinions that 
supported the program.~0 
"'
19 Ibid. , p. 158. 
49Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 25 June 
1969, Chicago, Il .• p.3152. 
~ 0 Redmond interview. Joe.cit. 
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Redmond ref erred to the Raymond study of the 
shared-time program as a very accurate report of the 
shared-time program and as the basis for his recommendation 
that the shared-time program continue as a result of the 
success of the experimental program. 51 Further inquiries 
into the possibility of expanding the shared-time program 
were received by the Board during Redmond/s superintendency 
but none of the inquiries resulted in the establishment of 
new programs. Inquiries from Brother Rice and Quigley South 
High Schools were received as wel 1 as from some parochial 
elementary schools. 
Although this issue was not critical, it showed 
the wi 11 ingness of Superintendent Redmond to carry on 
experimental programs that seemed to be working. He also 
made it clear that he was supportive of new programs if 
parents wanted them. 
We have discussed four challenges that Redmond dealt 
with while in office. Now we wil 1 take a brief look at 
James F. Redmond/s administrative style as he perceived it 
and as he was perceived by others. 
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CHAPTER VII 
AN ASSESSMENT OF REDMOND'S LEADERSHIP 
James F. Redmond served as General Superintendent of 
the Chicago Public Schools for almost nine ful 1 years. from 
October 1966 unti I September 1975. His tenure as 
Superintendent brought the school system through some of the 
most complex problems that it had seen before or since. He 
has been complimented and criticized for the programs and 
the plans that he implemented during his superintendency. 
This chapter wi 11 discuss what others thought of Redmond as 
a leader and wil 1 try to give an idea of what Redmond 
thought of his own leadership. Some of the comments were 
made after Redmond notified the Board of his intention to 
retire in 1975. We will also discuss how Redmond measures 
up to the functions of a school leader as defined by 
Redmond's friend and mentor Herold Hunt. 
We must recal I that Redmond succeeded Benjamin Willis 
who at first had support from the Board and the community. 
In his later years, Wi 1 lis alienated several communities and 
had some staff members worried about whether they would be 
the next to feel the superintendent's wrath. Redmohd 
arrived with a reputation of being a "conciliator." He 
welcomed input from community groups on both sides of any 
issue. ·HI·s "fatherly" Image gave people the Idea that he 
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wanted to hear their side of an issue and that he would help 
them solve their problem. This public image of Redmond was 
generally reinforced by those who worked for and with him. 
In a article ln the Chicago Tribune Sunday Magazine, 
Ridgely Hunt noted that after only a year, Redmond "wi 1 I get 
his way a lot of the time, and get it so gently, so 
persuasively, that those through whom he works may not even 
know who brought the miracles to pass. He is not greatly 
concerned with grabbing al I the praise so long as the job 
gets done. He must rely on other people and It does no harm 
to let them take the credlt. 111 
Redmond was able to fulfil 1 his first contract without 
much criticism. The time frame of the contract (1966-70) 
was filled with each of the challenges mentioned In this 
dissertation. His second four-year contract was approved by 
the Board of Education on 25 March 1970 by a vote of 10-0. 2 
Later in the year, the Board again voted to renew Redmond/s 
contract and again he received a 10-0 vote, including the 
vote of new board member Gerald Sbarboro. 3 
The first public criticism of Redmond from the Board of 
Education came at a Board meeting on 28 July 1971. Mrs. 
William Rohter, a newly appointed Board member, addressed 
1 Ridgely Hunt, "The Concilator," Chicago Tribune Sunday 
Magazine, 3 September 1967, sec.7, p.19. 
2 Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 25 March 
1970, Chicago, Il ., p.3224. 
3 Mlnutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 26 August 
1970, Chi cage, I 1 • , p. 348. 
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herself to Redmond at the meeting and stated that she felt 
there had been an erosion of discipline within the schools. 
She criticized Redmond saying: 
: feel that you do not know what is going on in 
the schools. Not that you're not concerned. but that 
you have over a perlod of time insulated and isolated 
yourself from our problems. Perhaps you have relied 
too much on your staff. when you ~:ght better have 
served our schools by replacing some of them. I do ~o~ 
overlook the fact that you inherited many of these 
problems. but that was some years ago. In my judgement 
not enough effort has been directed to correcting these 
i 1 ls and preventing others, from developing. Rather. 
the action has been to Justify and defend. 
Dr. Redmond. it is my considered opinion that this 
system needs a thorough shake-up from the top down, 
that will clear it up and clean It out and make it 
work. Only you can do that. I ask, even plead with 
you, to stop talking about accountabi llty and start 
demanding it from those next to you, those under them. 
and the way down the line. 4 
After this verbal attack, the usually quiet Redmond was 
noticeably upset but did not react unti I the next Board 
meeting on 11 August 1971. At the meeting Dr. Redmond 
presented the fol lowing statement <in part): 
I have re-read your statement carefully since the Soard 
meeting of July 28, 1971 and repeat my comment on the 
floor of the Board that it is my bel lef that your 
comments were wel I motivated. However, they are 
subjective and very general in nature, and therefore 
difficult to answer specifically. It is difficult to 
speak of specifics when we are not aware of the 
specifics referred to. I trust that you wi 11 
understand that generalizations offer little guidance 
to the General Superintendent. Specifics wil I be 
Investigated, and answered whenever submitted to me . 
... Decentralization, however has been a traumatic 
change in Chicago. It demands a complete rethinking of 
4 Minutes of the Board of Education Meeting, 28 July 1971, 
Chicago, Il., p.211. 
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roles for everyone on the staff and for the members of 
the Board of Education. We must remember that it is a 
great deal to expect an immediate change of attitude on 
the part of people steeped in the concept of central 
off ice control . 
. . . So long as al 1 decisions emanate from the General 
Superintendent of Schools, centralization is in effect, 
and paper structure to the contrary changes nothing. 
This I do not intend to let happen. The Deputy 
Superintendent and the three Area Associate 
Superintendents and the field staffs have been given 
authority and responsibi Jity to look at the 
communities, the schools, the teachers, the children, 
and to evaluate and assess needs of these groups ... 
I expect the Deputy, the area associates, the district 
superintendents, and the principals to grow in 
confidence as each makes decisions and witnesses 
education coming alive for al I the children in the 
schools. Leadership cannot be fostered or developed if 
decisions are being questioned constantly ... 
... I do believe that as you travel across this city, 
you wil 1 find leadership in schools where it never 
existed before ... 
To resolve problems, Mrs. Rohter, you suggest that I 
make sweeping changes of staff. Yet, when they were 
appointed these administrators met criteria essential 
for appointment; they have responded to what they were 
told at the time of appointment; and if the rules are 
changing, they must also be told and they must be 
helped in the changing ... ~ 
Redmond/s response indicated that he was concerned that Mrs. 
Rohter did not truly understand his administrative style and 
how it coalesced with the idea of decentralization. He 
noted that he felt it was essential for his subordinates to 
realize that they could be decision makers. He defended his 
subordinates and reminded Mrs. Rohter that he realized there 
were some problems but he also noted growth and a new 
~Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 11 August 
1971, Chicago, Il ., p.276-77. 
233 
willingness to make decisions and develop programs. 
Redmond 1 s wi 1 lingness to defend his subordinates was an 
indication of his leadership ability and of loyalty to them. 
The relationship between Redmond and Mrs. Rohter never 
changed during his tenure as Superintendent. In an 
interview with Redmond, he noted that he had great 
difficulty with her and felt that she had her own personal 
agenda for the Board of Education.~ 
Most of the commentary on the leadership ability of 
Redmond came either at the time of his tenure as Acting 
Superintendent or after he removed his name from the list of 
candidates for the Superintendency in August 1975. Redmond 
received- a one-year appointment as Acting Superintendent on 
22 May 1974 by a vote of 7-2. It was apparent that Redmond 
had lost some of his support on the Board. There was 
speculation in the papers that Black Board members would not 
vote to retain Redmond for another four years. 7 After the 
22 May meeting, Board member Mrs. W. Lydon Wild, a Redmond 
supporter, said, "The superintendent has done as well, if 
not better, than any man could. I believed in him then and 
I believe in him now and I would include him in the search 
for the new superintendent." 9 
On 12 October 1974, Redmond received a vote of 
0 Redmond interview, Loe.cit. 
7 Connie Lauerman, "Redmond Elected for One More Year," 
Chicago Tribune, 23 May 1974, p.1. 
8.lQl.9, 
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confidence from one of his yearly adversaries, Robert 
Healey. Healey, who said he was speaking as an individual 
not as a Union representative, praised Redmond for his 
success in developing a balanced budget in the last two 
years and for various educational programs. Healey 
~entioned the child parent centers, the Disney Magnet School 
and the READ program at Goudy as positive examples of 
Redmond/s administration. Healey said, "if he takes the 
blame for the bad, he should take credit for the good." 9 
Red~ond removed himself from consideration for the four 
year term as Superintendent on 25 April 1975. He announced 
his intentions at a press conference during which he took an 
unprecedented stance against the Board. Redmond said: 
Despite the efforts of several sincere and dedicated 
members, I feel the present board membership is not 
compatible and not able to work together for the 
improvement of the schools. The constant bickering by 
the board membership among themselves, the personal 
attacks by some of the board members on members of my 
staff, the intrusion of some members of the board into 
administrative prerogatives of the staff at the school, 
district, area, and central office levels; the 
continuing refusal of some the board members to 
confine their activities to policy matters, despite the 
pleas and protestations of some few of the board 
members, all of these have led me to my decision. 10 
After hearing of Redmond/s decision, Mayor Richard J. Daley 
commented, "All the city of Chicago should be grateful for 
what Redmond did in seven dissentious and contentious years . 
.... Casey Banas, "Redmond Should Be Retained: Healey," Chicago 
Tribune, 12 October 1974, p.3. 
u:icasey Banas, "Redmond Angered; Bows Out," Chicago Tribune, 
26 Apr i r · 1975 , p . 2 . 
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After the history of the Board of Education is reviewed, I 
think he will go down as a great supecintendent. 1111 Board 
P['esident John D. Carey said, "I am saddened by his 
decision, although I can understand his feeling. 111 2 
In his iast speech as superintendent, Redmond addressed 
the delegates of the Chicago Region Parent Teachers 
Association, his stauch ally over his nine year tenure. 
Redmond acknowledged his strong working relationship with 
the PTA du['ing his tenure. PTA President Doris Leftakes 
presented Redmond with an honorary lifetime PTA membership, 
and praised him foe "the long, hard hours of work that you 
have contributed on behalf of our youngstecs. 1113 Leftakes 
then noted Redmond/s accomplishments including his 
legislative program, pub! ishing of the reading scores, the 
intensive reading program, and building rehabilitation 
programs. She continued saying that he made the schools 
more accessible foe parents and made great strides in 
relation to teacher salaries. 14 
The strained feelings between Redmond and the Board 
were apparent during his last Board meeting as 
Superintendent on 28 May 1975. Redmond did not say a word 
at the meeting which included a communication from the 
Chicago Federation of Labor that thanked Redmond for his 
1 
·
1 Ibid. 
t :2 Thl.Q. 
1
'
3 Casey Banas, "Schools /Alive and Vital,/ Says Redmond," 
Chicago Tribune, 28 May 1975, sec.3, p.3. 
14 Ibid. 
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support and participation in co! lective bargaining with the 
various labor groups ~epresenting empioyees of the Board of 
Education. This Board meeting concluded with President 
Carey thanking Redmond publicly for al 1 that he had done 
for the children of Chicago. A resolution was immediately 
passed that reflected these same feelings from the entire 
Board. There was a brief standing ovation for the outgoing 
Superintendent and then a quick adJournment. 1 ~ 
In an interview with Dr. Manford Byrd. former 
Superintendent of Schools in Chicago and Deputy 
Superintendent under Redmond, the topic of Redmond/s 
leadership was discussed. Byrd noted that one of the 
characteristics that he most admired in Redmond was his 
integrity. Byrd said, "He was probably one of the most 
ethical persons I have ever known. He would not sacrifice 
others when pressures were great on him. He would never 
scapegoat staff to save his neck." 1 ' 
Byrd said that Redmond would delegate certain tasks .to 
his staff, and once delegated he would try to keep himself 
clear of the task so that the staff member would feel that 
he had control of his own situation. Redmond had great 
confidence in his staff and would be very supportive of them 
even in the face of criticism from Board members. Byrd felt 
1 ~Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 28 May 
1975, Chicago, Il ., p.2355. 
1
•Personal interview with Dr. Manford Byrd, Jr., Chicago, Il ., 
13 December 1989. 
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that Redmond helped many staff members deveiop into leaders 
by giving them tasks and the free reign to fol low the task 
through fruition. 
Byrd noted that his successes as Deputy Superintendent 
and later General Superintendent were due in large part to 
the empowerment that Redmond gave him. He felt that Redmond 
wanted to develop leaders and was the person who helped hlm 
understand what it meant to be a leader. When asked lf he 
saw any weakness in Redmond, Byrd replied that "if he had 
one it was that he tolerated staff longer that he had to. 
He did not like to give up on people, he felt that they 
could be reached. 1117 
When asked to define his own style of leadership, 
Redmond said that he felt that "if I think enough of a guy 
to recommend his appointment to a position of importance 
then I/m convinced that he is able to do the job and I want 
him to get it done. I don/t believe in second guessing my 
subordinates but I would step in if I saw disaster 
coming. 1118 He wanted to give people the chance to prove 
themselves and was not concerned with minor errors. 
Redmond felt that it was the responsiblity of the 
leader, whether he is a superintendent or a principal, to 
create an atmosphere for the enterprise to work. The 
leader must make available the tools that his subordinates 
17 Ibid. 
18Redmond interview, Loe.cit. 
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need to do their job. He said that a leader must be a 
dreamer as wel 1. He must be able to seek alternate 
solutions to problems that he encounters. He has to be able 
to make long term plans. 1 • 
As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, Redmond 
considered his friend and former boss, Herold Hunt, as his 
mentor. Referring to Herold Hunt 1 s eight functions of 
adminstrative responsibility listed in chapter one, we will 
now analyze Redmond's leadership abilities in relation to 
Hunt/s criteria. The first criterion, the cooperative 
development of a program that is custom made for a 
community, was exemplified by both the "Redmond Plan" for 
the desegregation of the schools, and by the development of 
district and local school advisory councils. The second 
criterion, organization of an administrative framework to 
implement and facilitate the program, was achieved through 
the implementation of the Boaz. Allen. and Hamilton Report 
which decentralized the school system and gave more decision 
making capabilities to district superintendents. The third 
criterion, serving as an adviser and executive officer to 
the board of education, was also achieved through the Boaz. 
Allen. and Hamilton Report which created the role of the 
Deputy Superintendent <as chief operating off iccer) and gave 
the Superintendent (chief administrative officer) time to 
develop educational, financial, and facility plans for board 
review and approval. The fourth criterion. providing a 
democratic leadership of school personnel. was also achieved 
through the administrative decentralization of the system. 
The fifth criterion, observation of legal educational and 
administrative requirements, was exemplified in the efforts 
that the Redmond administration showed in trying to comply 
with the federal government's order to desegrate the 
schools. During teacher negotiations, Redmond also tried to 
defend the right of the Board of Examiners to establish 
criterion for teacher certification. He warned both the 
Union and Board members that they could not legally 
negotiate changes in certification procedures. He insisted 
that changes had to be approved by the Board of Examiners. 
The sixth criterion called for the development of working 
relationships with home and community agencies. The 
guide! ines for the composition of district and local school 
councils required the inclusion of parents, community 
members, and local community workers on the councils. The 
seventh criterion, adequate instruction and guidance in 
American citizenship, has always been a stated goal of the 
Chicago public school system and the Redmond administration 
embraced this goal. The final criterion, providing a 
healthful, humanized, and satisfying Jiving for pupils and 
teachers, was strived for through negotiations with the 
Teachers Union. Redmond supported many of the educational 
improve~ents suggested by the Union but he found it 
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difficult at times to reach a prioritization of needs with 
the Union. His remarks after the first negotiated contract 
showed that he was in favor of providing a equitable salary 
for his teachers. After reflecting on Hunt's functions of 
administrative responsibility, we can see that according to 
hls criteria, James F. Redmond showed the qualities of a 
good administrator and leader. 
Finally, we wil I try to assess Redmond as a leader 
using three leadership theories. First, we wi 11 use Robert 
Tannebaum and Warren Schmidt·· s "Conti nu um of Leader 
Behavior." Tannebaum and Schmidt describe "forces" a 
leader should consider when deciding how to manage. 20 
Al thought other theorist would place these forces into the 
category "situational," Tannebaum and Schmidt cal led them 
"forces in the manager," "forces in the subordinates," and 
"forces in the situation. 1121 We would evaluate Redmond as a 
"Relationships-Oriented Leader" who wanted to permit his 
subordinates as much freedom as possible. He expressed 
great confidence in their abilities. He assured those who 
had held positions of authority under Willis that he would 
not remove them if they were performing their duties 
appropriately. He would be considered a democratic leader 
as opposed to an authoritarian leader. Although he was a 
20 Stuart C. Smith, Jo Ann Mazzarella, and Phi I ip K. Plele, 
School Leadership- Handbook for Survival, <Eugene, Oregon: 
Clearinghouse on Educational Management, 1981), p.66. 
2 1 lb.l.Q. • p • 67 • 
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democratic leader, he also noted that ultimately he was the 
one who would be accountable to the Board in case of errors. 
Secondly, we will consider Redmond/s leadership style 
using the Hersey and Blanchard/s situational leadership 
model. 2 =-' Using this model, we find that Redmond fell into 
the second quadrant which indicated a high task and high 
relationship style of leadership. Redmond shared many of 
his duties. a mark of a good administrator. He not only 
shared tasks but gave his subordinates the authority to 
carry out the tasks. We see that Redmond did exactly what 
Hersey and Blanchard said a leader of this type would do. 
As his subordinates matured in their positions, Redmond 
would decrease task behavior and increase relationship 
behavior unti 1 the subordinate reached a moderate level of 
maturity. As the subordinate reached above average maturity 
in his position, Redmond decreased both task behavior and 
relationship behavior. The su~ordlnate was given power to 
make his own decisions. 
Finally, if we were to place Redmond on Blake and 
Mouton's "Managerial Grid", we would find him in the 9.9 
Management area. :z~ Redmond had a high concern for his 
staff. He wanted them to feel ownership in his organization 
and encouraged them to offer their own opinion. He fostered 
22Paul Hersey and Kenneth Blanchard, Management of 
Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources, 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hal 1, Inc.,1976). 
23Robert Blake and Jane Mouton, The Managerial Grid, (Houston, 
Texas: Gulf Pub! lshing Company, 1964). 
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a belief in the idea of providing the best possible 
education for the children of Chicago. He would appoint 
people whom he felt were committed to the schools. He 
wanted to build a leadership atmosphere of mutual trust and 
respect with the common goal a better educational system for 
Chicago. He tried to assure those who held power before he 
assumed the superintendency that he was not interested in 
replacing them, but wanted them to continue to contribute 
and support his efforts. He did not "clean out the cabinet" 
when he arrived but asked those in influential postions to 
continue to support his efforts for the schools. 
In considering the assessment of Redmond/s leadership, 
whether we choose the assessment of his subordinates, his 
adversary, leadership theorists, or Redmond himself, we must 
conclude that he was in fact, a leader. His quiet demeanor 
was only part of the make up the man who ably led the 
Chicago public schools for nine years. He received the 
support of his subordinates by giving them the opportunity 
to make decisions and providing them with support in their 
decisions. The effects of his leadership remain with the 
school system. Programs and ideas first discussed during 
his administration were carried out by future superintendents. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
James F. Redmond assumed the superintendency of the 
Chicago public school system in October 1966. He was 
selected for the position because he offered the Board of 
Education both a new type of leadership and a familiarity 
with the Chicago public school system. The Board of 
Education and community leaders had tired of the abrasive 
and dictatorial style of Benjamin Wil !is. James F. Redmond 
brought to the Board a quite different personality. He was 
known as a calm and democratic leader. Upon his arrival 
Redmond was immediately involved in critical decision 
making. In his first six months as General Superintendent, 
he was required to negotiate the first collective bargaining 
agreement with the Chicago Teachers Union and prepare a 
response to the federal government/s demand to develop a 
plan to desegregate the schools. Within the first eighteen 
months he would be responsible for the decentralization of 
the school system. He had to manage all of these new 
responsiblities while at the same time assuring the citizens 
of the city that the current educational offerings, 
including programs like the shared-time experiments, 
would continue to meet the needs of their children. 
The purpose of this final chapter is to discuss how 
Redmond/s ideas and decisions have fared with the test of 
time. We wi 11 discuss his plan of action for each of the 
issues presented in this dissertation and how, over the 
fifteen years since Redmond left office, these plans 
have affected the Chicago school system. 
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The first issue discussed was the collective bargaining 
negotiations between the Board of Education and the Chicago 
Teachers Union. Redmond made it clear in the first 
negotiations that he was generally supportive of demands for 
a salary increase. Redmond negotiated nine contracts with 
the Union. During this period there were only three strikes 
and they accounted for twenty-two days of lost school time. 
In my interview with Redmond, he noted the growth in the 
abilities of the Board negotiators during his years as 
superintendent. He felt that a key to his success in 
negotiations was the development of a good bargaining 
team led by Guy Brunetti. He noted that his only regrets 
about the negotiation process was when the two sides were at 
an impasse and were forced to seek mediation from Mayor 
Daley/s off ice. Redmond said that he would rather 
compromise with the Union on an issue than go to the Mayor/s 
office, because once negotiations reached City Hall, he knew 
that his bargaining position had eroded. Redmond recognized 
that Mayor Daley depended upon being considered a friend of 
the unions and if negotiations reached the Mayor/s office, 
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the Mayor would tel 1 the Board members to give the Union 
what they wanted. Redmond/s attempts to keep the Board in a 
fiscally responsible position were continually thwarted when 
he was forced to create a large deficit because Board 
members were told to appease the Union. 
Redrnond/s experience in the Board/s negotiations 
reflect the conclusions he reached in his own dissertation. 
He advised school leaders to seek the support and input of 
teachers and develop within them a sense of power and 
responsibility. If teachers feel that they have power 
within the system, then they feel an ownership and are 
willing to share responsibility with the Board. Redmond 
warned school boards not to become fiscally dependent on 
other governmental bodies. Redmond knew the limited 
resources of the Board of Education and tried to maintain 
fiscal responsibi 1 ity. Nonetheless he was often left 
powerless because of the Mayor/s influence over Board of 
Education members. Eventually, the influence of city hall 
over the Board of Education lead to the financial col lapse 
of the Board and the resulting watchdog group called the 
School Finance Authority. 
The Recimond Plan <Increasing Desegregation of 
Faculties. Students. and Vocational Education Programs) was 
Redmond/s solution to end the segregated school system in 
Chicago. This plan recommended a new faculty assignment 
plan that would assign experienced teachers to schools 
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throughout the city. The plan also cal led for changes in 
school boundaries to lessen the burden of overcrowding. The 
ldea of open enrollment in vocational and technical high 
schools were further efforts to provide an integrated school 
system. Students of al 1 races were encouraged to take part 
in extracurricular activities such as the all-city band and 
chorus. 
Redmond/s recommendations were accepted in principle. 
He referred to the term "ln principle" as the Board saying, 
"It/s a good idea but it/snot politically reasonable to 
carry it out." 1 He said that Board members realized that 
the programs had to be educationally beneficial to all 
children and provide a way for the Board to show the federal 
government that we were trying to desegregate the school 
system. However, he also felt that they had been told that 
the plan could not be put into effect because it could 
threaten the political machine.· Many ethnic groups voiced 
their disapproval of integrated schools, and since these 
groups made up part of the political machine, their voices 
were heard. 
It seems that many aspects of the Redmond Plan were 
necessary in order to attempt to desegregate the schools. 
In the later 1970/s and 1980/s, many of the suggestions of 
the fl.fill were carried out by later administrations. The 
Consent Decree entered into by the Board of Education 
1 Redmond interview, Loe.cit. 
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restricted the teacher transfer policy of the Board of 
Education and assured that all school faculties would be 
integrated. This plan helped to keep some experienced 
teachers in schools where they could be used as a resource 
for new teachers. 
The Redmond Plan's concept of magnet schools was later 
expanded. The "Access to Excellence" and "Options for 
Knowledge" ptograms of later superintendents are basically 
the same programs as suggested in the Plan. 
One might reflect and wonder what changes would have 
taken place in the Chicago public schools if the Redmond 
Plan was accepted in fact rather- than "in principle." It is 
possible that the "white flight" that took place in the late 
1960's and 1970's could have been lessened. The cr-eation 
of specialized schools might have kept some parents from 
leaving the city in order to get a quality education for-
their- children. 
The Boaz. Allen. & Hamilton Repor-t which became the 
basis for the administr-ative decentr-alization of the Chicago 
Public Schools was fully supported by Supec-intendent 
Redmond. Redmond was pleased with the report because he 
shared many of the management consultants' ideas. He felt 
that the General Superintendent should be the chief 
administrative officer- and should be r-esponsible for 
developing the educational, financial, and facilities plans 
for Board r-eview. He should be the planner and the policy 
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implementer for the Board. The day-to-day operations of the 
schools would become the responsibi 1ity of the Deputy 
Superintendent. 
The Boaz. Al Jen. & Hamilton Report also suggested the 
creation of the office of Area Associate Superintendent. 
This new position would further decentralization because 
the new Associate Superintendents could make decisions 
previously made only in the central office. The Area 
Associate Superintendent administered the total spectrum of 
activities of the school system in his assigned area. 
The political decentralization of the Chicago public 
schools began when the Redmond administration created the 
district advisory council and later the local school 
counci I. Both of these groups were composed of parents and 
community members who were interested in creating a better 
district or school. The council members could advise the 
district superintendent or principal on matters regarding 
the school. 
Redmond/s ideas of administrative and political 
decentralization have continued through the years with a few 
changes. The position of Area Associate Superintendent has 
been eliminated, but the position of Deputy Superintendent 
remains and stil 1 functions in the same areas that were 
delegated to the position by Redmond/s reorganization plan. 
Until the recent school reform movement, local school 
councils continued to act as advisors to the principal. The 
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powers of the local school counci 1 were greatly increased in 
the recent school reform movement. Now the local school 
counci 1 has the power to make decisions. not just act as 
advisors. 
As stated earlier, the shared-time experiment was Just 
one example of programs that were already in existence when 
Redmond became General Superintendent. Redmond and his 
staff f~llowed the progress of the experiment and suggested 
that it continue on a limited basis after the four year 
trial period. The Kennedy-St. Paul program was quite 
successful and lasted for an additional eight years. The 
reason the program ended was not because of lack of 
interest. but because the area from which St. Paul could 
draw Its students was limited to the Kennedy attendance 
area. 
The idea of shared-time programs could again become a 
reality. Many states are discussing the possible use of an 
educational voucher system to give parents an opportunity to 
select the school which their child wil 1 attend. It 
would be reasonable to assume that shared-time schools 
similar to the Kennedy-St. Paul program could develop again 
and provide parents with an additional option for their 
child's education. 
James F. Redmond served as General Superintendent of 
the Chicago Public Schools for almost nine years. During 
his tenure In off ice there was a great deal of social 
change. Redmond was able to assume the leadership of a 
troubled school system and provide a stable atmosphere 
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unti 1 the last year of his tenure. Redmond met the four 
challenges discussed in this dissertation and many other 
cha! lenges as we! 1. He provided effective leadership to the 
school system and helped nurture future leaders of the 
system. I believe the school system would be better today 
if he would have had the power to carry out his proposed 
programs. 
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CONTROLLER 
BUDGET 
DAT A PROCESSING 
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ACCOUNTING 
AUDITING 
PAYROLLS 
ASSOCIATE 
SUPERINTENDENT 
OPERATION SERVICES 
PURCHASING 
ARCHITECTURE 
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BOARD OF EXAMINERS 
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I 
LAW 
Pr•pare contracts, bonda, 
lea1e1 ond other legal 
.. ocumenta 
Furni1h legal opinions on 
school system matters 
Appear for the board in 
legal proceedings 
Perform oth•r legal 1er-
vic•1 prescribed by the 
board 
BOARD OF 
EDUCATION 
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Fig. 3a 
(Source: Organizational Study) 
(Booz, Allen, & Hamilton) 
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facilities plona with 
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GENERAL 
SUPERINTENDENT 
Supervise ond provide guidance for the operation of 
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eatablhhed by the board 
R•commend plona orui boa ic guide lines for th• 
operation of the 1chool 1ystem 
Recommend long-range financial, focilitiea and 
educotionoi programs 
Recommend attendance units 
Recommend opuoting and capitol budgets 
Recommend approval of operating and capitol 
••p•nditures 
Recommend appointment, transfer and reassignment 
of perao"nel reporting to the general auperintendent 
and to the deputy superintendent 
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general SLtperintendent's staff directora 
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I 
OPERATIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Evaluate effectivene1s of 
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DEPUTY 
SUPERINTENDENT 
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principals, 011htont principals, director• of field 
:~~f!rt~:':~~~~~ 51a:~a:t~f:~;:::• of the ileput)' 
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL SUPERINTENDENT 
I 
COMMUNITY 
RELATIONS 
Coordinate public relations 
programs 
Provide counsel to Held 
units on particular public 
relations problems 
Advise 9enerol superin-
tendent on governmental 
and communit)' iuuea 
Coordinate school svatem 
le9i1 lative programs 
I 
HUMAN 
RELATIONS 
Recommend humon re1o-
tiona and integration pro-
grams for the school 
system 
Provide counsel to field 
units on particular humon 
relotiona and ·integration 
problems 
Aucfit the effectiveness 
of human relations ond 
integration programs 
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tionol level of individvol unit1 
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to field per5onnel 
- Medical and nurse services 
- Psychological services 
- Guidance 
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Conduct testing programs 
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Provide pupi I transportation 
services 
Coordinate city-wide 
recreation programs 
Coordinate special educa-
tion programs throughout 
the school system 
Operate social adjustment 
homes 
I 
ADULT 
EDUCATION 
Operate evening schools 
Conduct Americanization 
and basic adult education 
programs 
Direct programs under the 
manpower training and 
development act 
Direct neighborhood 
youth corps program 
Conduct urban youth pro-
grams 
I 
GOVERNMENT 
FUNDED 
PROGRAMS 
Coordinate contacts with 
governmental agencies 
Identify potential govern-
ment funded programs 
- Elementary and 
secondary education 
act 
- Manpower 
- Economic opportunity 
- Vocational education 
low 
- Other 
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Develop operating ond capitol budgets 
Recommend appointment. transfer and reassignment of 
di strict superintendents 1.1nd personnel reporting to 
the deputy superintendent 
Approve appointment, transfer and reassignment of 
principals, assistant principals, directors of field 
staff functions, and subordinates of the deputy 
superintendent's staff directors 
Establish administrative controls over school system 
expenditures 
Direct staff activities 
I I 
CURRICULUM PERSONNEL 
Provide curriculum guides 
- Basic subject areas 
- Vocational education 
- Pre-kindergarten 
education 
- Special education 
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- Art 
- Music 
- ROTC 
- Health, sex education 
and physical education 
- Safety 
Develop instructional 
media and moteria Is 
- Library 
- Audio-visual 
- Radio-TV 
Perform curriculum re-
search 
Coordinate activities 
of the curriculum 
council 
Develop personnel prac-
tices for the school system 
Conduct collective bar-
gaining negotiations 
Administer grievance 
procedures 
Recommend salary ad-
ministration procedures 
Administer employee 
benefit programs 
Coordinate practice 
teaching 
Recruit teachers 
Conduct management 
de.elopment programs 
Maintain civil service 
and teacher personnel 
records 
Provide office services 
for the school system 
ASSOCIATE 
SUPERINTENDENT 
{AREA) 
Administer the educational program of the area 
Evaluate and recommend attendance unit changes 
and construction of educational facilities 
Prepare operating and capitol budgets for opprovo I 
Recommend appointment, transfer and reassignment 
of principals, assistant principals and personnel 
reporting to the associate superintendent 
Approve appointment, transfer and reassignment of 
personnel reporting to area staff directors 
Control expenditures in accordance with the budget 
Supervise di'strict superintendents and area staff 
directors 
Establish operating procedures for the area 
I 
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
ANO DATA 
PROCESSING 
De •e lop do to processing 
systems and procedures 
Supervise data processing 
operations 
Analyze and develop 
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Control school system 
forms 
I 
ASSOCIATE 
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E \111111'1' I\' 
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PROPOSED ORGANIZATION PLAN 
(Deputy Superintendent) 
Fig. 3b 
(Source: Organizational Study) 
Bcoz, Allen, & Hamilton) 
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CONTROL 
Consolidate budgets 
Confl'of expenditures 
Report status of ex-
penditures against 
budget 
Perform general ac-
counting fun ct ions 
Audi' school system 
accounts 
Develop and recommend 
school system insurance 
plans 
Administer insurance 
plans not related to 
emplqyee benefits 
I 
OPERATION 
SERVICES 
Purchase materials( equip-
ment and services or the 
school system 
Prepare plans and speci-
fications for improve-
ment and rehabilitation 
projects 
Coordinate activities of 
outside architectural firm 
Provide functiona I direction 
to plant operations per-
sonnel in the field 
Maintain school facilities 
playgrounds, and equip-
ment 
Operate lunchroom facilities 
Manage income-producing 
and vacant properties 
owned by the Boord of 
Education 
NOTE: Level of boxes indicates reporting relationship 
only ••. not organizational level of individual 
units or positions 
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LEGEND: 
Level of boxes indicates reporting re-
lationship only ... not organizational 
level of individual units or positiOns 
Or9onizotion and composition of line 
and staff groups varies among areas 
depending upon educational requirements 
and programs administered within the 
oreo 
PUPIL PERSONNEL 
SERVICES AND 
SPECIAL 
EDUCATION 
AREA 
PROGRAMS 
Provide pupil personnel 
services to schools 
- Guidance services 
- Attendance services 
- Social work 
Ope rote summer schools 
Operate pre-school 
education programs 
Administer social center 
programs 
-. Nurse services 
- Psychological services 
- Speech therapy 
- Reading clinic programs 
Provide functional direc-
tion to special education 
programs administered in 
the area 
- Mentally handicapped 
- Physically handicapped 
- Socially maladjusted 
Supervise playground and 
stadium operations 
ASSOCIATE 
SUPERINTENDENT 
(AREA) 
Administer the educotionol program of the area 
Evaluate and recommend attendance unit changes 
and construction of educational facilities 
Prepare operoting ond capitol budgets lor opprovol 
Recommend appointment, transfer and reossignlftent 
of principals, assistant principals and personnel 
reporting to th• associate superintendent 
Approve appointment. transfer and reassignment of 
personnel reporting to oreo staff directors 
Control expenditures in ciccordonce with the budget 
Supervise district superintendents and area staff 
directors 
Establish operating procedures for the area 
I 
CURRICULUM 
SERVICES 
COMMUNITY ANO 
HUMAN RELATIONS 
Provide consultant services 
to schools 
- Basic subject areas 
- Vocational education 
- Art 
- Music 
- Health, sex education. 
and physical education 
Provide assistance to 
schools in the use of in-
structional medio and 
materials 
Provide in-service 
training for teachers 
Administer human re lotions 
and integration programs 
Administer public relations 
programs 
Elicit community opinion 
on school plans and 
operations 
Explain school policies, 
plans and operations to 
the community 
Supervise parent and 
human relations co-
ordinators based in the 
oreo office 
Provide functional 
direction to school 
community represento-
t i ve s and parent and 
human relations co-
ordinators based in 
schools 
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BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO 
PROPOSED ORGANIZATION PLAN 
(Associate Superintendent - Area) 
Fig. 3c 
(Source: Organizational Study) 
(Booz, Allen, & Hamilton) 
ADMINISTRATION 
Ad•inister substitute 
teacher poo I 
Develop and control area 
budgets 
Deyelop recommendations, 
coo~inated with Community 
and Humon Relations, lor 
attendance units and 
lacilities 
Coordinate odministrotive 
procedures in oreo 
PLANT OPERATIONS 
Supervise plant operoting 
personnel 
Coordinate maintenance 
work 
DISTRICT 
SUPERINTENDENT 
DISTRICT 
SUPE RINTENOE!"T 
DISTRICT 
SUPERINTENDENT 
DISTRICT 
SUPERINTENDENT DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENT 
DISTRICT 
SUPE RINTENOENT 
DISTRICT 
SUPERINTENDENT 
PRINCIPALS PRINCIPALS PRINCIPALS 
Administer the educational program of the district 
Propose operating and capitol budgets 
Reco.mm_end ossignme.nt of tea.che.rs an~ appoi~tm~nts 
of pnnctpols ond assistant pr1nc1pals 1n the d1Stt1ct 
Coordinate instructional programs among elementary 
and secondary schools in the district 
Supervise principals in the district 
Coordinate the use of orea staff services, in the 
district 
Administer community relations programs for the 
district 
PRINCIPALS PRINCIPALS PRINCIPALS PRINCIPALS 
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